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I examine international law in this thesis as a dialogical interplay between its jurisprudential 
use and its operation as a network. I define networks as a set of actors who are connected 
through a common purpose, be it secular, religious, commercial, political or economic. Rather 
than placing networks as something new and antithetical to our conventional understandings 
of international legal concepts such as territorial sovereignty, or understandings of the 
international as only a network of actors, an understanding of international law as a dialogical 
interplay highlights its nature as a relational process between webs of social actors and its 
static, territorially centered jurisprudence. This approach demonstrates that networks of social 
actors deploy, develop and benefit from conventional international legal jurisprudence as 
much as international law develops, and foregrounds itself, through the operation of networks. 
 
My formulation of international law is grounded in sociology of knowledge production 
with a leaning towards critical history to understand the context in which social actors operate. 
From the sociologically grounded analysis that I advance in this thesis, it becomes clear how 
the interplay between international law as network and as a particular body of territorially 
centered jurisprudence produces a kind of invisibility which hides the effect of the network 
operation. This effect of the network operating in tandem and through conventional 
jurisprudence takes violent forms through hegemonic governance over particularly human 
(economic, political, social and intellectual) life. This undercurrent of violence is 
characteristically silent and constantly evolving to direct and control individual and 
community lives, often taking both physical and non-physical forms. 
 
I explore the dialogical interplay and this violence through key historical moments in the 
development of doctrines of sovereignty and the separation between war and peace. I start my 
examination with the colonization of the New World by the Spanish Empire. Here we see the 
genesis of the dialogical interplay through the missionaries of the Holy Roman Church and 
the Spanish Empire. This is followed by the expansion of merchant networks of the Dutch 
East India Company and the British East India Company. In this era mercantile networks 
evolved into the imperial British State as a supra-national organization with a network of 
imperial state administrators. This evolution laid the ground for the League of Nations 
international expert networks. In the post-1945 era, this continued through 
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international financial institutions and the universal acceptance of the knowledge, for 
example, of the World Bank’s development discourse. Here, the expertise of international 
development came from within the state through local experts trained in the development 
discourse of international financial institutions. Finally, in the post-9/11 era, when network 
organization and technology have reached an unprecedented level, I show how the US Joint 
Special Operation Forces Network operates across territorial boundaries reminiscent of earlier 
network structures yet ushering a new era of imperialism. Its novelty is characterized by its 
contingency on technology to erase any spatio-temporal limitation – a feat not possible in 
previous forms of networks – so that it becomes an omnipresent techno- hegemony. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction: networks in international law and the 
problem of sovereignty 
 
 
So the first thing we did when I took over in late 2003 was realize that we needed to 
understand the problem much better. To do that, we had to become a network ourselves – 
to be connected across all parts of the battlefield, so that every time something occurred 







In an interview with Foreign Policy, US General McChrystal gave a triumphant explanation 
of why the Iraq Invasion was the perfect laboratory to hone a new kind of warfare i.e. Network 
Warfare. 
 
In 2003 the Joint Special Operation Forces was utilized for the first time to ‘counter’ the 
guerrilla tactics of Baathist insurgents within Iraq. In the broader context of the War on Terror, 
however, General McChrystal’s reference to the battlefield was not just Iraq – but wherever 
the ‘terrorist networks’ were located. As he explains in this interview, 
 
The network had a tremendous amount of geographical spread. At one point, we were in 
27 countries simultaneously. Inside Iraq, we were in 20 and 30 places simultaneously – all 





Gideon Rose, ‘Generation Kill: A Conversation with Stanley McChrystal’ (2013) 92 Foreign Affairs 2. 
2 
ibid 2. More literature on the Special Operation Forces has emerged since, mostly within the context of 
situating it as a new military ‘solution’ to terrorist networks see: Steven P Bucci ‘The Importance of Special 
Operations Forces Today and Going Forward’ in Heritage Foundation, 2016 Index of US Military Strength 
(Washington D.C, Heritage Foundation 2016). There are different numbers as to the number of countries where 
the Special Operation Forces Network is operating. The official number stands at 75 countries as of 2015. 
Investigative journalist Nick Turse, however, revealed a higher number at 134. Nick Turse cited in Jon Moran, 
‘Time to Move out of the Shadows: Special Operations Forces and Accountability in Counter-Terrorism and 
Counter-Insurgency Operations’ (2016) 39 University of New South Wales Law Journal 1239; Michael 
McAndrew, ‘Wrangling in the Shadows: The Use of United States Special Forces in Covert Military Operations 
in the War on Terror’ (2006) 29 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 153. 
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Considering its nature as a trans-boundary organization cutting across borders, connected 
socially and technologically, conducting military operations, Steve Niva astutely questions 
how ‘Network Warfare’ stands in relation to the principle of territorial sovereignty.3 
While the question in the context of the War on Terror is not a new one,4 taking principally 
the utilization of network organization as a form of military, covert operation force which 
bases its idea of ‘war’ as an ever-present, present everywhere, has not been looked at in as 
much detail. This becomes even less so, particularly when one considers the jurisprudential 
basis of territorial sovereignty, that every country has a right to its territorial integrity under 
the United Nations (UN) Charter, Article 2(4).5 
Yet General McChrystal also hints to something else in his interview with Foreign Policy, 
which points to phenomena broader than the Joint Special Operation Network. Specifically, 
the inspiration for Network Warfare comes from multinational companies and their approach 
to global supply chains as a way to increase efficiency, reduce costs and streamline the 
production process.6 
This is important to this thesis precisely because the question, or problem of network 
organizations, and their relation to fundamental principles of international law, in particular 
the idea of territorial sovereignty, is also not a new one entirely. In this thesis, my approach 
to the problem of networks and international law is to uncover and deconstruct how our 
fundamental, or static understanding of a territory-centric international law has co-existed 
alongside network forms of organization. 
 
My central argument is that international law as a body of knowledge has been produced 
and facilitated by trans-boundary social actors and institutions that I refer to as networks.7 I 
 
3 
Steve Niva, ‘Disappearing Violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s New Cartography of Networked Warfare’ 
(2013) 44(3) Security Dialogue 185. 
4 
See for example, Derek Gregory, ‘The Everywhere War’ (2011) 177(3) The Geographical Journal 238; 
Antony Anghie, ‘The War on Terror and Iraq in Historical Perspective’ (2005) 43 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 
45. 
5 
The only exception being of course Art 51 self-defence, hence within the context of War on Terror. These 
two articles and their development in relation to a ‘war without borders’ has been met with critical reception. 
See for example; Michael Byers, ‘Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law after 11 September’ 
(2002) 16 International Relations 155. 
6 
Rose (n 1). 
7 
Networks here are defined conceptually as a web of actors with a common aim whose organization is 
demarcated through clear ‘membership’ or inclusion/exclusion and who have goals (political, economic, 
religious) to which they are all committed, subject to those outside of the network. I expand the conceptual  
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define the relationship between the two, networks and international legal jurisprudence, as the 
dialogical interplay. As I show in this thesis, networks are not new or antithetical to 
international law but have historically operated relationally with a static and territorially 
centered understanding of international law. 
 
This understanding of international law’s operation demonstrates that networks of social 
actors deploy, develop and benefit from conventional jurisprudence. At the same time, the 
network of social actors grounds their operation both through the use of conventional 
jurisprudence and by actively facilitating the development of the doctrines. Thus, we can see 
international law’s development, specifically the doctrine of territorial sovereignty, 
inextricably linked to the social process of a network using, deploying and benefiting from 
jurisprudence. My thesis thus unveils the sociology of international legal knowledge 
production through the modality of the network. Here, international legal norms, i.e. 
specifically their foundational aspect of territorial sovereignty, are historically produced and 
developed by a social network of actors. 
 
I advance these ideas through an exploration of different forms of networks, i.e. religious 
(Holy Roman Church’s missionaries in chapter 2), secular (the Dutch and British East India 
Company merchant networks in chapter 3 and 4), bureaucratic (the British imperial officers 
in chapter 4), international administrative (the League of Nations Mandate officials in chapter 
5), and local technocratic, economic expert networks (the World Bank trained local experts 
in chapter 6). Throughout the history of international law, these networks I identify reproduce 
a particular kind of violence. This particular kind of violence which is part of the dialogical 
interplay is not encompassed within violence as understood within orthodox legal regimes of 
international law, such as international human rights law and international humanitarian law. 
 
This violence takes the form of hegemonic governance over individual and community 
life and its various aspects i.e. political, social, economic, intellectual. It is exhibited in 
different ways – both physical forceful harm and non-physical i.e. through the erasure of 
social, intellectual, spiritual life and economic pressure. A distinct feature of this violence is 
 
 
basis of my definition later in this chapter under the section conceptual framework and methodology. 
Throughout this thesis I generally use the plural, networks, as a descriptive phrase for the various forms of 
historical networks and singular network as a concept to describe the social process of actors using, deploying 
and benefitting from international law. 
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that it is constant, ever-present and experienced by those who are experiencing it in a totalizing 
power over their life and being. Thus it remains characteristically silent to direct and control 
individual and community lives. 
 
This approach to violence helps us to understand and disentangle how we imagine the 
violence of an everywhere war conducted by the US Special Operation Forces Network over 
the last 20 years. It also helps us conceptualize the violence of international law’s dialogical 
interplay in the sites, which I have identified above, that unveil the nature of violence as an 
undercurrent of power over human life. Violence, in this case, is understood in ways which 
are not ‘measurable’ i.e. an epistemicide which is intellectual and spiritual. In my concluding 
chapter, I return to this notion of violence of the dialogical interplay as a way in which we 
must also understand the plane at which we must find possibilities despite this violence of 
ordering humanity. I turn particularly to possibilities of decolonial knowledge but also an 
understanding of decolonality which would bring us to critically examine counter-hegemonic 
networks of knowledge. 
 
This chapter proceeds to explain the main question I answer in my thesis i.e. understanding 
the relationship between state sovereignty and networks. Primarily the following section looks 
at sociological approaches to answering this question present in current and past literature. I 
proceed then to explain my answer to the question of networks and state sovereignty within 
international law in the second section where I introduce in more detail the concept of the 
‘dialogical interplay’. After explaining my main hypothesis, I give an overview of conceptual 
understanding of network in this thesis, as well as my understanding of the violence of 
international law. Finally, I end the chapter with a short chapter outline of the thesis. 
 
I. State sovereignty and networks collide 
 
a. A sociological approach to international law 
 
 
In the orthodox analysis of the history of international law, what has been considered 
‘international’ and what is considered trans-boundary has been answered by differentiating 
the ‘international’ as distinct in jurisprudential terms from ‘trans-boundary’ forms of 
interaction. I am referring here to the difference drawn between matters of nation states 
representing a territorial ‘jurisdiction’ i.e. ‘public international’ as a legal subject as opposed 
to ‘private international’,8 which is relegated to commerce, trade, and transnational matters 
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beyond the territorial boundaries of one state. This distinction draws jurisdictional boundaries 
between matters of the state within its territory, and thus sovereignty, and matters which are 
of a ‘trans-boundary’ nature, i.e. those that are about interconnected issues such as commerce. 
Despite these neat jurisdictional and jurisprudential lines between ‘public’ and ‘private’, the 
distinction between public and private is often blurred either through the ‘actors’ themselves 
or the coalescing of public actions/private actions making this boundary between both 
unclear.9 
For instance, this can be seen through different international legal regimes which have 
complicated the difference between what is considered ‘public’ and ‘private’. Regimes which 
are in the orthodox sense understood within the purview of public international law are not 
limited to what would be considered a ‘public international’ jurisdictional boundary 
i.e. nation states. For example scholarship on international criminal law,10 international human 






For two orthodox accounts of this distinction particularly in relation to transnational regimes see: Antonio 
Cassese, ‘Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of Role Splitting (Dedoublement Fonctionnel) in International Law’ 
(1990) 1 European Journal International Law 210; Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in 
World Politics (Palgrave Macmillan 2012). For a critical account of this distinction as part of imperialism of 
state system through civilizational discourse see: Edward Keene, Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, 
Colonialism and Order in World Politics (CUP 2002). 
9 
Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Empire and International Law: The Real Spanish Contribution’ (2011) 61 University 
of Toronto Law Journal 1. For specifically a perspective of private corporate and commercial law and its 
intersection with public see: Dan Danielsen, ‘How Corporations Govern: Taking Corporate Power Seriously 
in Transnational Regulation and Governance’, (2005) 46 Harvard International Law Journal 411; Dan 
Danielsen, ‘Corporate Power and Global Order’ in Anne Orford (eds), International Law and its Others (CUP 
2006). 
10 
Fausto Pocar, ‘The Proliferation of International Criminal Courts and Tribunals: A Necessity in the Current 
International Community’ (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 304; David Kaye and Kal 
Raustiala, ‘The Council and the Court: Law and Politics in the Rise of the International Criminal Court’ 
(2016) 94 Texas Law Review 713. 
11 
Mark Goodale and Sally Engle Merry (eds), The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking Law between the 
Global and the Local (CUP 2007). See also: Yves Dezalay and Bryant G Garth, The Internationalization of 
Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists and the Contest to Transform Latin American States (University of 
Chicago Press 2013); Steven LB Jensen, The Making of International Human Rights: The 1960s, 
Decolonization and the Reconstruction of Global Values (CUP 2016); Ratna Kapur, Gender, Alterity and 
Human Rights: Freedom in a Fishbowl (Edward Edgar Publishing 2018). 
12 
For a critical examination of this principle in the context of deep sea bed global regulation see specifically, 
Surabhi Ranganathan, ‘Ocean Floor Grab: International Law and the Making of an Extractive Imaginary’ 
(2019) 30(2) European Journal of International Law 573; Surabhi Ranganathan, ‘Global Commons’ (2016) 
27(3) European Journal of International Law 693. 
17 
 
law13 demonstrate the influence and development of jurisprudence through and intersections 
with private actors, organizations, civil societies, corporations and interests. Additionally, 
literature within ‘private international law’ regimes – such as international commercial 
arbitration and investment law,14 intellectual property,15 international corporate governance 
and regulation16 – have also attempted to explore how the jurisprudence of these disciplines 
cuts across a state-centric approach which limits itself to ‘public/private’ distinctions. 
 
Another approach to answering the question of trans-boundary relations beyond the nation 
state-centered framework of international law has been through a focus on the public/private 
distinction and its blurring in the context of the crystallization of the nation state, from the 
interwar period to the new global order in the 1950s. Since the theorization on how to 
understand this moment was a mix of public/private administration at an international level, 
the emergence of trans-boundary social function of international organizations became an 
important idea to encapsulate interactions beyond nation states. Emerging both from the 
interwar period17 and after it,18 conversations with regards to trans- boundary regulations 




David P Forsythe, The Humanitarians: The International Committee of the Red Cross (CUP 2005), David 
M Rosen, ‘Child Soldiers, International Humanitarian Law, and the Globalization of Childhood’ (2007) 109 
(2) American Anthropologist 296; Frédéric Mégret, ‘From “Savages” to “Unlawful Combatants”: A 
Postcolonial Look at International Humanitarian Law’s “Other”’, in Anne Orford (ed), International Law and 
its Others (CUP 2006). In the field of International Relations see the seminal work of Michael Barnett, Empire 
of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Cornell University Press 2011). 
14 
For an examination of transnational lawyers as knowledge producers see for example, Yves Dezalay and 
Bryant G Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of  a 
Transnational Legal Order (University of Chicago Press 1996), for the politics of arbitrator networks see; 
Sergio Puig, ‘Social Capital in the Arbitration Market’ (2014) 25 (2) European Journal of International Law 
387; Moshe Hirsch, ‘The Sociology of International Economic Law: Sociological Analysis of the Regulation 
of Regional Agreements in the World Trading System’ (2008) 19(2) European Journal of International Law 
277. 
15 
Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy (New Press 
2007). 
16 
See for example, John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation 
(CUP 2000). 
17 
Cassese (n 8); Martin David Dubin, ‘Transgovernmental Processes in the League of Nations’ (1983) 37 
International Organization 469; Susan Pedersen, ‘Back to the League of Nations’ (2007) 112 The American 
Historical Review 1091. 
18 
Philip Caryl Jessup, Transnational Law (Yale University Press 1956). For a development of transnational 
law into the separate discipline of transnational criminal law as a response to organized crime, trafficking and 
its legal regulations see for example; Neil Boister, ‘Transnational Criminal Law?’ (2003) 14(5) European 
Journal of International Law 953. 
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organizations19 or those that sought to give closed theoretical answers to transnational legal 
orders as a separate discipline in its entirety to public/private international law.20 
The question for my thesis to answer – the issue of how trans-boundary, networked 
organizations operate in the long-standing and continuing understanding of international legal 
regimes as state-centered – is then not just a regime-centered approach. Thus I have not limited 
this thesis within a realm of any one of these sub-disciplines mentioned above, whether public 
or private. The breath of the kinds of networks I am exploring in the following chapters attests 
to the primary aim of my thesis which emphasises a longer trajectory of understanding 
international law and networks regardless of the nature of the networks. At the same time, it 
also points to my broader aim with this thesis, which is understanding the operation of 
international law as a socially grounded discipline that takes form through different modalities 
of knowledge production and action, that adopts different forms through time and space. 
Therefore, what I attempt to answer more consciously here is a question about the operation 
of international law at a meta-register i.e. how a different understanding of the relationship 
between a sociological concept of network and a jurisprudential doctrine of territorial 
sovereignty can change our perception of the discipline itself and its history. 
Existing sociological theories of international law have attempted to understand the 
discipline through social contexts at the macro-level, i.e. the world organized through an inter-
state relationship where the global system for international order is mediated at only the level 
of nation states interacting with each other,21 and the micro-level, i.e. driven by the agency of 
social actors at the ground level.22 However, the ways in which different forms of micro-level 
social actors such as networks throughout history both shape and influence the ideological 
frames and rules concerning macro-structures of state/organizations have remained largely 
unexamined. 
The sociological question, in more critical traditions, has been cognizant and conscious of 
law being a descriptive tool rather than a normative answer to social contexts. Thus, while 
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being situated within legal regimes, the emerging body of literature in more critical traditions 
is closer to a sociological approach to understanding the ‘why’ of law i.e. its power and 
politics.23 Specifically, sociological inquiry of international law goes beyond doctrinal 
prescriptions of the law as a solution to sociological issues but is attentive to how the law 
itself can be coded to reproduce global socio-economic inequalities instead of resolving them. 
This attention to descriptive question underpinning sociological analysis makes it particularly 
valuable for building on a critical approach to understand the sociology of jurisprudential 
knowledge production and thus it is important for this thesis to distinguish– as well as 
squarely highlight – the contribution of my thesis. 
 
Within this emerging literature, two key seminal texts have been most influential for recent 
literature on the sociology of international law which explain the issue of networks/trans-
boundary relation and international law’s state-centric understanding: Anne Marie Slaughter’s 
A New World Order24 and Braithwaite and Drahos’ work on ‘network governance’.25 
Slaughter’s intervention and answer to understanding state sovereignty and trans- 
boundary forms of interaction or network of actors have focused on the study of transnational 
regulatory networks such as institutional cooperation between judicial bodies, banking and 
the financial sector as a new form of cooperation between state and non-state actors.26 
Slaughter suggests that government and state functions are moving to greater independence 
and transnational cooperation with institutional counterparts in other nation states. She further 
argues that this transnational cooperation is ushering in a new era of dissipated sovereignty 
i.e. sovereign state-like functions exercised by government officials and departments 
independently which reflect what Slaughter refers to as a disaggregated state. For Slaughter, 
as well, international legal doctrines need to evolve and are not equipped to deal with new 
forms of trans-boundary interactions. This argument assumes a normative, linear and 
23 
Notably, David Kennedy has time and again raised this sociological problem when international legal 
academics from various backgrounds seek to understand the problems of globalization and international 
regulation. For his most seminal work to date on this, see for example, David Kennedy, A World of Struggle: 
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progress narrative of international law’s key doctrines, specifically state-centric understanding. 
It also presents law as a normative solution to global issues without problematizing the role of 
politics and power within trans-boundary networks.27 
Counter to Slaughter’s approach, Peter Drahos and John Braithwaite understand network 
governance as more than just normative observations of networks but an empirical study of 
how non-hierarchal organization is a space of power and politics.28 This is primarily informed 
by Peter Drahos and John Braithwaites’ work which examines the role of pharmaceutical 
companies in the United States, Europe and Japan in influencing  state actors to push policies 
for the monopoly over the intellectual property of medicines. Further, Braithwaite revisits this 
concept of network governance in his work with Hillary Charlesworth and Aderito Soares on 
peacebuilding in East Timor.29 
Building on these concerns, a collected body of work on ‘Experts, Networks and 
International Law’ edited by Cullen, Harrington and Renshaw has attempted to tackle the 
concern that questions of power and politics of such bodies are not considered by Slaughter.30 
This edited collected builds its examination of networks and their politics closer to Braithwaite 
and Drahos. 
 
Although valuable regarding empirical and theoretical inquiries into politics and power of 
networks within different international legal regimes, this edited collection still leaves a 
fundamental problem I have raised unanswered. Specifically, how do we reconcile our 
understanding foundational territory-centered, static approaches to international law to the 
concept of network. 
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Additionally, recent literature, particularly critical legal scholarship, particularly that 
which focuses on a sociologically grounded approach to knowledge production within 
international law, notably on the politics of experts,31 organizations, and legal networks32 is 
also dealing with a similar issue of a static territory-centered approach with networks. This 
critical work, particularly by David Kennedy, has tried to position both through empirical and 
theoretical study the politics of knowledge production in global legal policymaking across 
economic and military domains. 
 
Most recently, the Research Handbook on the Sociology of International Law, edited by 
Mosche Hirsch and Andrew Lang, has attempted to map a primer for sociological approaches 
to international law relying mostly on categorizing them through three main streams of 
sociological thinking: structural-functionalism, symbolic interactionism and social conflict 
perspectives.33 While attempting to give a broad brush view of a sociological perspective on 
international law, the edited collection attempts to create an overview rather than give 
descriptive or even normative answers to how sociology can contribute to our understanding 
of international law. Nonetheless, it still manages to center European sociological traditions, 
specifically Pierre Bourdieu, within primarily international economic law. This editorial effort 
leaves for another moment to tackle head on, however, historical sociology attentive to 
imperialism as part of international legal knowledge production particularly through 
networks. The edited collection at the same time hints at critical scholarship within 
international law as I have mentioned, particularly within the fields of global governance and 
knowledge production, leaving open the possibility of a concerted attempt to explore these 
questions further through its interlinking with imperialism. 
 
The aforementioned collections that follow from key contributions to sociological 
approaches to international law, i.e. by Hersche and Lang as well as Cullen, Harrington and 
Renshaw, do not go far enough in critically examining the historical relationship between the 
network and international law. This results in an examination of the network that bases its 
understanding of the international legal order and its history as one of linear progression. 
Scholarship that does consider the role of power and politics i.e. Braithwaite and Drahos, also 
works on the assumption of linearity of international legal jurisprudence progressing 
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through time along with new forms of political actors and spaces such as networks of 
NGOs(Non-Governmental Organization), counter-hegemonic movements, etc. 
 
Even within critical works that I have identified, notably Kennedy,34 scholarship within 
Law and Development,35 and literature which connects conversations within science and 
technology studies to understand global governance, there is a lack of emphases of how our 
fundamental understanding of international law through its state-centric, territory-centered 
approach has developed alongside networks. Additionally, they also assume network and its 
relationship to international law is a novel occurrence even when they are aware of 
conversations on the historical basis on which law is inscribed as a form of change to policy 
while reiterating similar logics of power. 
 
The role, power and politics of network organizations throughout the history of 
international law remains, therefore, unexplored. My aim in this thesis is to show how we can 
see the role of networks as an integral part of the development of international law’s 
foundational principle i.e. territorial sovereignty. My thesis gives a different analytical, 
critical way of theoretically positioning how we engage with the question of networks and 
international law. I do this by considering not just a critical view of sovereignty which pays 
attention to its hegemonic basis throughout history but also understanding networks as a 
sociological phenomenon which is not ‘new’ in its entirety. 
 
This intervention to mapping different forms of networks, not meant to be exhaustive or 
the only ones, also builds on the sociological challenge David Kennedy has raised concerning 
more contemporary forms of knowledge production by expert networks – beyond lawyers36 
and policymakers – which calls for a broader ‘mapping of modes of power and levers of 
influence’.37 While Kennedy’s invitation is for an empirical study of 
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sociological nodes of power, which I do not do in this thesis, my contribution here focuses on 
sketching the outlines of how the relationship between networks and international law can be 
theoretically understood in the first place. I propose that the framework I provide to 
understand this relationality can help empirically focused studies of networks within 
international legal regulation throughout history. 
 
b. State, networks, imperialism and international law 
 
The key literature that my intervention relies on critically questions the nature of ‘progress’ 
in international law or the formation/function of state sovereignty and understanding 
international law itself as a form of network operation. In relation to the former, literature 
which has framed its hypothesis to answer the question of how we can understand networks 
and a static territory-centered conception of international law presumes a particular 
understanding of not just international law but also the nature of state sovereignty itself. 
Specifically, this presumption is based on linear, progressive notions of international law i.e. 
international law as a discipline has come into its form as a result of transformations after 
formal colonialism as a way to mediate a world order of separate independent nation states. 
 
Here particularly relevant are sociological discussions on international legal structures 
which are attentive to their hegemonic and imperial reproduction through different eras. 
Notably, Bryan Garth contends that description of international law’s linear progression 
sidelines the ways in which international law and its foundational principles, specifically state 
sovereignty, are themselves mired in hegemony.38 
Within the critical tradition of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) 
itself, Anthony Anghie has, notably, already provoked the conversation on how the principle 
of sovereignty and a state-centric approach is part of an imperial reproduction of the 
international legal global order through its history.39 Both Anghie and Garth’s hypotheses 
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are not accounted for by ‘linear progress narratives’ that is assumed by literature on state and 
networks – particularly Slaughter and Rastualia.40 
The other aspect which is not paid attention by most of the literature I have mentioned is 
the intervention that Annelise Riles has made in our understanding of the operation of 
international law, explored further below. 
 
II. International law operation as the dialogical interplay 
 
 
Annelise Riles’ suggestion has been, explicitly, to understand international law as networks.41 
Here, my thesis takes Annelise Riles’ suggestion that we understand the international as 
‘network’42 further. I do so by understanding knowledge production of international law itself 
as inherently tending towards hegemony due to the way in which the social, political and 
economic is inscribed through its network nature. By bringing together the idea that hegemony 
is inscribed within jurisprudence through and for the social, economic, political benefit of 
networks, this thesis adds to recent critical international legal literature,43 to show that 
international legal jurisprudence and its network of actors have historically worked together. 
 
a. International law as networks and jurisprudence 
 
 
I contend that both Garth Dezalay and Annelise Riles’ hypotheses on how international law 
operates can be understood together. Specifically, that international law itself is a network but 
also a network inscribing itself through a ‘legalized hegemony’ of jurisprudential norms, such 







Slaughter (n 24); Rastulia (n 26) 
41 
Specifically in Annelise Riles, ‘Global Designs: The Aesthetics of International Legal Practice’ (1999) 93 
Proceedings of the American Society of International Law Annual Meeting 28. See this formulation by 
Annelise Riles in relation to understanding private international law, regulation as knowledge practices of 
actors in: Annelise Riles, The Network Inside Out (University of Michigan Press 2016); Annelise Riles, ‘The 
Anti-Network: Private Global Governance, Legal Knowledge, and the Legitimacy of the State’, (2008) 56(3)  
American Journal of Comparative Law  605. 
42 
ibid in Riles ‘Global Designs’ 28. 
43 
Particularly Kennedy (n 23). 
25 
 
Annelise Riles are imagining a sociological approach to international law’s operation, which 
is aware of its political, hegemonic and imperial underpinnings. If we understand international 
law as network as well as its structure inscribing a form of ‘legalized hegemony’, then we can 
also see how the social, economic and political capital of networks of actors operate through 
and based on jurisprudence i.e. sovereignty in this case. Here we can also see how the 
jurisprudence, which is informed by and facilitates the advancement of the aims of networks, 
itself evolves through time in a constant, continued dialogue with the network itself. At the 
same time, however, conventional jurisprudence is restricted to being understood through a 
static territory-centered outlook where territorial boundaries have no room to conceptualize 
trans-boundary network actors. I describe this relation between international legal 
jurisprudence – or its static, territorially centered understanding – and its networks of 
knowledge producing towards a common aim44 as the ‘dialogical interplay’. 
 
b. ‘Invisibilisation’ and the violence of the dialogical interplay 
 
The working together of networks of actors and international law’s jurisprudence, specifically 
through the doctrine of sovereignty, produces an invisibility which hides the effects of its 
operation. The jurisprudential aspect of international law foregrounds itself continuously in a 
way that hides and renders invisible the process and effects of its web of actors who operate 
for their benefit. 
 
In particular, this effect of invisibilisation takes the form of hegemonic governance over 
human life,45 which is inherently violent, for the network to achieve its objectives/aims. This 
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undercurrent of violence is characteristically absent from a jurisprudential perspective, unless 
it is identified and categorized into regimes such as human rights and humanitarian law, and 
can take physical and non-physical manifestations. 
 
My thesis draws attention to this violence and its inextricable link to international law’s 
operation as the dialogical interplay between networks and international law’s static territory-
centered formulation. This violence is not bound to categorical forms of ‘legality’ and 
‘illegality’ but is experienced by those governed by the network. Thus it can take different 
forms, i.e. economic, physical, symbolic, epistemological, depending on the aims of the 
network in question. It is essentially violence that is constantly evolving to direct and control 
individual and community lives. As the underlying intentional consequence of this violence 
is to assert a hegemonic view of the world in accordance to the network, it is imperial in its 
effects i.e. it dictates not just economic and/or territorial control and domination, but 
intellectual and spiritual.46 
 
III. Conceptual framework and methodology 
 
a. ‘Network’: a socio-historical perspective 
 
 
In the context of my thesis, ‘network’ is understood more widely than it is often understood 
in existing literature in international law. As I briefly mentioned above on the existing 
conceptualization of a network of actors as norm makers, in mainstream international law 
literature, as well as in international relations literature, governance through networks refers 
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matters.47 This literature limits itself to understanding governance through networks as a 
recent innovation facilitated by globalized economic and social activity.48 This understanding 
limits the study of a ‘network’ as a social and historical phenomenon as it relies on an 
understanding of network restricted only to contemporary technological and social 
formations. 
 
My use of the concept of networks here is similar to global historians, in what has been 
termed the ‘global turn’ towards the history of networks. The defining feature of this ‘global’ 
turn is how exploring the imperial configuration and interconnections can unearth the 
importance of networks as a component of imperial governance, not just as a social 
phenomenon. Following this concern, then, networks are used to describe effects, relations 
and connections beyond the state or local paradigms. For global historians, as David Bell 
explains, networks describe the political interconnections of the world. The deployment of the 
term, though seemingly anarchic, is close in its approximation to what is normally considered 
to be ‘controlling metaphor in the digital age’49 to understand the sociology of trans-boundary 
actors.50 The term networks throughout my thesis describes, however, not a new ‘digital age’ 
or ‘information age’ but rather it refers to social organizations that have taken place across 
history, formed through loose connections between actors who share a common aim or 
purpose. 
 
To elaborate this definition further, I utilize descriptive elements of theories of ‘network’ 
as they have been explained by contemporary sociology and communications theory. Manuel 
Castells’ thinking on networks explains networks as an organization structure of links or 
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chain of connections – a nodal chain – to achieve a common objective.52 Power over the 
framing of objectives is the central component of Castellian network thinking.53 Power then, 
as a form of influence, determines exclusion or inclusion into the network.54 Castells’ idea of 
power is meant to explain why a nodal chain of the network has no central actor responsible 
for framing the objectives of the network. A network-actor perspective, by Latour, instead 
focuses on the role of a central actor responsible for shaping the aims of a network.55 Through 
an actor-network perspective, a central actor within the nodal chain of the network is one who 
shapes the common objective of the network.56 So the inclusion and exclusion in a network 
depend on a single powerful actor.57 Despite a geographical distance between links in a 
network, its conduct is guided by common norms. 
 
I draw on this understanding of the central powerful actor in my understanding of 
networks in this thesis.58 This allows me to reflect on different forms of networks throughout 
the history of international law. This ranges from religious networks such as the Holy Roman 
Church of the 16th Century, with the Catholic Church as the powerful actor shaping the aims 
and objectives carried out by a network of missionaries and churches, to the merchant 
networks of Chartered Companies in the 17th–18th Century whose life was directed by officers, 
soldiers and the state. 
 
My understanding of networks helps me place different forms of networks within the 
historical, social, political and economic contexts through which international law has 
developed in time. This then allows me to show how the dialogical interplay between these 
social actors and international legal jurisprudence has developed in tandem with each of them. 
 
As I have explored, my approach to presenting an understanding of international law as the 
dialogical interplay between networks and conventional static jurisprudence of international 
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explains, is rooted in ‘histories of colonialism’.59 Thus, my broader understanding of networks 
adds a historical approach to my sociological frame. In this respect, I argue that international 
law’s history must be grounded within the field’s colonial and imperial past. My study of the 
relationship between networks and international law is inspired by critical historical 
methodology. Hence, I am providing a sociology of international legal knowledge production 
with a historical bent which allows me to explore historical contexts of doctrinal sources. This 
then also results in a re-imagination what we may even consider as sources of international 
legal doctrines in order to inform the development of international legal thinking and its 
understanding to present times. 
 
Thus, in doing a sociological analysis of a history of international law, I rely on critical 
and Third World Approaches to International Law scholarship. Critical histories which take 
into account how colonialism and imperialism are embedded in the making of international 
law, such as those notably by Anthony Anghie,60 Gerry Simpson,61 Sundhya Pahuja,62  Martti 
Koskenniemi,63 approach international law’s development through paying attention  to how 
the law has moved in time – and how it has been reiterated for continuities of politics, power 
and imperialism while having discontinuities in the form it takes and resistance against its 
imperialism. 
 
My understanding of how different forms of networks have played a key role, at key 
moments, in the development of international law is informed by these critical historical 
works. My project, as a historical sketching of networks in international law, advances, in this 
sense, a critical history of international law in a similar vein to the work of Anghie. These 
scholars conduct critical legal histories which deviate from and contest progress narrative 
histories of legal concepts in international law that are characteristic of its orthodox reading.64 
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law.65 Anghie’s thesis traces the origins of territorial sovereignty in canonical literature from 
the 17th Century. Through a contextual and historiographical approach to reading texts,66 
Anghie argues that differential treatment is present within foundational principles of 
international law.67 Moreover, he argues that this continuity of colonial differentiation exists 
in a different form through present day international financial institutions.68 
My purpose for conceptualizing networks through a socio-historic lens is to frame it in a 
particular sociological way i.e. web of actors working towards a common aim, which finds 
itself repeated in different forms through the history of international law. Thus, throughout 
this thesis, different forms of networks can be seen to implement, benefit and legitimise their 
role in the production of knowledge that shapes international legal rules, through imperial 
governance and violence. 
 
By understanding these continuities – and discontinuities – of networks and their violence, 
we can see their operation in the present day networks and their interaction with international 
legal regimes. 
 
b. ‘Violence’: coloniality and governance of human life 
 
The effect of these networks operating in tandem with the conventional static territory- centred 
jurisprudence unleashes a particular kind of violence which is inherent to international law’s 
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dialogical interplay. In conceptualizing this violence, I aim to show that within the discipline 
of international law a specific understanding of what counts as violence, or physical, state 
violence, is not only limited but is a Eurocentric framework of understanding violence. 
Violence is, within an orthodox understanding of international law and its legal regimes, 
juridified for it to be accounted for – whether in the form of rights, international crime or 
transnational crime. These forms of juridified ‘violence’ rely on transposing acts of violence 
recognized by the ‘law’ to create descriptions of what counts as violence which can be 
accounted for by the law within its frameworks i.e. inter-state violence, terrorist acts, crimes 
against humanity to mention a few. The frameworks within which these are imagined are 
underpinned by assumptions of legal categories within the discipline of international law 
created mostly within a Eurocentric understanding of violence. Not only is this orthodox 
understanding of violence in international law Eurocentric, but it also renders other forms of 
violence invisible despite facilitating the trans-boundary network organization that manifests 
other modalities of violence. These modalities of violence fall outside its frameworks or do 
not fit so neatly within legal categories as to be taken account of as part of its jurisprudential 
process. 
 
Following what decolonial political philosopher de Sousa Santos has called examining the 
other side of the abyssal line,69 that is developing understandings of concepts by questioning 
how it can be perceived from outside a Eurocentric framework, I aim to deconstruct the 
concept of violence in international law by focusing on the forms of  violence that are rendered 
invisible by an orthodox understanding of international law. Specifically, I do not adhere to a 
‘typology’ approach to define violence of network governance due to its limitations in 
capturing a consistent application of the definition  across different forms of network. Instead, 
I emphasise violence as experienced by those governed by and through the formations of the 
network of actors. 
 
The experience of violence by those governed through and by formations of networks of 
actors can be explained through postcolonial political philosopher Achille Membe’s 
explanation of ‘violence in a borderless world’.70 Membe attributes violence centred on 
control over constructing spaces or ‘territorialisation’ to the policing, surveillance and 
controlling of bodies i.e. governance of populations within these spaces. The construction of 
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Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Epistemologies of the South: Justice against Epistemicide. (Routledge 
2015). 
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Achille Mbembe, ‘Necropolitics’ in Stephen Bygrave and Stephen Morton (eds), Foucault in the Age of 
Terror: Essays in Biopolitics and the Defense of Society (Palgrave MacMillan 2008).  
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spaces as specific forms of territories, Membe explains, is sustained through ‘roads, tunnels, 
bridges..to maintain reciprocal exclusivity’.71 The violence of this ‘borderless’ world is 
exercised, importantly, by those who create and control these spaces in the first place, to 
decide who to police, control and survey through networks they create and are part of.72 
This understanding of violence is centered on the role of networks to govern populations 
and is broader in its understandings of physical and non-physical forms of violence. Violence 
in this context is the operation of, actions taken by and knowledge produced by the networks 
to create spaces of governing according to a set of norms that create inclusion and exclusion. 
This makes the understanding of violence through and by the governance of a network fluid 
in that as I demonstrate in the thesis different forms of violence are part of different forms of 
networks through the history of international law. 
 
Through this idea of violence, I aim to show how international law’s operation is also part 
of its imperial process – in this case, its dialogical interplay between its static jurisprudence 
and networks of actors. It does not just assume a juridified form in the way scholarship has 
already critiqued within critical traditions such as TWAIL73 and beyond,74 but tells us of the 
violence of international law as a silent, but totalizing, form of imperial governance over 
human life. Through this understanding of violence we understand  violence of coloniality 
more broadly encompassing various aspects of those that are governed through international 
law, in particular those who experience violence of the network. 
 
This totalizing, silent and ever evolving violence which manifests in different forms is 
characterized by control/domination of various aspects or constructions of the ‘human life’ 
i.e. in Anibal Quijano’s words it is a matrix of power encompassing economy, authority, 
knowledge, gender/sexuality.75 This broader understanding of the violence, beyond the 
juridical, economic, territorial sense and as totalizing ever-present processes of imperialism 
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knowledge production,76 de Sousa Santos’ idea of epistimicide77 or Islamic philosopher 
Allama Iqbal’s formulation of colonial violence of the mind and soul.78 
Our understanding of the imperialism of international law and its violence, revealed 
particularly through the relationality between networks and international legal jurisprudence 
working in tandem, needs to consider coloniality as hegemonic governance beyond juridical 
forms and practices. This understanding of the violence of international law then shows us the 
extent to which issues of accountability, regimes of international humanitarian law, 
international criminal law and human rights in different contexts – while attempting to stand 
up to the challenge of contemporary issues – are limited due to the framework they adhere to. 
My claim is that international legal regimes cannot capture the core of violence in the 
operation of international law as the dialogical interplay between networks and international 
law. Particularly as violence, in this case, is a material sociological experience of those that 
are governed by the network. Any attempts to transpose or juridify the violence experienced 
by communities through the totalizing control over their life would end up being framed in 
isolated categories to explain violence within the frameworks of a static territory-centered 
conception of international law. This transcription of violence in a juridified form is not 
reflective of the material and social reality of those that experience violence of international 
law and networks operating in tandem. 
 
IV. Chapter outline 
 
The start of my story of networks and international law begins by tracing the origin of the 
dialogical interplay to the 16th Century theologian Francis de Vitoria. I argue, Vitoria’s 
reflections on the Law of Nations, considered to be one of the earliest conceptions of the 
principle of sovereignty, was grounded in a legal architecture for the missionary network of 
the Holy Roman Church (also referred to generally as the Roman Catholic Church)79 to 
operate and expand in the New Indies. The foundational legal concept of ‘public/common 
access to territory’ was territorial land which included riverways, shores, ports that I 
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collectively refer to as ‘quasi-public enclaves’. These enclaves were integral in securing 
territorial access and occupation for the governance of the Holy Roman Church in the New 
Indies. These quasi-public enclaves did not just become the means for the Holy Roman 
Church to establish territorial control but also allowed the Church to manifest violence in the 
form of economic, administrative policing and forced conversions through en masse baptisms. 
This governance of the Holy Roman Church and its missionary network I argue is the first 
formulation of what we can recognize in present times as network governance and its violence. 
 
In chapter 3, the next stage of the relationship between international legal development 
and commercial network, I explore how the secular shift in international legal thinking was a 
necessary transformation in commercial enterprise at the turn of 17th Century. I show that the 
international legal reasoning proposed by Hugo Grotius concerning sovereignty was designed 
to expand the commercial network of the Dutch East India Company in the Indonesian 
archipelago. This commercial network, I argue, developed into a governing political body that 
owned and controlled the Indonesian archipelago. Grotius’ discourses on private property, 
partial sovereignty and private violence were influenced by Vitoria’s concept of quasi-public 
enclaves. However, in the case of Grotius, the secular turn to international law shifted the 
focus of the international legal order from religion to mercantile trade. The nature of the 
mercantile network in the form of the joint stock company allowed for a more expansive set 
of relations that have at their core an imperial ambition. Its corporate nature allowed it to raise 
finance while minimizing risk and to locate itself as a separate legal entity capable of having 
its own jurisdictional – including economic, territorial – claims about the state. By this logic, 
the commercial company acted as a governing body with its private army and punitive 
sanctions all in the name of treaty enforcement. 
 
I show in chapter 4 that the secularisation of the dialogical interplay during the 17th 
Century laid the foundations for the bureaucratic network of imperial administrators of the 
British Empire. Within this long period from the 18th to the19th Century, I show how the 
British legal scholars of the early British imperial ideology and later philosophers of British 
liberalism brought conceived state sovereignty which informed, in turn, how they governed – 
through and along with native elites – indirectly. Existing models influenced by Grotian 
discourses and the Dutch commercial network’s success in the Indonesian archipelago 
influenced the case of the British East India Company following its imperial territorial 
ambitions in the Indian subcontinent. In this period, I argue, conceptual developments around 
the doctrine of sovereignty, notably through ideas of pluralism, moral universality and free 
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trade, were developed by the British as a result of mutually beneficial cooperation between 
the imperial administrator and their native elite networks. The pragmatic, conscious and 
inevitable consequence of this cooperation translated into indirect governance in the form of 
an imperial state network, where the colonies of the British Empire were administered as a 
loosely managed network of colonial administrators with chosen native elite leaders. This 
particular form of network shifted the relationship of international law from commercial 
imperialism to a supra-state network which informed the dialogical interplay in the next 
chapter. 
 
In chapter 5, I show how the groundwork for the modern, which is the 21st Century, 
understanding of the dialogical interplay was set up in the form of international organizations 
in the 20th Century. I argue that the intellectual legal thought in the 19th Century, the idea of 
colonies as ‘trust’, the rise of imperial internationalism and the competition between European 
imperial state networks over expansion in Africa became the foundation for the global legal 
order in the form of the first international organization i.e. the League of Nations. The League 
system can be seen as the first instance of a network through an international organization. At 
this point, the model of a network of administrators came to be adopted in the form of the 
network of experts of the League of Nations. The League’s international legal discourse 
through its mandates system (Art 22) and international cooperation (Art 23) both supported 
and was driven by economic, administrative, humanitarian experts who would formulate 
policies on how to best govern the ‘colonies’. Within orthodox literature and political history, 
there is still, however, an assumption about the separation between international cooperation 
and the colonial logic underpinning international law within the interwar period. This 
separation masks the practice of the League as a network institution and the different forms 
of violence that were legitimised by the policies and actions of its departmental experts. Most 
noticeably, within the continent of Africa, the International Labour Organization (ILO), a 
subsidiary body of the League, imposed policies in conjunction with criminal and policing 
actions that were based on the exploitation of the native population. This particular stage in 
the history of the dialogical interplay became the basis for the violence inherent in 
international governance through international organizations in the 21st Century. 
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In chapter 6, I focus on how the ‘rule by expert’ mode of the network was transformed to 
accommodate the universalization of state sovereignty. Part of this process, where state 
sovereignty became the central element for the international order, further entrenched the 
‘formal’ separation between transnational forces and the international realm. The state, now 
conceived as an independent unit of the global order could, through its sovereignty, engage in 
transnational legal orders such as the cross-regional work of international organizations and 
their trans-governmental policy networks. The period of decolonisation has been told as a 
particular historical point where state-based relations attained a relatively more ‘equal’ claim 
to political participation in the global legal order. However, I argue that the construction of 
the modern state itself, and thus ideas of state sovereignty, was informed by ‘development 
experts’ of the World Bank. In this period, expert networks did not just directly or indirectly 
implement their norms, they internalised the norms by including state technocrats as part of 
their functioning. Distinctively, in this particular phase of the interplay between networks and 
international law, development experts created a relation between ‘sovereignty’ and ‘human 
security’. As part of a modern nation state, sovereignty itself was thus graded in accordance 
to the level of human security; specifically, ‘under-developed’ and ‘low-income’ states were 
likely to have more insecurity and thus be less ‘sovereign’ than the developed states. This 
categorization became the basis for intervention within the states to modernise the ‘under-
developed’, often resulting in a further entrenchment of structural violence in the form of 
displacement, dislocation and dispossession of land, socio- economic deprivation and the 
creation of greater inequality. The violence that came as a consequence of these ‘local 
experts’, from within the new states, was long lasting and structural. 
 
In chapter 7, I explain how the US Special Operation Forces (USSOF) operates as a 
network organization and is a novel form of imperialism through a networked transnational 
policing force or what has been termed ‘Network Warfare’. I show how Network Warfare is 
both similar to and different from historical forms of networks. The Special Operation Forces 
Network’s presence in foreign territories is based on its classification of ‘governed’ and 
‘ungoverned’ territories which was developed throughout 20th Century international 
organization networks. Furthermore, it utilizes assumptions of transnationalism as part of its 
policy for countering terrorist networks, as well as advancing the economic and political 
interests of the United States through its presence. The violence that is conducted through the 
network’s presence then assumes both physical violence (targeted killings) and non- 
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physical invisible form of violence through policing, surveillance, ‘softer’ indirect governance 
through nation-building programmes, desecration and reconstruction of villages, and 
interference with governmental economic policymaking in foreign territories. The imperial 
policing of Network Warfare is in this way both like colonial and postcolonial forms of 
network governance. Additionally, as part of a hegemon – the United States – the Special 
Operation Forces can be imagined as the new imperial state network. Unlike the network of 
colonial administrators of the 19th-Century British imperial state, whose failure in sustaining 
direct state control was a result of a technological inability to sustain the network, the Special 
Operation Forces through its advanced technology can sustain a state- controlled network 
without spatial or temporal limitations. 
 
In my conclusion to this thesis, I reflect on what we learn from a new sociological 
approach to international law based on linking the sociology of knowledge production through 
a web of social actors in different forms throughout the history of the discipline. This 
sociological approach to international law, as I show in the chapters, shows how international 
law jurisprudence is inextricably linked to social actors who create knowledge to influence 
and benefit from orthodox deployment of international legal thinking. The thesis argues that 
colonial forms of social networks and social networks following formal colonialism have been 
instrumental in producing and benefiting from orthodox conceptualizations of international 
law in various forms. 
 
This influence is more important in the making and shaping of international legal, 
specifically territorial, sovereignty. Each network that I have identified has contributed to 
international legal thought on sovereignty within its context to benefit from it. The influence 
also lies in the way that social actors of each network build on juristic scholarship advanced 
by key political, theological, economic and legal figures for the benefit of the network they 
were part of. By only focusing on these specific networks I do not intend to suggest there are 
no other forms of networks in international legal history that can be analysed in the same way. 
 
My thesis gives these specific examples to establish a framework to re-examine how we 
look at networks as a modality of power within the discipline of international law. This 
framework than can be used to study, for example, treaties as a form of network, other forms 
of transnational governance within international economic law, multinational corporations, 
security governance, international organizations, and epistemic communities as forms of 
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networks. At the same time, while my project is meant to provide a critique of  how networks 
operate as a modality of power within the discipline of international law and the violence that 
goes unchecked, I am not suggesting an ontological perspective of networks as only 
imperialistic. 
 
As I suggest in chapter 6, networks as social formation can be – and have been – used as 
a mode of resisting hegemonic power within international law. I hope that this project helps 
us to re-examine these counter-hegemonic networks.80 More importantly, in our attempts to 
explore counter-hegemonic networks, we must remember not just how knowledge can be 
colonial but how the structures through which it operates reaffirms coloniality. While this 
thesis explores, and complicates, how knowledge is produced through social actors and 
deployed in jurisprudential form, it also cautions how we understand what becomes legitimate 
knowledge – whether colonial or anti-colonial. Our turn to exploring counter- hegemonic 
networks thus would also be critical in defining what forms of knowledge are inherently 
colonial, regardless of whether they are coming from a resistant ‘network’ from below or 
above. Here, then, the concluding chapter of this thesis opens up a provocation – and a call – 
to scholars to think about both knowledge and networks more critically with its inherent 
potential for counter-hegemony. This provocation is a call for thinking critically about 
‘decoloniality’, or plural forms of knowledge, and its production through social actors or 
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Chapter 2. The ecclesial genesis of the dialogical interplay: 
Francis de Vitoria, quasi-public enclaves and the missionaries of 





At the turn of the 16th Century, a particular kind of ‘international legal thinking’ was 
developed through the writings of Francis de Vitoria’s (1492–1546) lectures during the 
Spanish Conquest of the New Indies.1 Vitoria was a Spanish theologian, Friar of the 
Dominican Order, the founder of the Salamanca School of Christian theology. Considered at 
the time and later in history as the humanitarian voice of Spanish Conquest and progenitor of 
modern conceptions of sovereignty in international law, Vitoria’s discourses presented a novel 
articulation of the policies of the Spanish Empire towards the operation of the Church and its 
missionaries. In this chapter, I argue for a new interpretation – and thus a new understanding 
of the operation of international law – of his work on sovereignty,  specifically universal 
dominium and public/private property. 
 
By revisiting Vitoria’s writings, we can see the creation of a legal architecture for the 
Church and its network of missionaries in the New Indian territories through the concept of 
public territorial enclaves. I define enclaves as territorial lands that are surrounded by either 
water or foreign territory. This may include ports, land attached to riverways or territorial land 
that is occupied but surrounded by foreign territory. While Vitoria does not term them 
enclaves, all the spaces he identifies as ‘public/common territories for access’ in his writing 
are those I identify as public territorial enclaves. The concept of public territorial enclaves did 
not just ensure that the Holy Roman Church and its missionaries remained important actors 
in the conquest of the New Indies; public territorial enclaves also became part of the Spanish 
Empire’s colonial policy in the New Indies. The idea of public territorial enclaves allowed for 
Vitoria’s formulation of the Law of Nations to be applied in conjunction with the Church’s 
evangelizing mission. The Church, through its missionary network, approached the 
indigenous rulers and native population with the aim of ‘pacification 
1 
Francisco De Vitoria, Political Writings (Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrence eds, CUP 1991). 
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through conversion’. I argue that the Church’s forcible conversion of the population through 
its missionary network was purposefully supported through Vitoria’s discourses on the 
justified public war for both the benefit of the Spanish Empire and the Holy Roman Church. 
 
The Holy Roman Church’s operation and expansion as a religious organization can be 
seen as consciously and inextricably linked with the development of Vitoria’s international 
legal thinking and vice versa. Considering the relationship between the Church’s trans- 
boundary operation and international law, we can see international law conceived not only as 
sovereign relation at its earliest history, but inextricably linked to a trans-boundary form of 
governance i.e. through and as a network. In this chapter, I understand networks as trans- 
boundary forms of organization of interconnected actors directed and driven by a powerful 
central actor – in this case, the Holy Roman Church – which forms the objectives/aims of the 
organization.2 
In this case, as I will argue, adopting this conceptualization of networks through the 
example of the Holy Roman Church and Vitoria’s international legal discourses on 
sovereignty gives us a novel understanding of the operation of international law. By 
presenting the operation and development of its foundational doctrine of sovereignty as and 
through networks, this chapter challenges orthodox histories of international law and its 
relationship to trans-boundary/network forms of organization. 
 
Through this intervention, I present the operation of international law beyond just its 
‘static’ state- and territory-centered approach, which is seen as opposite to trans-boundary and 
network forms of organization, to an understanding of international law as the dialogical 
interplay between the two – that is international law developed as and through a network of 
actors and its static, territory-based operation. Understanding international law as a process of 
the dialogical interplay shows that networks of social actors benefit, deploy and develop 
conventional jurisprudence of international law as much as international law develops, and 
foregrounds itself through the operation of networks. The effect of this foregrounding of a 
static understanding of international law’s operation is that the violence of networks is 
rendered invisible. This violence is also not categorized or recognized within the static 
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different modalities but is part of the operation of international law understood as the 
dialogical interplay.3 
 
In the second section of the chapter, I trace traditional and contemporary interpretations 
of Vitoria’s scholarly writings to situate my reading of his text about the history of 
international law. My reading of Vitoria’s discourses builds on both Anthony Anghie’s 
explanation of Vitoria as a key figure that helps us to explain the doctrine of sovereignty as  a 
question associated with the ‘dynamic of difference’,4 and Martti Koskenniemi’s thesis on the 
real contribution of Vitoria in introducing the vocabulary of public/private property as the 
foundation for informal imperial relations with colonial territories.5 In the third section, I argue 
for a reinterpretation based on placing the Holy Roman Church and its operation as a trans-
boundary form of an institution at the center of reading Vitoria’s political writings. In the 
fourth section, I show that when the significance of the Holy Roman Church as an organization 
within the development of international legal doctrines is considered, the concept of territorial 
enclaves becomes integral to the expansion and access to New Indies territories. Territorial 
enclaves were not only doctrinally justified through the vocabulary of property but further 
entrenched within an imperialistic ‘dynamic of difference’ necessitating the expansion of the 
Spanish Empire. Underlying concepts of public war ensured that the forces of the Spanish 
Empire built forts in these enclaves to provide access and security to the Church’s 
missionaries. In this context, the missionaries and the empire could be seen as co-imperialist 
in their colonization of the New Indies. 
 
Finally, in the last section, I look at how then we can reframe our understanding of the 
violence of international law through viewing the violence, supported by Vitoria’s writing 
specifically ‘on the evangelization of the unbelievers’,6 of the Church’s missionaries over the 
native population as part of their governance. I argue how, as a result of this legal architecture, 
the Church was not only able to maintain its presence through the protection of Spanish forces 
but was also able to create conditions for indigenous communities that led to conversions, 
specifically through enforcing taxes, destroying the heritage of the native 
3 
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population, which Vitoria referred to as smashing ‘idols’, and en masse baptisms. This 
eradication of the indigenous culture, life and knowledge also became a part of the colonial 
policy of the Spanish Empire, particularly in how the ‘native’ was constructed in the eyes of 
the colonizers, as mired in ‘sin’ and ‘sexually perverse’, particularly by the missionaries of 
the Holy Roman Church. In this chapter, I understand this as a violence which is the lived 
reality of those on whom it is perpetrated and thus appears in different modalities i.e. structural 
through living conditions, symbolic forms of destruction and erasure of native ways of 
knowing7 and is characterized by being made invisible through the state understanding of 
international legal thinking. These modalities of violence are not understood as legitimate acts 
of violence by state actors or in state of war as explained in orthodox international legal 
thinking.8 However, they are an integral part of international law understood through the 
dialogical interplay between networks and static understanding of international law. In the 
context of this chapter, these forms of violence were part of the Holy Roman Church’s 
evangelizing mission. However, they were not envisioned or held legally accountable by 
Vitorian discourses on public violence in international legal doctrine. 
 
Vitoria’s legal discourses did not just advance a vocabulary for informal empire through 
private and public rights as Koskenniemi has suggested or a discursive basis for an imperial 
‘dynamic of difference’ as Anghie suggests, but they also enabled trans-boundary governance 
and violence of the Holy Roman Church. Vitoria’s contribution to international legal thinking 
resides, therefore, on its germinal contribution to the understanding of international law as 
trans-boundary governance and its violence. This interpretation argues for a revision in our 
understanding of international law as a separate domain from trans- boundary forms of 
governance in its history. In a closer approximation to the historical period studied in this 
chapter, it is also possible then to look at other forms of trans- boundary organizations which 
closely followed the colonization of the New Indies, their governance and their violence 
facilitated by international law in the years after the Spanish 
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Conquest. Most notably of which was the rise of imperialism through commercial companies 
of the 17 th–18th Century, which I explore in the next chapter in more detail. 
 
II. Francis de Vitoria in international legal history 
 
 
Francis de Vitoria (1483–1546), a 16th-Century Dominican theological scholar, was one of 
the founders of the Salamancan school. Within the colonial and ecclesial history of both the 
Holy Roman Church and the colonial Spanish Empire of the 16th Century, Vitoria has been 
put forward as one of the earliest humanist Christian philosophers. In the historical context, 
the Holy Roman Church’s part in colonial conquests in the 16th Century through slavery and 
forced labour was met with resistance by Vitoria as he attempted to ‘humanize’ and defend 
the rights of indigenous communities in the New Indies.9 At the time, this attempt  prefigured 
humanitarian discourses that later spoke to a ‘progressive’ view of both law and religion in 
the early and the mid-20th Century. 
Within the literature of international legal history, Vitoria’s discourses have been marked 
as one of the earliest formulations of modern international law. His writings, particularly on 
the universal dominium or right to sovereignty of the indigenous population of the New Indies, 
have influenced orthodox narratives of the development of international law. Vitoria’s take 
on the idea of the universal right to sovereignty is said to promote a humanitarian and universal 
vision of the international legal order that is characteristic of the modern international legal 
order. James Brown Scott (1866–1943), a 20th-Century jurist of international law, emphasised 
this progressive dimension of Vitoria’s international legal doctrines.10 According to Scott, 
Vitoria’s discourses embodied visions of global justice, equality and humanitarianism that 
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However, Fernando Gomez, among others, have criticized Scott’s use of Vitoria as part of a 
progressive account of the history of international law.12 According to Gomez, Scott used 
Vitoria to advance a particular kind of 20th-Century capitalist liberalism.13 The focus on Vitoria 
as a central figure of early humanitarianism is based on notions of civilization that reflect the 
global vision of American and European powers in the early 20th Century.14 The use of Vitoria 
in traditional international legal historiography has been thus deliberately selective and does 
not delve into problematic notions that reside in the texts and the historical context in which 
they were written.15  
Recent critical scholarship in international legal history has tackled, therefore, Vitoria’s 
discourses and their relevance to the development and contemporary practice of international 
law more substantively.16 Among these, Antony Anghie has not only challenged the notions of 
humanitarianism attached to Vitoria’s writings but has also demonstrated how Vitoria provided 
the discursive foundations for imperialism in the application of international law.17 Anghie 
suggests that Vitoria’s discourses gave a legal justification for colonizing the New Indies based 
on a cultural differentiation between Spanish Christians and the new Indian ‘infidels’.18 He 
argues that Vitoria embedded the idea of ‘standard of civilization’ as a continuing discursive 
logic that became part of past and contemporary practices of international law.19  
 
12 
Fernando Gómez, ‘Francisco de Vitoria in 1934, Before and After’ (2002) 117(2) Modern Language 
Notes 365; Anne Orford, ‘The Past as Law or History? The Relevance of Imperialism for Modern 
International Law’ (September 9, 2011) Institute of International Law & Justice Working Paper 2012/2 
University of Melbourne Legal Studies Research Paper No.600<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
abstract_id=2090434> accessed June 2020. 
13 






Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral, ‘Francisco de Vitoria’s Unexpected Transformations and Reinterpretations 
for International Law’ (2013) 15(3) International Community Law Review 287; Andreas Wagner, ‘Francisco 
de Vitoria and Alberico Gentili on the Legal Character of the Global Commonwealth’ (2011) 31 (3) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 562; Pierre-Alexandre Cardinal and Frédéric Mégret, ‘The Other “Other”: Moors, 
International Law and the Origin of the Colonial Matrix’, in Ignacio De La Rasilla and Ayesha Shahid (eds), 
International Law and Islam (Brill 2019). 
17 
Anghie (n 4). For Anghie’s broader thesis on the continuing foundations of imperialism in international law 







Martti Koskenniemi has argued that another contribution of Vitoria to international legal 
thinking and its imperial function was the introduction of the vocabulary of private and public 
rights.20 Koskenniemi argues that private and public rights vocabulary became the technique 
of governing peripheral colonies particularly in the acquisition and ownership of territories.21 
This vocabulary was integral to the informal expansion of imperial relations, a process that 
continues to be relevant in present day international global relations.22 
In both critical interpretations of Vitoria’s place in international legal history, however, 
little attention has been paid to the existing historical role of the Holy Roman Church as 
actively involved in the colonization of the New Indies. Anghie draws on Vitoria’s discursive 
method of differentiating Christianity as superior to native beliefs and fulfilment of full human 
potential as a justification for colonization,23 while Koskenniemi focuses on the 
evangelization mission as a historical backdrop for the real contribution of Vitoria. This 
contribution in his analysis is the introduction of the public/private vocabulary in the colonies 
for the attainment of economic objectives.24 Both Anghie and Koskenniemi consider the Holy 
Roman Church’s role in the colonization and the making of international law as a background 
actor. 
 
The Holy Roman Church was, however, already an imperial institution on its own in the 
16th Century, particularly when we recognize that, beyond the ‘nation-centred’ discussion of 
Vitoria’s writings, the Holy Roman Church was already operating in the New Indies as a 
powerful and influential institution in complicity with the Spanish Crown. I argue that, in 
reinterpreting Vitoria’s discourses, the practice and governance of the Holy Roman Church 
as an imperial institution are also relevant to international legal history beyond its contextual 
importance to the legal thinking of the jurists of the time. In the next section, I discuss not 
only the historical context of Vitoria’s discourses – that is the Church and its relation with the 
Crown – but more specifically how the Holy Roman Church operated as an imperial 
institution with a trans-boundary network of missionaries being part of its  governance within 
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III. The Church in the New World 
 
 
a. The Church and its missionary network 
 
John Schwaller observes that the Holy Roman Church was the most important institution 
in the colonization of the New Indies specifically in terms of its structure and internal 
governance.25 Structurally the Church was divided into two main orders with different 
evangelical views on spreading the religion: the Franciscans and the Dominicans.26 The clergy 
were divided into secular and regular clergy, the former being local parish priests under the 
supervision of local bishops while the latter consisted of members from both religious 
orders.27 Despite these divisions, the hierarchy of authority led eventually to the Pope. 
 
The networks of missionaries, part of the regular clergy, were the leading members of the 
Church whose mission was to convert the population of the New Indies.28 At the same time, 
the local bishops were responsible for maintaining homogeneity through the colonized 
territories with respect to Christian values.29 Both the missionary network with its 
evangelization and the clergy system in settlements systematically subverted indigenous 
culture and identity by imposing ‘civilizing Christian values’.30 Furthermore, the Holy Roman 
Church became the single largest landowner in the colonies of the Spanish Empire.31 This 
control also made it responsible for subverting every aspect of native life into Christian values 
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agricultural and commercial activities to support its evangelizing mission in the New Indies 
made its organization self-sustainable.33 
In this respect, the Holy Roman Church’s governance over the New Indies could be 
understood as a ‘political form’.34 Carl Schmitt writing in the 20th Century argued that the 
Church and Crown were effectively both political forms of governing communities.35 The 
Holy Roman Church, as an institution, was fixated on normative uniformity that was based 
on the universal truth of Christianity as the highest form of ideal. Its institution and ideological 
structure were designed to accommodate this uniformity.36 Hence, through its evangelizing 
mission, the Holy Roman Church considered every native convert a member of the Church.37 
Missionaries and clergies within settlements taken over by the Spanish were considered 
components of its governance structure. Regardless of the distance and a lack of direct control 
by the Holy Roman Church or the Pope himself, all the components of the institution, that is 
the missionaries, the parishes, the converts, were all part of a unified Holy Roman Church. In 
this sense, the Holy Roman Church as an institution particularly through its missionary 
network and local parishes in settlements could be seen as a trans-border networked 
organization.38 
 
b. Co-imperialism: the Crown and the missionary network 
 
 
Given how the Holy Roman Church’s governance relied on networks of missionaries and 
clergy within settlements, its role in the colonization of the New Indies could be seen as 
important as the mercantile and military ventures by the Spanish Crown. From the perspective 
of the missionaries of the Church as well, the New Indies colonization was seen as an 
‘endeavour of both the cross and the crown’.39 The evangelizing mission of the Holy Roman 
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network was also instrumental in the colonization process.40 From the inception of the 
conquest, the missionaries were at the vanguard of the colonization process.41 As the 
following discussion will demonstrate, the relationship between the Holy Roman Church and 
the Spanish Crown was one of mutual benefit. However, as co-imperialists, they were also 
rife with internal disagreements. What I argue in this section is that, despite the disagreements 
between the Holy Roman Church and the Spanish Crown, the role of the Holy Roman Church 
in directing and shaping the colonial policy was an extremely important one due to its position 
in the period and historical context. This powerful influence over the Spanish colonial policy 
for the New Indies was even more pronounced due to the nature of its institutional structure – 
which I have discussed in the previous section. 
 
The first and foremost question in regards to the conquest of the New Indies was one of 
territorial rights. Initially, this was resolved through acquisition as a right by discovery and 
legal instruments were used to justify the conquests; they were legitimised through the support 
of the Holy Roman Church.42 The Holy Roman Church, in 1493, issued papal bulls, as a form 
of legal authority given to the Spanish Crown to propagate the Christian faith in the New 
Indies territory.43 Following the papal bulls, the Holy Roman Church’s role within colonial 
policy also intensified, as missionaries travelled along with colonial administrators to the New 
Indies. Among the orders of the Church, the Dominican friars held a strong position not just 
within the Holy Roman Church but also as advisors to the Crown.44 It was the Dominican 
missionaries, to which Vitoria belonged, who opposed how colonial policy  in the New Indies 
was being carried out by colonial administrators.45 One of the main points of contention was 
the first colonial law in the New Indies, the Law of the Burgos introduced in 1512. The Law 
of the Burgos was based on the economic exploitation of labour in the New Indies. 
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The Law of Burgos justified forced slavery of indigenous people both politically and morally 
as part of the spread of Christianity and civilization, which also included forcible conversions 
into Christianity.46 
In the initial period of the conquest, papal bulls that justified the territorial acquisition of 
lands in the New Indies for the Spanish Crown were negotiated as part of the papal legitimacy 
with the Holy Roman Church.47 The Crown did not just negotiate the claim to the territory for 
evangelization but also controlled the license to missionaries to travel from Castellian territory 
to enter into the New Indies.48 Even though the Spanish Crown’s expansionist interests were 
motivated by the economic and political benefits of the conquests, it was imperative that the 
Holy Roman Church’s interests in the conquest were taken into account for the Spanish 
Crown. This was because the Holy Roman Church was a powerful institution whose 
ideological influence within the time was significant. It thus weighed strongly on the Spanish 
Crown’s colonial policy of the conquest of the New Indies. 
 
Although the papal bulls and adoption of different instruments of moral and political 
legitimacy applied in succession,49 the question of title to lands remained a crucial problem 
for the Spanish Crown. This is important, particularly as the Spanish Crown officially shifted 
the narrative of the colonization from military conquest to a missionary enterprise.50 
Theologians from the Dominican order thought the Crown’s treatment of natives was 
unchristian, perverse and tyrannical.51 The Dominican missionaries in the New Indies were 
Thomist-humanist moral philosophers who contested the treatment of the indigenous 
community by colonial administrators. Most notable reformers included Bartolome De Las 
Casas (1484–1566) and Francis de Vitoria. The problem of territorial control as far as the right 
to evangelize was never in dispute by these figures. Instead, for the Dominican order of the 
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rights of the native people to be equal to those of the Spanish Crown.52 For Las Casas in 
particular, the answer to the rights of the natives and approach towards evangelization came 
from theological roots.53 He thought questions of political legitimacy or the socio-economic 
interests of the Spanish Crown were secondary.54 
The Spanish Crown’s concern was still one of juridical explanation for the territorial 
control in a broader sense, that is, how could the Crown react when natives resisted and what 
if the conversion was not accepted.55 As much as these questions related to theological or 
ecclesial concerns, there were socio-economic interests of the Crown tied into the colonial 
venture in the New Indies. Growing contradictions and reports as to how the natives were 
being treated by the colonial administrators and the missionaries further complicated the 
matter56 and resulted in the Spanish Crown allowing ‘experimenting’ with the native 
population with regard to conversion into Christianity.57 Nonetheless, the territorial claims 
over the lands taken over by the Spanish Crown were never reduced,58 and the Holy Roman 
Church not only enjoyed a greater say in the colonial policy of the Spanish Empire but it also 
played an active part in the colonization of the New Indies, specifically through its missionary 
network whose evangelization mission in the New Indies was instrumental in the Spanish 
Crown’s expansion into the New Indies. 
 
The Spanish Crown’s recognition of the importance of the missionary network can be 
deduced from the monopoly it sought over the communications between the missionaries with 
the Holy Roman Church and giving them license to travel to the New Indies.59 Luis Rivera 
observes that the Spanish Crown’s initial response to Vitoria’s lectures on the rights of the 
native people having ‘dominium’ over the New Indies territory was one of caution.60 For the 
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of native people were not as important as the monopoly over such methods.61 More 
specifically, in the context of imperial rivalry and competing socio-economic interests of 
European empires, the Spanish Crown was more interested in juridical reasoning that allowed 
for both a socio-economic and a theological basis for the continuing exploitation of native 
labour and resources. 
 
This ‘co-imperialism’ of the political form and aims of the ‘Crown’ and the political form 
and aims of the Holy Roman Church is emblematic of how we can understand international 
legal discourse emerging at this moment in history. Particularly, by understanding 
international law as a dialogical interplay between networks and international legal discourse 
we can also see how different forms of imperialism can operate in tandem, in this case, the 
ecclesial (i.e. the Church’s missionary network) and the monarchical (i.e. the Crown). 
 
IV.  Vitoria re-visited: dialogical interplay and ‘Law of Nations’ 
Thus, it is in the context of the role of the Holy Roman Church as a colonizing institution 
along with the Crown that we can better understand Francis de Vitoria’s lectures on the New 
Indies. As I have discussed above, the Holy Roman Church was not only a powerful governing 
institution at the time. In the case of the conquest of New Indies, it also operated through 
networks of missionaries who governed through structures of local parishes and individual 
evangelization efforts. The network of missionaries was able to operate in this fragmented 
manner because of how the Holy Roman Church was both ideologically and institutionally 
defined. In the context of the time, it can be surmised as a universal true religion for all 
mankind that ought to be spread across space and time. With the support of a network of 
missionaries and local parishes in indigenous communities, it could ensure that every aspect 
of native life was in line with the precepts of the Holy Roman Church. 
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The importance of the Church’s operation within Vitoria is not just limited to its importance 
as a normative authority. What was unique about Vitoria’s conception of the Spanish Empire, 
as Philpott points out, was how he also presented a natural law reasoning for relations between 
nation states.62 In this sense, Koskenniemi has also pointed out that Vitoria provided a 
framework for the global relations between the European and Non- European world through 
the vocabulary of public/private rights. Vitoria’s explanation of  ‘ius gentum’ included a 
natural right of people with dominium to trade and move freely.63 Underpinning the freedom 
to trade and move to other territories was the concept of the distinction between public and 
private property. Dominium not only meant ownership of property by those occupying such 
property, it meant a right to own territory as property. This right to own territory as property 
alluded to the bounded nature of territorial sovereignty. However, as ‘ius gentum’ necessitates 
trade or any kind of relations between nation states, the ability to access territory must be 
categorized as ‘public’ so that all nation states may be able to trade and move freely. Vitoria 
describes this specifically as ‘natural partnership’ that is part of ‘ius gentum’ common to all 
mankind.64 This natural partnership meant that territorial areas such as ‘riverways, open sea’ 
and, to access the territory of the New Indies, ‘ports’ were public or common property.65 That 
is, territorial water on the land of natives, for Vitoria, is public property for the ships of the 
Spanish Empire that carry traders, soldiers and missionaries of the Holy Roman Church. These 
public ports and riverways are essentially ‘territorial enclaves’ that Vitoria claims are the 
exclusive property of the Spanish Crown to help the missionaries with their evangelization. 
 
This idea of public property was not only useful for developing a framework for 
conducting relations but in Vitoria’s discourses, as far as the New Indies was concerned, it 
became a way to monopolize the territorial enclaves in the New Indies as their own. Vitoria’s 
conception of the superiority of the Spanish republic and its ‘mission’ to educate the 
‘barbarians’ was also qualified by his reasoning that the Spanish Empire alone should not 
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mission. This exclusivity of the Spanish Empire in owning, what I describe as, territorial 
enclaves is how Spanish ships would bring missionaries to the New Indies territory.66 
Given the importance he gave to the ‘dual sword’ of the Pope and the Holy Roman Church 
as a normative authority, for Vitoria, the travelling of missionaries was the most important 
function that the Spanish ships could serve. He describes this exclusivity and priority of 
enabling access for missionaries by stating: ‘since they (the Spanish) have the right to travel 
and trade among them … then they must also be able to teach them the truth especially about 
matters having to do with salvation and beatitude’.67 Further, on the duty of the Spanish Crown 
to support the evangelizing mission exclusively in the New Indies, Vitoria states: ‘Princes of 
Spain are in a between a position to see the reaching of the gospel 
… the pope may entrust it to them and deny it to all others’.68 
 
The territorial enclaves were not just a means of monopolizing trade, but a means for the 
access of the Holy Roman Church to expand its missionaries and clergies. In practice, the 
public ports and territorial waters became the exclusive territorial enclaves of the Spanish 
Empire that allowed access to the Holy Roman Church for its evangelizing mission. 
 
In this manner, Vitoria’s contribution to international legal thinking was not only to 
provide for a colonial basis for international legal thinking,69 or juridical thinking on public 
and private property.70 He also put forward a framework that allowed the continuing 
expansion and influence of the Holy Roman Church through access to territorial enclaves by 
its missionaries. As I have mentioned previously, the Holy Roman Church and its network of 
missionaries were already operating as a governing imperial institution. Its structure of leading 
missionary networks, clergies in local settlements, operated as a fragmented organization or 
network like structure with the singular objective of normative control and homogenization 
of the native way of life. What Vitoria managed to provide was a legal framework that came 
to support public enclaves exclusively for Church missionaries who were the ‘educators’, 





Cummins (n 47). 
67 




Anghie (n 4). 
70Koskenniemi (n 5). 
54 
 
b. The Spanish Empire and ‘just’ war 
 
 
Vitoria’s lectures delivered at the School of Salamanca between 1528 and 1540 were from his 
position as a Professor of Theology, following in the tradition of Thomist-humanist 
philosophy that was characteristic of the Dominicans. While the basis for his rejection of papal 
bulls and any authority of the Holy Roman Church to legitimise a conquest derived from 
Thomist-humanist roots, his discourses on the rights of natives instead are based on Roman 
conceptions derived from the Law of Nations. As Daniel Philpott observes, part of Vitoria’s 
novelty was in the direction his analysis alluded to a broader theory of international relations.71 
Essentially, Vitoria combined theological humanist traditions and socio-political conceptions 
of global relations to legitimise the Spanish Empire’s conquests of the New Indies. Vitoria’s 
arguments regarding the rights of the natives were thus neither completely nationalistic nor 
purely based on moral reasoning characteristic of contemporary theologians or missionaries.72 
This is what has led historians like Rivera and Robert William Jr. to conclude that what Vitoria 
was suggesting in regards to the Spanish Crown’s identity as a colonial empire may be 
described as a ‘Catholic’ Spanish Empire.73 
Vitoria’s conception of a Spanish Empire which he described through the idea of ‘ius 
gentum’ was, therefore, an important part of the legitimization of conquest. In essence, ius 
gentum meant that the universal idea of ‘natural dominium’, that is sovereignty, belonged to 
the natives regardless of their denial or acceptance of the Christian faith. Nonetheless, he 
suggested that the Spanish Empire, as a benevolent republic, occupied a higher purpose and 
position of guidance towards the otherwise ‘free’ world including the ‘barbaric natives.’74 
This meant, as Rivera observes, that James Brown’s interpretation regarding Vitoria’s 
conception of sovereignty being similar to today’s conceptions of equal sovereigns (despite 
religious and/or cultural difference) was incorrect.75 For Vitoria, having the ‘divine grace’ to 
preach exclusively made the Spanish Empire culturally superior to the rest of the world. This 
is precisely what Anghie’s assessment is with regards to the link between colonialism 
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and international law. He points out how Vitoria’s discourses presented the idea of universal 
sovereignty embedded with a standard of civilization that must be reached by ‘independent’ 
and ‘free nations’.76 In the case of the New Indies conquest, the universal standard was one of 
Christian faith. Thus, only when the unbelievers accept it can they reach the potential of a 
superior sovereign state. 
 
The evangelizing mission for Vitoria was both a condition to conquests and an important 
aspect to his discussion on the affairs of the New Indies. Part of his discourses delivered at 
the Salamancan school focused on the Holy Roman Church and its clergies. Even though 
Vitoria maintains that there is a distinction between ecclesial or spiritual affairs thereby 
rejecting the idea that universal authority to deny dominium belongs to the Pope, Vitoria 
placed the Church, specifically the Holy Roman Church and its seat in the Spanish Empire, 
as an important normative authority.77 In his lecture ‘On the Power of the Church’, Vitoria 
states: 
 
The pope has temporal power only as far as it concerns spiritual matters, that is, as far as is 
necessary for the administration of spiritual matters. As the purpose of spiritual power is 
ultimate happiness whereas the purpose of civil power is social happiness therefore 
temporal or political power is subordinate to spiritual power.78 
The spiritual administrative affairs Vitoria refers to here are concerning the spreading of 
Christian faith through missionaries who would teach the ‘barbarians the truth concerning 
matters of salvation and beatitude’.79 Vitoria further explained this as a ‘responsibility for 
using temporal things for spiritual ends’,80 and more specifically, to ‘use temporal means such 
as the material sword of the temporal authority to guard, administer spiritual things’.81 
Rivera observes that in reality a strict separation never translated effectively,82 as both the 
Holy Roman Church and the Crown involved themselves with ecclesial and administrative 
matters.83 This observation is also consistent with Victoria Cummin’s 
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analysis, that the Church required the material support – in terms of economic and military 
protection – as much as the Crown found spiritual affairs, especially missionaries, useful to 
the expansion in the New Indies.84 In light of the above analysis, Vitoria attempts to maintain 
the strict separation between the spiritual and temporal affairs by describing the role of the 
Holy Roman Church as ‘holding two swords’.85 As Luis Rivera points out, this can also be 
understood as a way to justify the continued operation of the Church as a governing institution 
that both supports the Crown’s conquest while benefiting from the conquest for its 
evangelizing mission.86 His lectures on American Indies for example show how the protection 
of the Holy Roman Church missionaries was embedded within his idea of the Law of Nations. 
In the lectures on American Indies he states that: 
 
… if the business of religion cannot otherwise be forwarded, the Spaniards may lawfully 
conquer the territories of these people deposing their old masters and setting up new ones, 
carrying out all things that are lawfully permitted in other just wards by the law of war.87 
And: 
 
… if the barbarians obstruct the Spaniards in their free propagation of the gospel, the 
Spaniards, may preach and work for the conversion of that people even against their will, 
and may if necessary take up arms and declare war on them, in so far as this provides safety 
and opportunity to preach the gospel.88 
As much as these statements are presented as part of orthodox international legal thinking, 
that is, the relation between the European and Non-European world, they also emphasise the 
protection and safety of missionaries by the Spanish armies. Anthony Anghie refers to this as 
part of international law’s colonial legitimization of violence.89 
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However, I argue that, in formulating a lawful conception of what the state may resort to as 
part of war, Vitoria’s thesis on just war hides other forms of violence inflicted on the natives 
as part of the co-imperialism of the missionaries and the Crown. These forms of violence fall 
beyond the orthodox framework he has provided in his writings and were an integral part of 
the Holy Roman Church’s operation in the New Indies. Here we not only see the colonial 
legitimization of violence within the orthodox framework of laws of war but other modes of 
violence that are not recognized despite being a consequence of the legal architecture provided 
through international legal discourse for the functioning of the Holy Roman Church or its 
support of the evangelizing mission. Violence here, as the sections below will show, is not 
just a ‘legally legitimised’ form of violence, such as ‘just war’, but specifically understood as 
the violence of ‘coloniality’90 enacted and perpetrated on a community through governing and 
controlling, specifically by and through a trans-boundary network of actors that are part of a 
powerful governing institution. 
 
a. Ecclesial imperialism: forced conversions, taxes and native  ‘epistemicide’   
 
 
In his lectures ‘On the evangelization of unbeliever’, Vitoria states that: 
 
… it seems that it is lawful, to smash down the idols of these barbarians, because it does 
them no harm or wrong … nor is it evil per se to do so, being against neither the honour of 
God nor the good of a neighbour, since it does not harm them.91 
In the same lecture, he goes on to say, on the matter of indirect coercion into Christianity 
through taxes or levies that may encourage natives to become converts: 
 
…in this regard, it should be noted that taxes (tributum) and levies are of two kinds. One 
kind may justly be imposed on unbelievers such as tributes appropriate at the time and place 
raised at the outbreak of war. Indeed they may be required to pay tributes from which 






Here I refer specifically to my description of violence influenced from Anibal Quijano (n 7). 
91 





As Rivera observes, these methods of evangelizing were common practice in the way  the 
Holy Roman Church and its missionaries were able to subvert native life and culture.93 Rivera 
argues that Vitoria’s discourses on the evangelization of unbelievers gave an implicit license 
to coerce conversion indirectly through these means, translated into missionaries practising 
baptisms en masse.94 Baptisms, Rivera argues, became the culmination of psychological 
pressures exerted over the natives through strenuous conditions imposed by the Spanish 
presence.95 
The conditions that the natives were put in, through financial tributes, destroying of their 
idols and en masse baptisms, within my argument here, constitute a different kind of violence. 
Carried out as part of the Holy Roman Church’s evangelizing mission, through its clergies 
and the soldiers that protected them, they were part of the Church’s governance over the New 
Indies. The Holy Roman Church’s approach towards conversion, both direct and indirect, I 
argue, can be viewed as colonial violence that was part of its governance. 
 
b. Colonial Expansion: natives as ‘citizens’ of empire 
 
 
The Holy Roman Church’s approach towards evangelization has been described by Daniel 
Castro as ‘ecclesial imperialism’.96 The different kinds of violence inflicted on the indigenous 
communities become connected to ideas of ‘just war’ and conquest only when protecting the 
converts is taken into account. Thus, in Vitoria’s commentary on the affairs of the New Indies 
he states: 
 
if a good portion of the barbarians have been converted to faith in Christ … the pope with 
reasonable cause, could give them a Christian prince and remove the other infidel lords.97 
This particular claim of legitimate title to the territory of the New Indies argued by Vitoria 
is directly linked to the violence of the Holy Roman Church missionary network. However, 
in both international legal thinking and Vitoria’s writings, these forms of violations on native 
life, spirituality, ways of living and living conditions were seen in isolation from and separate 
to lawful/unlawful force. Additionally, as Luis Rivera points out, 
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native converts were deemed to owe fidelity to the Crown once they were Christians.98 Hence, 
it also became how the missionaries served the expansion and legitimacy of the Spanish 
Empire, as baptism meant serving the Holy Roman Church meant being part of the Spanish 
Empire.99 
The missionary network, through these confluences between the Crown and itself, thus 
consciously and actively facilitated the socio-economic territorial expansion of the empire. As 
the territories were taken, the Church established ‘dioceses’ in the colonized territories taken 
over by the Spanish military.100 These were the administrative center points for the colonial 
settlements of the Crown as well as the Church.101 Thus the international legal architecture 
worked as part of both the Crown’s and the Church’s aims as the ‘multiplication of “diocese” 
meant the proliferation of colonizing enterprise of the Crown’.102 
These settlements, particularly economically resource-rich areas where mining was being 
done, relied on and made use of the Crown’s network of West and Central African slaves 
brought in for mining work.103 The frontier of New Indies territories became the frontiers of 
the empire building itself, replicating, reiterating and embedding forms of violence it 
perpetrated in its other imperial ventures, particularly in its ‘otherisation’ of Muslim 
Empire.104 
Rivera argues that Vitoria’s discourses specifically on the conversion of natives were 
linked to the expansion of political legitimacy of Spanish dominium over native land. In 
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turn, what this meant was that the work of the missionary network and the Holy Roman 
Church provided for the expansion of the application of international legal standards as 
understood by Vitoria and the Spanish Crown. In conjunction with other methods of 
supporting the conversion of natives, through destroying their idols, imposing levies, and 
‘educating’ them, pacification through conversion became not just an ecclesial endeavour, but 
a political approach to expansion and application of the Law of Nations as understood by 
Vitoria. 
 
Ecclesial imperialism was inherently linked to the social construction of the native – as an 
‘infidel’, as ‘converts’, and as ‘cannibals’ and practising ‘sodomy’.105 Vitoria when speaking 
of conversation, for example, refers to ‘sins which are harmful to our neighbours, such as 
cannibalism’.106 For Vitoria, 
any prince can compel them not to do these things. By this title alone the emperor is 
empowered to coerce the Caribbean Indians.107 
Coercive conversions of these kinds were linked directly to the understanding of the native as 
‘sexually perverse’.108 Andrea Smith elaborates, the very idea of the native as ‘sexually 
perverse’ was a personification of sexual sin for the missionaries.109 In this context, the 
violence of the Spanish missionaries – which is echoed in Vitoria’s discourses on 
evangelization in particular – was the social construction of the natives used by the Spanish 
Empire to justify their violence on the native population, particularly sexual violence.110 
In this way, we see the missionary networks’ knowledge of natives, acts of conversion, 
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and perpetrating epistemological spiritual,111 intellectual violence, which de Sousa Santos 
refers to as ‘epistemicide’,112 as well as sexual violence.113 
The social construction of the native was produced by the missionary network and then 
used as a means to carry out baptisms, forced conversions and creating conditions for baptisms 
as a way to reiterate and embed further the territorial expansion of the empire – as through the 
missionary network the native became subsumed and consumed by the empire as ‘citizens’. 





This violence of the missionary network, I have covered above, effectively can be understood 
as the undercurrent of colonial governance over the New Indies through the relationship 
between the Spanish Empire and the Holy Roman Church. More importantly, I have shown 
in this chapter how this was specifically and consciously supported by international legal 
doctrines in Vitoria’s discourses. It is because of the formal doctrines, as presented by Vitoria, 
that the operation of the missionaries and the Church is facilitated by ensuring exclusive 
access. Furthermore, by separating violent evangelism of the Church from public violence 
between states, the former becomes unaccountable under the Law of Nations. It is precisely 
the unaccountable modes of violence, through the Holy Roman Church, that then facilitate 
the expansion of the Spanish Empire’s territory in the New Indies. 
 
In the formulation of my thesis, this particular chapter stands as the first instance of 
international law as a relational interplay between international law’s static territory-centred 
approach i.e. Vitoria’s idea of access to territory or what I refer to as public enclaves, and a 
network of actors, i.e. missionary network of the Holy Roman Church. Vitoria’s writing is 
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usually interpreted as one of the origin points of the international legal framework as we now 
understand it – particularly concerning the doctrine of sovereignty. In this chapter, as I have 
shown, his discourses on access to territory and evangelization of the unbeliever, i.e. 
conversion/baptisms, reveal to us how he was speaking to a more specific relationship 
between the Church’s operations in the colonization of the Americas and the Spanish Empire. 
His writings represent a turn in developing a framework or legal architecture for public ‘access 
to territory’ for both the network and the colonial expansion of the Crown. 
 
The germination of a network and a juridical principle of territory-centric formulation of 
international law has been an ecclesial one in the first place – i.e. it started with the Holy 
Roman Church’s missionary network. This process of how the juridical principle of ‘access 
to territory’ or public enclaves and missionary network sought to expand both the network’s 
reach and thereby the empire’s frontiers reveals to us the violence of international legal 
discourse beyond simply its static territory-centered nature. Vitoria’s specific mention of ‘just 
war’ in the chapter on ‘new indies’ has been interpreted as his formulation of legal 
legitimization of war and thus the only way in which we can assess the violence of 
international legal relations. This renders the violence experienced by the indigenous 
population, the native and the colonial ‘citizens’ of the empire completely invisible in the 
paradigm of international law. 
 
In the next chapter, I move on to how Vitoria’s conception of ‘access to territory’ 
translated into the legal capital for another network of actors i.e. the merchant network, 




Chapter 3. The secularisation of the dialogical interplay: Hugo 
Grotius, private property and the merchant networks of the 





In the previous chapter, I showed how Vitoria provided the basis for the dialogical 
interplay between the network of missionaries and international legal discourse on access to 
a territory as part of his understanding of ‘sovereignty’. In this chapter, I explore how Vitoria’s 
understanding of public territory or access to territories was then utilized by Hugo Grotius, 
who is thought to be one of the ‘founding’ fathers of contemporary international law,1 for the 
benefit of commercial expansion and governance of the Dutch East India Company 
Merchants. Central to this aspect of the history of dialogical interplay between merchant 
network and international legal discourse is the underlying imperialism of the birth of the 
‘corporation’ as an association of life which had a colonial accumulative character as well as 
a trans-boundary expansionist logic of property ownership. 
 
I discuss how Grotian discourses moved international legal thought from a strictly 
theological basis towards a secular mercantile oriented approach. However, this movement, 
while relying on the Vitorian emphasis on universal dominium, advanced a more detailed idea 
of ownership of property. I argue, in the third section, how Grotius provided, in this way, a 
legal basis for merchants to not just access territory but to enjoy full authority and control of 
parts of territories and surrounding areas, particularly in the Indonesian 
 
1 
David J Bederman, ‘Reception of the Classical Tradition in International Law: Grotius’ De Jure Belli ac 
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Roberts, ‘Grotian Thought in International Relations’ in Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts 
(eds),  Hugo Grotius and International Relations (OUP 1990) , Kingsbury and Roberts observe that it is not 
possible to accord that paternal title as originator to any one figure as international legal thinking in the mid-
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archipelagos.2 Grotius redefined sovereignty by introducing the idea of the occupation of 
public property by merchants for a longer period so that they could become owners of the said 
‘public property’ and may claim sovereignty. Like Vitoria, Grotius’ reference was to public 
territories that constitute shores and ports and territories closer to or attached to rivers and 
oceans. In Grotius’ case, these happened in ports and shores of islands occupied by indigenous 
communities in the East Indies, specifically Java, Ambon, Banda and the Moluccas. The 
Grotian discourses on sovereignty and war allowed, at the same time, for aggressive expansion 
and appropriation of territories and jurisdictions surrounding the territories acquired through 
exclusive treaties. The Dutch East India Company as a ‘Company-State’ then monopolized 
trade with the indigenous people of the islands in the East Indies, specifically Java, Banda and 
Ambon, often forcing exclusive trade on the indigenous people. 
 
In the last section of this chapter, I turn to the question of violence that this merchant 
network perpetrated as part of its ownership, control and governance over the Indonesian 
archipelago. I show how the development in the legal doctrine of sovereignty became the 
main instrument through which the Dutch Empire’s colonial agent, the Dutch East India 
Company (VOC), maintained control over colonial territories during the early 17th Century. 
Part of the way territorial control was exercised during this time was based on treaties between 
indigenous rulers in the East Indies and the Dutch East India Company - treaties in which the 
balance of power remained with latter. 
 
Focusing on the experiences of natives from the islands of Java, Ambon, Banda and the 
Moluccas, I explore how the VOC enforced these treaties through the use of force against the 
communities it traded with. The Dutch East India Company maintained this uniform policy 
of ownership and unequal exclusive treaties with the East Indies island communities which 
also gave the VOC means to secure trade routes and access to islands. This created a 
commercial-military network of mercantile monopoly through ownership over the chain of 
islands in the East Indies.3 The Grotian conceptualization of war depended, as a result, on the 
securitization of trade routes and territories owned through treaties between the VOC 
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and indigenous peoples. War for Grotius was an integral part of global relations and was meant 
to be regulated as far as inter-imperial rivalry was concerned. However, the Dutch East India 
Company’s violence and forced unequal treaties were excluded from the Grotian concept of 
public violence even though these were a result of Grotian principles of ownership of property. 
 
Furthermore, I argue below that this idea and use of sovereignty through ownership of 
property by occupation allowed the Dutch East India Company to establish a chain of islands 
from which it conducted such relations – using force when necessary to maintain its presence. 
The coercive force used by the company over indigenous communities is described here as 
violence of economic coloniality which resembles hegemonic political form and control.4 The 
Company was a form of a ‘state’ in the way it governed its relationship to the natives of the 
Indonesian archipelago. Grotian discourses on the separation between war and peace, and 
specifically on the distinction between public and private use of force, enabled the Dutch East 
India Company to exercise force without accountability. 
 
Grotius’ redefining of sovereignty in terms of ownership of property coupled with 
divisible property and war and public violence gave the Dutch East India Company’s 
mercantile network both a juridical basis for its governance over islands of indigenous people 
and it allowed for the indirect governance of the Dutch Empire over these territories. Having 
a network of merchants owning territory of a chain of islands allowed for the Dutch Empire 
to expand its hold over trade routes and ports and created a monopoly through force. This 
governance by the Dutch East India Company became an integral part of the Dutch Empire 
and allowed for the application of the Grotian vision of international legal order in an age of 
commercial oceanic imperial rivalry. The rise of the joint stock company/the Company-State 
as a commercial entity in the form it took was central to how the merchant network was 
different to the missionary network in its deployment, development and benefit of the 
international legal discourse it utilized. 
 
II. Grotius and the secular foundations of international law 
 
a. The secular turn in international law 
 
4 
See my definition of violence in this thesis in the introduction, which encompasses this form of economic, 
territorial violence exercised by the VOC against the natives of the Indonesian archipelago.
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Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), the Dutch lawyer to VOC or the Dutch East India Company, is 
remembered in the disciplines of law and philosophy as a jurist.5 His scholarship in his own 
days earned him the reputation of a humanist philosopher.6 He wrote broadly on matters of 
theology, law and politics relevant in the time of commercial and colonial expansion of the 
European world in the 16th Century.7 As a young lawyer, Grotius was hired by the Directors of 
the Dutch East India Company in 1604 to advise them on legal matters.8 The Dutch East India 
Company (VOC) was a joint stock company chartered by the Dutch state on the foundations of 
other mercantile companies and the United Amsterdam Company in 1603.9 Grotius was 
commissioned to write a defence of the Company’s confiscation of the Portuguese vessel, 
caught in Malaccan straits, Santa Catarina.10 The text produced as a result of this defence by 
Grotius was Dejure Pardae, or The Law of Prize and Booty.11 This text itself remained a 
manuscript until 1864; however, the 12th chapter of the text, Mare Liberum or The Free Sea, 
was published in 1609.12 
A few years after the publication of Mare Liberum, Grotius reflected that the purpose of 
the text was to address issues of war and trade in the Indies, as these matters would determine 
the future of the United Provinces in his opinion.13 Grotius’ background was tied to mercantile 
ventures of the Company as his own family owned shares in the United Dutch East India 
Company.14 Hence, as John Haskell among other scholars such as Martine Julia van Ittersum 
argues, his interest in the mercantile endeavour of the Company was driven by personal rather 





Peter Haggenmacher, ‘Hugo Grotius (1583–1645)’ in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds), The Oxford 






Koen Stapelbroek, ‘Trade, Chartered Companies, and Mercantile Associations’, in Bardo Fassbender and 






Hugo Grotius, Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (Martine Julia Van Ittersum ed, originally 
published 1864, Liberty fund 2012). 
12 
Hugo Grotius, The Free Sea (David Armitage ed, originally published 1609, Liberty fund 2012). 
13 
Stapelbroek (n 8). 
14 
John D Haskell, ‘Hugo Grotius in the Contemporary Memory of International Law: Secularism, 
Liberalism, and the Politics of Restatement and Denial’, in José María Beneyto and David Kennedy (eds), 
New Approaches to International Law: The European and American Experiences (T.M.C. Asser Press 2012). 
15 
Martine Julia Van Ittersum, Profit and Principle: Hugo Grotius, Natural Rights Theories and the Rise of 
Dutch Power in the East Indies, 1595-1615 (Brill 2006). 
67 
 
Moreover, it was clear earlier on in his career that he was connected quite well with the 
Dutch state. Before being approached by the Dutch East India Company, he was 
commissioned to write a history of the Dutch revolt against Spain by the Estates of Holland. 
Later on, in 1607, he was appointed as the Solicitor General of Holland.16 The influence of 
his writings on the Dutch colonial policy, especially with regards to its overseas mercantile 
endeavours, can be appraised from these governmental positions as well as Grotius’ 
professional role as the lawyer for the Dutch East India Company at the time. 
 
However, it was his later work, De jure Belli ac pacci or On the Rights of War and Peace,17 
published in 1625 that became influential with the 19th and early 20th Century international 
law jurists.18 David Bederman considers that this book ‘has been one of the most systematic 
treatments of international law in history’.19 Bederman, citing Adam Smith, observes that 
Grotius was the first to present a natural law jurisprudence on the conduct between nations.20 
For some authors, such as Arthur Nausbam and Hersch Lauterpacht, Grotius was thus a 
revolutionary thinker whose ideas on the rights of war and peace presented a secular turn in 
formulating an international legal order based on sovereign equality.21 Hersch Lauterpacht, in 
particular, considered Grotian legal thought as a precursor to what he considered as modern 
international legal thought.22 Referring to what he saw as the post-World War II challenges to 
international law, Lauterpacht observed that Grotius’ writing was tackling ‘fundamental 
problems of international law… in nearly all of them the teaching of Grotius has become 
identified with the progression of international law to a true system of law both in its legal 
and in its ethical content’.23 Lauterpacht argued that Grotius’ thesis on the rights of war and 
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as they were not only appropriate for/to the post-World War II context but represented a 
secular turn in international legal history.24 
For Lauterpacht, Grotius presented a novel progression of natural law philosophy as a way 
of looking at the international legal order between states in a way that was not done by his 
peers,25 by ‘emancipating the law of nature from the shackles of theology’.26 In this way, 
Lauterpacht interprets Grotius’ On the Rights of War and Peace as a law of nature that fulfils 
a ‘humanizing function in the cause of alleviation of suffering and progress’.27 This 
secularisation of the law of nature informs, according to Lauterpacht, the way Grotius 
conceives the international legal order.28 It promotes toleration for religious and cultural 
differences to build a world community of nations mutually benefiting from cooperation and 
trade.29 Hedley Bull, and more recently Mary O’Connel,30 echoes these interpretations of 
Grotius as putting forward a model of a functional international legal order that is 
representative of the purpose of and power of international law.31 Mary O’Connell in 
particular argues that Grotius gave a normative force to international legal rules.32 O’Connel 
argues that Grotian tradition embodies the characteristics of international law that are part of 
its history and development.33 Comparing it to the contemporary practice of international law 
and international relations, Mary O’Connel suggests that Grotius is relevant now more than 
ever as his concerns are similar to present issues around how to respond to ‘leaders willing to 
use violence and cruelty’ to achieve their ambitions 
 
This view of Grotius as the inaugurator of a turn to secularism in international legal 
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humanitarianism has been questioned by critical international law and international relations 
scholars. International relations historian Mark Samos, in his article on Grotius’ use of bible 
sources to present a natural law theory, looks at the idea of secular turn in international law 
and international relations within Grotian discourses on rights of war and peace among other 
related writings.34 
Samos argues that Grotius’ interpretation of natural law sources, that is theological 
philosophy and scripture, can be termed ‘secularizing but not secular’.35 Within the context 
of the Dutch/Iberian conflict, Grotius benefited from using the conceptual tools of the Leiden 
school of thought at the time to separate the arguments about trade and war from religion. As 
Samos observes, ‘the neutralization of religious component from this (Dutch/Iberian) conflict 
would have made it much easier to come to a viable arrangement in the East Indies’.36 
This understanding of Grotius as ‘secularizing’ international legal discourse makes more 
sense given the context, place and reasons for his writings i.e. the commercial ventures of the 
VOC. It is also for this reason I understand this particular part of history as ‘secularisation’ of 
the dialogical interplay between international law and network of actors as it specifically 
relates to commercial/merchant networks. 
 
It is for this reason again the focus on Grotius as a progression figure in international law 
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Iterrsum39 explains how Grotius’ discourses on rules of war and peace, in particular, served 
primarily the commercial interests of the Dutch East India Company. Keene suggests, 
similarly, that the Grotian tradition of international law maintained a distinction between 
relations with the European world and non-European world.40 This Grotian vision of world 
order continued and expanded, therefore, the Eurocentric view of colonial relations based on 
both toleration and a standard of civilization.41 My argument here on Grotian principles adds, 
in this sense, to Keene’s and Van Ittersum’s analyses by considering the relationship between 
the development of international legal doctrine and the expansion of the Dutch East India 
Company as not just a commercial one but also as a governing political body. 
 
While the commercial enterprise of the Dutch was led primarily by the Dutch East India 
Company, The Dutch East India Company was not just a commercial organization. It was a 
political institution with its force supported by the Dutch Empire.42 To understand Grotian 
discourses and revisit them, taking into account the contemporary critical accounts as well as 
the traditional ones, we must also consider how exactly the Dutch East India Company 
operated as a governing body across the Indonesian archipelago. To do so, we must first 
understand the rise of the transnational commercial/merchant network within Europe. 
 
b. Dutch East India Company: the transnational Company-State 
 
 
As overseas trade and merchant guilds rose in Europe, particularly the Spanish, Portuguese 
and the English trading ventures towards the Indian subcontinent and the Indonesian 
archipelago, the Dutch merchants found themselves unsuccessful in creating trading 
outposts.43 In 1598, five consorting merchants ventured towards the Malaccan straits in an 
attempt to establish trade in Indonesia where, for the most part, the Portuguese had already 
established their presence.44 The Dutch merchants, as a new competitor to the English and 
Portuguese,   were  successful   in   bringing   stocks   of  spice   from   the   island  of   Java, 
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consequently plummeting the price of spices in Europe.45 This resulted in the English 
merchants forming the English East India Company in 1600.46 As this presented the Dutch 
with a competitor to the spice trade in the East Indies, the Grand Pensionary of the Dutch 
Republic Government Johan van Oldenbarnnevelt proposed forming a chartered joint stock 
company called the United East India Company or, as I have referred to it, the Dutch East 
India Company.47 de Vries and van Woude have observed that the political leaders of the 
Dutch Republic realized at this moment that a ‘single “united” Dutch presence in Asia could 
pursue a military objective against Spain and Portugal, something that competing merchants 
from both states could never contemplate’.48 
The Dutch East India Company, formed in 1603 with 76 sole administrative directors and 
with 17 selected as active directors, was given its charter by the States General to be the only 
Dutch merchant company to ‘trade, build forts, maintain armies and conclude treaties with 
rulers of non-European territories’.49 The Dutch East India Company was structured to be 
decentralized from its home state, that is the Dutch Republic, for it to be autonomous and 
maintain an oceanic military-based presence in the Asian ocean, in particular in terms of 
trading routes and trading outposts.50 From the outset, the purpose of the Dutch East India 
Company was an aggressive expansion of the overseas trade that could compete for control 
over the spice trade with the Portuguese, Spanish and British. For the Dutch, the archipelago 
of Indonesia was an extremely important geographical point for establishing settlements.51 
These islands on the Malaccan straits, particularly the islands of Java and Banda, could help 
further ventures into and around important trading ports in Japan, China, India, Malaysia and 
Ceylon.52 
The nature of the merchants’ guild in the form of a chartered joint stock company had an 
inherent legal advantage as well. Within the European context, particularly property rights 
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of merchants, education institutions and religious bodies like the Church.53 The purpose of 
this collective to be recognized as ‘legal persons’ was to create an agency to own property, 
make contracts and be referred to as a legal person in all legal matters of ownership and 
succession.54 Previously, in the 15th and 16th Century, the medieval corporate form primarily 
referred to institutionalized religion.55 In the 17th and 18th Century the largest corporations 
were merchant guilds; a collective of merchants that shared responsibility for debt.56 Apart 
from sharing the risk of liability, there were other advantages of merchants forming guilds.57 
This form of cooperation allowed different shareholders of the company to pool in their 
resources and avoid legal fees and taxes normally reserved for single merchant companies and 
individuals.58 The corporate joint stock company status also led to the pursuit of profit for 
shareholders rather than being tied to interest of the regulatory state.59 
The corporate form as a ‘legal person’ that emerged in this time was unique in this 
particular way that it diluted risks and created an opportunity to gain capital through 
investment without actual physical presence and/or labour. The Amsterdam Stock Exchange, 
founded by the Dutch East India Company, was also in this time the first body to regulate the 
buying and selling of shares of public mercantile associations.60 Grietja Baars, for example, 
describes the Dutch East India Company’s creation within the context of the emergence of the 
joint stock company where both the empire, as well as the company derived benefit from its 
nature which allowed raising finance for larger ventures, externalizing risks and also 
providing ‘royal charters’.61 
Thus, the advantage this form of cooperation enjoyed as a legal person, in terms of 
ownership of property and ability to grow for profit, led to its evolution as a chartered 
company. In the era of inter-imperial rivalry for colonial conquests, the formation of the Dutch 
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what the corporation would be capable of achieving in its overseas trade.62 While the 
merchants guild as joint stock corporations operated purely for profit and economic 
advantages for doing so, the chartered cooperation did not, as Koel Stapelbroek observes, 
necessarily come into being for purely profit purposes.63 He goes on to observe that these 
chartered companies were often, at the time, looked at as profit making overseas trading 
companies.64 However, in reality, they were recorded as not making enough profit.65 Hence 
an alternate explanation for their continued support by the State, specifically in the case of the 
Dutch Empire, was how they could operate as a political institution through territorial 
occupation in trading settlements.66 
Stapelbroek also argues that the initial experiences of the ‘pre-companies’, that is the 
trading companies that later joined to make the Dutch East India Company, led to an interest 
in how territorial occupation could be used to deny trading rival rights to trade in a  particular 
non-European territory.67 Stapelbroek argues that this ‘presented the Dutch empire a unique 
opportunity for the sea-borne population of the Dutch Empire to exert pressure onto its 
enemy’.68 In a sense, then, the idea of a chartered company, which received state monopoly 
over trade by carrying out sovereign-like functions, was as much of a political move as an 
economic move. As Stapelbroek states, it reflected a combination of ‘governmental and 
entrepreneurial interests’.69 This confluence between the military or empire’s elite classes with 
the mercantile class is described by Baars as ‘military- mercantilist complex’.70 
Charters as a form of legal technology for the corporate form enabled this combination 
between the state and the corporation. Charters granted to joint stock companies allowed 
‘politics to absorb commerce’.71 As Janet McLean has observed, the charters as legal 


























or imperium to a joint stock company.72 Mclean describes this as a blurring of, what can be 
considered in present times as, public and private spaces.73 Chartered joint stock companies 
like the Dutch East India Company would carry out duties normally considered under the 
ambit of a state.74 The nature of a charter as a prerogative from the monarch, which derogated 
sovereignty into the company to carry out public duties, also allowed for armed commercial 
ventures.75 The company could also carry out certain duties reserved normally for governance 
by a state such as being a source for public finance by raising revenues for the monarch and 
further foreign policy through the company’s earnings by bearing the costs of embassies, 
overseas representatives and fortifications of settlements.76 
Following this analysis, Janet McLean, amongst others including notably Baars77 and 
Mieville,78 concludes that the idea of a chartered joint stock company was for it to be an 
‘instrument of colonization’.79 Baars notices how this relationship between the empire and the 
commercial company ‘represented legal and organization form through which colonial 
powers annexed/appropriated territory’.80 The organizational form here is what in this thesis 
is important for understanding how the chartered company operated in colonial frontiers. 
 
Keeping this in mind, I place my understanding of the VOC in the way described by 
Arthur Weststeijn who states that it is more than just a commercial company serving as an 
instrument of colonization.81 He argues that the fact that it operated as a commercial 
enterprise, with sovereign powers which exercised state-like powers over people within its 
territories, makes it a governing political body.82 He concludes that the Dutch East India 
Company can be seen not just as a corporation but as a Company-State.83 Following Phillip 
Stern’s analysis of the British East India Company, that formed after the Dutch East India 
72 
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Company, this particular understanding of the Dutch East India Company also shows how its 
corporate form is not unlike a governing political body.84 This conceptualization is important 
here for the next section, and the thesis in particular, as it does not do away with ways in 
which the corporation is looked at as an inherently colonial commercial enterprise for the 
accumulation of capital using law as its instrument,85 but pays specific attention to how 
exactly the legal and organizational form of the chartered company imitates political control 
and hegemony like that of an empire or state. More specifically, how this form is itself a 
network form of operation which is facilitated by international legal discourse. 
 
III. The merchant network and the doctrine of partial sovereignty 
 
a. Partial sovereignty and ownership of property 
Keeping the above analysis in mind about the nature of the Dutch East India Company, I turn 
to the conceptual work of Hugo Grotius and the context in which he entered into service of 
the Dutch East India Company. As I have mentioned earlier, Grotius was employed by the 
Dutch East India Company to write a defence for the capture of the Portuguese vessel Santa 
Caterina by the Dutch East India Company at the straits of Singapore in 1603. This particular 
incident was part of the initial formation and expeditions of the Dutch East India Company in 
Asia with the intent of removing the Portuguese presence in the Malaccan straits, specifically 
the town of Johor in Malaysia and Bantem in the island of Java. The political mind behind the 
formation of the Company, Van Oldenbarnevelt, was also a patron to the young Hugo Grotius 
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The incident itself involved the battle and eventual capture of the Portuguese vessel Santa 
Catarina.87 Some members of the Company opposed the idea that goods captured could be 
declared as prize in the Dutch Admiralty court.88 Representing the Company’s interest, 
Grotius’ defence for the capture and declaration of goods as the prize of the East India 
Company rested on propositions mostly set out in the document Mare Liberum. In this 
document, which was a smaller part of his whole defence De jure Pardae, he developed his 
main thesis on the concept of property rights within the discourse of sovereignty and the right 
to war became central to his later works. 
 
One of the more significant issues in the case was whether the Portuguese had exclusive 
rights to trade with the Indonesian islands or even the sea routes between Europe and the East 
Indies. The main concept that allowed him to make his defence was proprietorship, which was 
also a central concept to Grotius’ understanding of sovereignty in the Law of Nations. Within 
the context of this conflict and consistent with his scholastic training, his most important 
source to support his argument on the freedom to trade and access ports and to explore sea 
routes was the humanistic writings of Spanish theologian Francis de Vitoria. 
 
On the point of exclusivity to trade by occupation in the Indonesian island of Java, Ceylon 
and the Moluccas89 Grotius cites Vitoria as a scholarly source for the concept of universal 
sovereignty and for the freedom to trade under the Law of Nations as result of this universal 
sovereignty. He argues that ‘discovery per se gives no real legal rights over things unless 
before the alleged discovery they were res nullius (that is unoccupied)’.90 If it is occupied by 
non-Europeans, Grotius relies on arguments of universal sovereignty as espoused by Vitoria 
in the context of the Spanish experience in the New Indies observing that, 
 
[n]ow these Indians of the east, on the arrival of the Portuguese, although some of them 
were idolators … therefore sunk in grievous sin, had none the less perfect public and private 
ownership of their goods and possessions, from which could not be dispossessed without 
just cause. The Spanish writer Vitoria has the most certain warrant for his 
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conclusion that Christians cannot deprive infidels of their civil power and sovereignty 
merely on the grounds that they are infidels.91 
Grotius comes to the same conclusion as Vitoria in this context on the idea that ‘religious 
belief cannot do away with either natural or human law from which sovereignty is derived’.92 
Further relying on Vitoria, Grotius then moves on to the second part of his defence against 
the exclusivity of the Portuguese over trade with the rulers of the Indonesian islands, that is 
freedom of access and trade under the Law of Nations. Grotius, referring to Vitoria, argues 
once again, 
 
[t]he subjects of United Netherlands have the right to sail to the East Indies and to engage 
with the trade with people there … I Shall base my argument on the unimpeachable axiom 
of Law of Nations called a primary rule or first principle: that every nation is free to travel 
to every other nation and to trade with it.93 
While this reliance seems to suggest similarity to Vitoria’s ideas on Law of Nations, in the 
context of this case and particularly the aims of the Dutch East India Company, Grotius’ use 
of these ideas develop into a more extensive understanding of property and ownership through 
occupation. 
 
When discussing Vitoria in my previous chapter, I had emphasised both these concepts, 
particularly the idea of freedom to and access to trade and the duty of spreading the Christian 
faith. In the case of Vitoria, however, there was a specific focus in how these concepts were 
deployed to support the network of missionaries and the evangelizing endeavour in the New 
Indies. Public territorial enclaves for Vitoria had a very specific purpose in facilitating the 
Church’s governance in the New Indies. In the case of Grotius, however, both these ideas – 
of sovereignty and of freedom to and access to the territory for trade – are specifically 
developed to support the Dutch East India Company’s purpose in expanding into the East 
Indies, particularly in the way in which Grotius had qualified how certain common public 
property can become private property if certain conditions are fulfilled. In the context of this 
overseas trade competition between the Dutch and other imperial rivals, ownership of 











policy of the Dutch East India Company aggressively pushing out the Portuguese from the 
Indonesian archipelago. 
 
Grotius’ explanation of the common public property and private property in Mare Liberum 
is derived from a more detailed explanation of property as a part of natural law. According to 
Grotius, the origins of property suggest that ‘common property and sovereignty had different 
meanings’.94 Sovereignty as understood by Grotius was a ‘particular kind of proprietorship 
that excludes possession by anyone else’95 while common property meant ‘ownership or 
possession held between many people by mutual understanding’.96 However, Grotius goes on 
to say, the idea of sovereignty and common property was different at the time of primitive law 
of nations as ‘nature knows no sovereigns’97 and there was no such right as ‘private 
property’.98 In the primitive law of nations, there were ‘no boundary lines’99 and ‘no 
commercial intercourse’.100 He goes on to say that according to this reasoning ‘there was a 
kind of sovereignty, it was universal and unlimited’.101 
The transition to sovereignty and ownership, as we now know them, was, according to 
Grotius, one that was dictated by nature itself. Grotius stated that natural things could be 
divided between movable and immovable property.102 These natural things according to 
Grotius then started to be divided among states. Further, as the ‘states began to be established 
so two categories were of the things which were wrested away from early ownership’.103 
These two categories were public and private. The public is the property of people and private 
is the property of individuals. Ownership, for Grotius in either public or private categories, 
occurs in the same way. States would then begin occupying anything that by nature is 




























who occupies it’.104 To make something occupied, however, it must be contained through 
‘building’ or ‘boundary’.105 
It is also this nature of the property that, he argues, is what makes the seas free to all 
nations. Since the sea ‘cannot be enclosed nor be built upon’, by nature it is meant to be 
‘common property to be enjoyed by all’.106 It cannot be ‘physically appropriated by any nation 
or person’.107 However, there is a certain common property attached to the sea that can be 
owned. Grotius states that ‘if any part of the coast, shore, or portion adjoining the sea is 
susceptible to the occupation, it may become the property of the one who occupies it only so 
far as such occupation does not affect its common use’.108 Further exploring this idea of 
ownership of a property through occupation Grotius qualifies this by suggesting that 
occupation can be possible only by ‘erection of boundaries, some determination of boundaries 
such as fencing in’.109 
This form of occupation or definition of occupation is the only way in which these shores, 
pieces of land adjoining the sea can be owned as property. Later on, in his later works, he 
develops the idea of occupation further by suggesting that, as part of a transition from 
primitive law of nations to Law of Nations in his own time, private property was a natural 
means of progression.110  
 
This is where Grotius’ concept of proprietorship in understanding sovereignty leads to 
supporting the territorially expansionist policy of the Dutch East India Company. The idea 
that the shores or adjoining lands to the sea can be occupied and thus owned is part of how 
Grotius supported the Dutch Empire’s drive to push and monopolize trade with the natives of 
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occupants’111 was derived for the Dutch Empire and the VOC by Grotius to facilitate a claim 
of ownership over shores to build ports, bases and settlements. The second aspect of what 
made the VOC merchant network’s colonization successful was their use of treaties as a 
means to both build and expand their ports and settlements. Here again, we see Grotius’ legal 
discourse providing the legal architecture for this governance over natives for the merchant 
network to expand. 
 
b. Unequal treaties and monopolization of trade through force 
The first base that the Dutch merchants established was through a treaty in North Ambon in 
1600 with the Hitu Muslim community as part of a treaty to provide military support against 
the Portuguese.112 As part of this treaty, the natives were to exclusively trade with the Dutch 
on a set price. As Weststeijn notes, this agreement was a common model to develop a military-
commercial alliance against particularly the Portuguese at the time with the caveat they would 
not interfere in each other’s religious affairs.113 As Borschberg observes, the VOC’s agreement 
with the Kingdom of Johor was seen through Grotius’ conception as an alliance between the 
VOC and the natives against the Portuguese.114 Thus soon enough, in 1608, with the help of 
locals, the Dutch East India Company managed to establish a settlement and government in the 
island of Java making the port city of Batavia their centre of operation in the Indonesian 
archipelago.115 
While the legal conception of partial sovereignty through ownership of shores to build 
ports was an integral step for the Dutch Company’s colonial expansion, it is effectively a 
Grotian conception of treaty making as a result of this ownership which reflects the 
‘secularizing’ process of a dialogical interplay between international legal discourse and 
network of merchants. Grotius, for example, maintained and developed a sanctity to trade 
when he said, that ‘which is done by two parties cannot be undone by one’ in response to the 
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Java islands.116 The agreements which VOC made with the natives in the Indonesian 
archipelago were exclusive trade agreements and while they could not stop other foreigners 
coming to trade,117 they could enforce their contract on the natives they had an agreement 
with along with driving off the Portuguese as part of the agreement. 
 
As part of their treaty ‘agreements’, The Dutch East India Company attacked the 
Portuguese port in Malacca in 1606 assisted by forces in the town of Johor,118 Malay as well 
as the island of Ambon in 1605.119 The Dutch East India Company’s aim in all these initial 
excursions into port cities of these islands was not only to drive the Portuguese out of the 
Indonesian archipelago but to establish settlements and forts to occupy the shores under the 
ownership of the Company. This particular ownership meant reinforcing the terms of 
exclusive trade with the natives as well as its enforcement. Thus, while, under Grotius’ thesis, 
the Portuguese and any other could roam the sea routes in the Malaccan straits, they could not 
have monopoly or access to trade with the island native merchants and their rulers as they 
would have to go first through ports owned by the Dutch but the natives themselves would be 
forced only to trade with the Dutch should they try to trade with anyone else.120 It was also 
consistent with the aims of the Dutch East India Company, along with its charter, to build 
forts and settlements in port towns and shores of the islands in Indonesia to drive the 
Portuguese away. 
 
The territorial ownership of the shores through occupation by way of fortifications did not 
just restrict access to these ports for other European merchants but was integral in creating a 
network of port cities that could control traffic and governance of trade within these islands.121 
Grotius’ concept of private ownership and private agreements/treaties enforcing economic 
governance in this way facilitated the operation and expansion of the Dutch East India 
Company and its territorial occupation which created a ‘chain of islands’122 in the straits of 
Malacca. In contrast to Vitoria, whose claim to exclusivity of access to quasi-public territorial 
enclaves was contingent on the religious precedence and authority of 
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the Pope, Grotius claimed this exclusivity through a secularised notion of ownership over the 
property. In the case of Grotius, moreover, private ownership of shores applied to the 
chartered joint stock company, like the Dutch East India Company, which complemented and 
enhanced the way it could justify its governance and operation in a transnational manner. 
 
As I have mentioned before, by nature the chartered joint stock company could not only 
own property but was decentralized from its place of origin, the Dutch Republic. It was a legal 
entity that could own property as a private owner and with a military force to build forts and 
make treaties with native local rulers. Separated from any religious difference, network in the 
form of a commercial network in this manner was far more expansive within the Law of 
Nations than religious networks could have ever been. A private company acting like a state, 
owning property in colonial frontiers, making treaties in its name and enforcing them all 
across its interconnecting island ports was not possible in this manner by either the empire or 
the Church. 
 
By 1609 the Dutch East India Company managed to establish a governance system like  a 
state government with its central operations in Batavia.123 Ruled by a Governor General 
appointed by the directors of the Company, permanent factories were established in the port 
city of Batavia.124 Poor communication with the Dutch Republic and the directors of the 
Company meant that the Governor General had greater autonomy and flexibility in his 
decisions.125 The Governor General of Batavia was Jan Pieterzsoon Coen (1587–1629), who 
had envisioned the Dutch East India Company’s network in Asia as a series of strong points 
connected by sea power. The island of Java and the Moluccas were important trading ports as 
they were integral to the trading system in the Indonesian archipelago and routes that led 
further eastwards into China and Japan.126 For Coen, establishing strong military occupation 
and control over the governance of trade in these islands and the Malaccan straits meant that 
it could break the Portuguese and possibly English monopoly over the spice trade to replace 
it with its own. 
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a. ‘Private’ war and enforcement of treaties 
 
 
Partial ownership, unequal treaty enforcement became a way for the Dutch East India 
Company (VOC) to establish control and governance over the Indonesian archipelago. Using 
the idea of occupation to claim ownership, it developed ports while it used its alliance building 
by unequal treaties to create monopolies, both forms of juridical tools being used to reassert 
its governance like that of a ‘state’ in the Indonesian archipelago. The sharp end of its 
colonization of Java islands was specifically how its military presence, through the occupation 
and ownership over ports to build forts, was used in conjunction with treaty enforcement on 
the natives in particular. Grotius, while providing a framework for ‘free trade’, and giving a 
distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’, gave a framework for a ‘private’ company to act 
like a state. This particularly justified form of violence not considered ‘public’ or by a ‘state’ 
was an ‘absolute’ and ‘just’ right to ‘punish’ to enforce treaties. 
 
Grotius’ approach towards just violence as a form of punishment to preserve and protect 
common property as much as private property made no distinction between a public and 
private war. In his own words: 
 
war is righteously undertaken in defence of individual property, so no less righteously 
undertaken on behalf of the use of those things which by natural law ought to be common 
property. Therefore he who closes up roads, hinders the export of merchandise ought to be 
prevented from so doing even without waiting for any public authority.127 
This particular paragraph from Mare Liberum does not just the make case for war being waged 
between nation states on just grounds for preserving and protecting the use of common 
property like the free sea but also emphasises the individual right to violence under natural 
law. This individual right to violence for protection of private as well as common property for 
Grotius extends not only to the sea but also to common property that is susceptible to 
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Grotius’ insistence that war, whether public or by private individuals, can be waged justly 
hinges upon the protection of property. As he states: ‘Let no one seize possession of that which 
has been taken into possession of another’.128 Grotius argues further that the right to wage war 
as a collective in the form of a state is inherently linked to the individual’s right to seek 
punishment. He observes that ‘the right of chastisement was held by a private person before 
it was held by the state’.129 His description of just war in this sense explains it as a form of 
punishment. Parry notes that from these passages in Mare Liberum and Commentary on the 
Law of Prize and Booty, it could be said that Grotius was equating the rights of an individual 
to that of the rights of a state in resorting to violence to redress wrongs.130 
Beyond the fact that this concept of war puts the Dutch East India Company in a position 
where it can both take by force and defend its owns ports and shores, it gives a justifiable 
framework of violence for a private legal person to use force. This was not only important to 
drive the Portuguese away from the ports and shores that the Dutch East India deemed 
important to establish strong links for trade but also in governing over the East Indies native 
rulers. 
 
Here, Grotius’ idea of sovereignty became useful in a specific way to rulers of these 
particular islands in the Indonesian archipelago where the Dutch East India Company 
established its naval and military ports. Ed Keene observes,131 and as I have also shown above, 
that while Grotius understood sovereignty as universal even for the non-Christians, his 
understanding of how to conduct relations with them is entirely different to his understanding 
of how to conduct relations with Europeans. At the center of this difference lies Grotius’ ideas 
of civilization, which for him can only be reflected in the Europeans due to the way they have 
occupied property. Grotius explains the difference between ‘simple tribes living in America’ 
who ‘lack ambition’ and ‘industry’ and their European counterparts who chose a ‘refined 
mode of living’.132 This ‘refined mode of living’ was a sign of progress for Grotius as the 
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we are commended not to throw it into the sea not leave it unproductive nor to waste it but 
to use it to meet the needs of other men by giving it away or lending it to those who ask as 
is appropriate of not those who are owners but stewards or representative of God, the 
Father.133 
Grotius’ understanding of difference between the civilized and uncivilized also hinged on 
how property can be or must be occupied and it also ties into how the Dutch East India as a 
private legal entity could make treaties with non-Christians in a manner which would lead to 
governance over them. The idea of treaty obligations, even unequal treaties, became a legal 
instrument whereby the Dutch East India Company could gain governance over native people 
with whom the treaties were made. He maintained that even non-Christians under the Law of 
Nations must adhere to obligations of a treaty.134 Natural law dictated, according to Grotius, 
that treaties with infidels could be lawful instruments as they were ‘common to all 
mankind’,135 regardless of the fact that these would, in some conditions, be done forcefully.136 
Grotius also emphasised that private war, particularly in the case of treaties with rulers of 
native islands in the East Indies, was a legitimate form of violence. He states, ‘in the absence 
of independent and effective judge – of which none were available in the East Indies – each 
private person resumed his sovereign powers and executed judgment in his own cause’.137 
The primary form of violence was due to the economic governance which often led either 
to famine or violent push back from the Company forces when natives resisted trading 
constraints imposed on them. The treaties put restrictive trading practices on the native rulers 
and merchants of the East Indies. An example of how much control over traffic of trade the 
Dutch required from the East Indies natives is the case of the policing of trade around the 
islands of Banda and Ambonia.138 The Dutch East India Company’s policy within the East 
Indies was always to monopolize the spice trade. The elimination of competition has been 
described in DW Davies’ reference to the Company directors’ instruction to the Governor 
General of the Company in Batavia, Java, Jan Coen: ‘as far as possible he should see to it 
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remain firmly in the hands of the Company, so that no nation in the world should have a 
share in it but ourselves’.139 
This insistence on controlling and monopolizing spice trade was so aggressive that the 
Company forces began to police trade routes and ports at strategic points surrounding 
Ambonia and Banda.140 The main consequence of this was first felt in the Island of Solor 
where the local natives depended on food commodities coming from China and Timor.141 The 
Dutch Company officers were told to apprehend rice coming from these places as prizes which 
happened to be a staple food that the natives of Solor were dependant on.142 This led to hunger 
and famine on the Island of Solor.143 As the Dutch tried to sell these confiscated food 
commodities as their own they set higher prices since they lacked the manpower of the 
independent traders they had replaced.144 The Island of Banda had a similar scenario where 
rice trade was prohibited with any other merchant than the Dutch East India Company.145 The 
Company threatened to cut down the native islands’ palm trees depriving them of their 
principal food stuff.146 When the local merchants did not follow instruction, Jan Coen led a 
military expedition to massacre about 15,000 Banadense natives in 1627.147 
As Weststeijn observes, the VOC essentially led ‘monopolization by force’ campaigns 
against the natives due to their ‘faithlessness’ to the treaties eventually leading to the signing 
of the new treaty after Jan Coen’s Campaigns in 1627, which stipulated that the VOC were to 
be ‘Sovereign ruling Lords’ in the Banda Islands.148 Not only was this idea of enforcing 
treaties through private war, even if they were unequal, justified, but it was also linked then 
to the difference in civilization in the ‘refined mode of living’ of the Europeans. Grotius argues 
that through the treaties, ‘natives of the Spice Islands were fortunate that they might have lost 
their self-determination in economic affairs, but not in any other sense’.149 The transfer of 
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East Indies islands was implicit in the Grotian understanding of sovereignty,150 as stated, that 
‘Of the different kinds of unequal treaties, those that allowed the “building of garrisons” 
without any protest would lead to a transfer of “rights to ruling”’.151 
The result was that those towns or ports in the East Indies islands that were virtually 
occupied by the Dutch East India Company’s forces and were built upon would effectively 
come under the company’s control.152 Of course if this transfer of ‘rights of ruling’ was 
contested or resisted, the Dutch East India Company could, according to Grotius, use violence 
to enforce the terms and the implications of the treaty signed. Grotius maintained that in these 
cases ‘patronage of the state does not take away independence, as independence without 
sovereignty is inconceivable’.153 The ‘rights of ruling’ for Grotius were only partial rights.154 
Inge Van Hulle observes that this constitutes a kind of benevolent guidance and help granted 
by the protector rather than the establishment of dominion.155 
 
b. Island chains of the company and political banishment 
 
 
Moreover, the Company itself was not just a maritime or commercial imperial entity but, as I 
mentioned above, it was also a territorial governing political body. This can be surmised from 
Kerry Ward’s argument that beyond controlling access and traffic of trade, the Company used 
its network for the forced migration of workforce and political banishment.156 Kerry Ward 
argues that the Company’s rule within the East Indies island, particularly in those islands 
where it became a governing ruling force such as Batavia and Banda Island policing, bonded 







See Inge van Hulle, ‘Grotius, Informal Empire and the Conclusion of Unequal Treaties’ (2016) 37(1) 
Grotiana 43 for an in-depth analysis of unequal treaties as an instrument of usurpation of sovereignty in the 
East Indies. 
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Soon after the Banda Island massacre against the natives led by Jan Coen in 1627, the 
VOC introduced slave labour in parts of its controlled Indonesian territories.158 The ‘rights of 
ruling’ that gave partial sovereignty over East Indies islands to the Company or rather allowed 
for a usurpation of sovereignty of, what Grotius considered, weaker states made up the nexus 
of forced migration networks for the Company.159 The Company used its existing ‘chain of 
islands’ connected through shipping networks for political banishment of dissenters in native 
islands;160 this included Ambonese and Javenese Muslims that resisted the Company’s 
governance over the islands of Java and Batavia. According to Ward, the island of Batavia 
was central to the nexus of forced migration network of the Company.161 Dissenters from the 
islands were transported to the Company’s territory in the Cape of Good Hope. Kerry Ward 
understands, therefore, the Dutch East India Company’s operation more as a form of a 
Company-State that operated through ‘cultural, military, migration, economic, transportation 
and exchange networks that amalgamated over time into an imperial web whose sovereignty 
was created and maintained but always partial’.162 
Kerry Ward’s explanation of the political governing practices of the Dutch East India 
Company further embeds the argument I have presented above in terms of how the VOC acted 
as a merchant network with state-like governing powers spanning across sea and land through 
port cities. My argument situates the importance of legal architecture given by Grotius as part 
of the Dutch East India Company’s expansion. The legal architecture that Grotius provided 
became a foundation on which the Dutch East India Company established its forms of penal, 
political and bonded labour migration networks as part of its governance after 1627. As I have 
argued above, Grotius did not just support the imperial policy of the Dutch East India 
Company as a trading mercantile corporation; his ideas of property ownership, private war 
and treaty enforcement also helped the Company to expand as a transnational governing 
political body. 
 
Along with Grotian understanding of sovereignty, the ownership of a property through 
occupation and private violence and the obligation to treaties signed became the legal building 
blocks for the Dutch East India Company to turn ownership over shores and ports into 













form of governance is inherently violent in the operation of the Dutch East India Company as 
a Company-State as well as its governance over the ‘chain of islands’ it owned in the 
Indonesian archipelago. This violence was perpetrated through Grotius’ ideas on partial 
ownership through occupation and enforcement of treaties by private individuals. By 
emphasising on partial ownership through occupation, which was contingent on the building 
of forts and military presence, the enforcement of treaties to consolidate their position as 
‘sovereign’ rulers in the Indonesian archipelago, Grotius gave the legal architecture for the 




In the previous chapter I argued that Vitoria’s contribution in setting up an architecture for 
dialogical interplay between a territory-centric notion of international law and the missionary 
network of the Holy Roman Church can be seen as the ecclesial genesis of network 
governance in international law. Grotius’ explanation of property ownership, private war and 
treaty making led to very specific support for the transnational expansion of the Dutch East 
India Company. This was markedly different, however, from Vitoria not only because of a 
shift from the religious missionary network to the secular mercantile network but also in the 
way in which Grotius set up a ground for the expansion of the Dutch East India Company’s 
governance as secular state-like formation. 
 
It was not just concerned with economic affairs, but its ownership and governance over a 
chain of islands facilitated political and military motives. This independence of governance 
over this chain of islands in this manner was also possible because of the autonomy that the 
Dutch Republic allowed the Dutch East India Company. While, theoretically, the company’s 
prizes and possessions could be held for the Dutch Republic, in reality, the Dutch Republic 
did not ask for any share in the profits of the Company.163 This too, along with its military 












In the context of the overall argument that I am advancing in this thesis, this stage of the 
relationship between international legal doctrine, particularly on understanding sovereignty 
through property ownership, represents the secularisation of dialogical interplay centering 
private actors i.e. merchant networks through a Company-State formation. This secularisation 
of the dialogical interplay through the Dutch East India Company merchant network shows 
colonization through interaction with the native population through unequal legal forms such 
as treaties which then are also used as a justification for violence. In the next chapter, I show 
how the Company-State of the British was influenced by the VOC and yet pioneered a 
different form of colonial rule in the 17th Century due to the existing social structure of the 
subcontinent of India. This colonial governance then also evolved into an imperial ‘state form’ 
emerging as an imperial trans-boundary network of administrators from the 19th Century 







Chapter 4. The bureaucratisation of the dialogical interplay: 






In this chapter, I show that the British contribution to the development of international legal 
discourses throughout the 17th to mid-19th Century relied on a Grotian concept of sovereignty 
– specifically the concepts of property and jurisdiction – to advance imperial governance in 
the form of networks. This chapter maps how the evolution of the principle of sovereignty to 
a ‘trust’ for civilization was informed by the merchant networks of British East India 
Company and later the British imperial administrators building a mutually beneficial and 
cooperative relationship with native elite dominant caste communities in the Indian 
subcontinent. This cooperation led to a shift from rule by company merchants to the indirect 
governance by a network of colonial administrators between the 17th and 19th Century. 
I argue that the British East India Company’s rule, while influenced by the VOC, assumed 
a different approach to the colonial interaction with the colonized in the subcontinent. Thus, 
even as unequal treaties remained important, and in fact increased as a practise in the early 
part of 19th Century, the British approach to interacting with the natives responded to existing 
socio-cultural and religious imperial elite formations existing within the subcontinent. These 
existing social-cultural, political and religious formations included particularly dominant 
caste Brahmin, Kshatriya and Ashraf/Mughal leaders/communities, to rule through 
interlocking interests and maintain British imperialism through dominant caste hierarchies. In 
this part of the history of the dialogical interplay in international law, we also see the 
development of the property as ‘trust’, ‘moral universalism’ and ‘pluralism’ as aspects of 
sovereignty in the imperial liberal legal order emerging from the cooperation between the 
imperial administrators as well as the native elite caste networks. An important aspect of these 
developments on the ideas of property as ‘trust’, moral universalism and pluralism was the
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inherent violence of colonial governance by merchant networks, imperial administrative 
networks and their patronage of native caste elite communities. This violence of these networks 
could be seen through the juridification/codification of laws for the benefit of existing imperial 
hierarchies and interlocking interests of both the British imperial administrators and the 
dominant caste communities in the subcontinent’s rule. This juridification process was violence 
in and of itself as it cemented legal and political hierarchies of the caste elites while also 
entrenching civilizational hierarchy of the British Empire to rule over the subcontinent. The 
codification as a confluence between the imperial administrators and their elite caste networks 
also led to physical violence through criminalization and policing of particularly peasant, 
marginalized caste-led movements against both the British and the native elite dominant caste 
leaders. This interlocking set of interests and mutual benefit also laid the foundations of 
‘indirect rule’, which was the imperial method of rule within the international legal order later 
on in the 20th Century. 
I explain how the international legal discourse on sovereignty in Vitoria and Grotius was 
influential to the British East India Company’s colonial expansion in the subcontinent. In the 
years spanning between the 17th and 18th Century, the British Crown’s support for establishing 
the British East India Company and giving it a monopoly became part of its imperial policy. 
The relationship between the State and the British East India Company in comparison to the 
previous instances of networks, that is, the Holy Roman Church in the 16th Century and the 
Dutch East India Company, was rife with conflicting interests. The Company, understood as 
a kind of separate governing networked institution, was able to grow its influence through the 
British State’s engagement with international legal discourses by Grotius. As a form of 
networked imperial governance, its government over territories in India, however, assumed a 
different form than the VOC i.e. it relied on native elite dominant caste networks to maintain 
control of its ports through policing and military force. 
 
I show how, as the conflicting interests between the Company and the British State 
intensified, the idea of property and jurisdiction began to be engaged with through the concept 
of ‘trusteeship’, which shifted to the state the responsibility of governing colonial territories. 
The late 18th Century saw the emergence, as a result, of the early foundations of imperial 
liberalism, which coupled with changing conceptions of Grotian perceptions of sovereignty 
placed the state as a form of government at the center of the discussion. From 1813 to 1833, 
the British State’s growing interference in the Company’s jurisdictions through legislative and 
juridical reform resulted in a slow administrative takeover of the territories of the Company. 
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This juridical and legislative control turned into a devolved governmental structure over the 
colonies, where a network of colonial administrators governed with relative autonomy and 
discretion. 
 
At the same time, this particular shift from the Company merchants’ governance to 
imperial administrators' colonial officers understood their position in the governance of 
subcontinent through the underlying notions of ‘moral universalism’ and ‘cultural pluralism’ 
which became central to how a liberal imperial legal order, and international law, was to be 
understood. I argue that these elements of sovereignty were the result not only of the changing 
British perception on sovereignty but also of their encounter and cooperation with the native 
elite dominant caste network whose continuing position within the socio- economic hierarchy 
of caste was maintained due to these aspects of sovereignty i.e. ‘cultural pluralism’ and ‘moral 
universality’. These political and juridical developments along with the rise of the liberal 
political philosophy of free trade allowed the British State to gain more control over the 
jurisdictional authority of the Company in India. 
 
In the last section, I explore how this network of colonial administrators not only took 
over important judicial and administrative positions that were previously taken by Company 
appointed individuals, but it also exercised a similar kind of administrative violence through 
the cementing of the dominant caste mythos and position through a codification of law in an 
Anglophonic form – which also reiterated a British civilizational hierarchy. In the garb of 
‘cultural pluralism’ and ‘moral universalism’, codification became also a way for the British 
to extend and control the resistance against their position in the subcontinent specifically 
through acts such as the Criminal Tribes Act 1871, Forest Act 1876, using ‘trust’ over the 
property to build infrastructure displacing and criminalizing indigenous (adivasi) 
communities in the subcontinent and confluence with land care-takers (zamindars) from 
dominant caste communities to quash marginalized caste peasant and indigenous rebellions. 
 
This shift towards imperial networks – from commercial to colonial administrators – was 
envisioned by 18th Century British and Scottish scholars as a turn to direct rule. However, due 
to the geographic expanse of the British Empire, the ‘Commonwealth’ could not practically 
be governed directly in a uniform and structured manner. Instead, the Empire in the 19th 
Century could be described as devolved colonial governmental structures led by 
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administrators with and through native elite dominant caste networks. In this sense, it is 
possible to see the 19th Century network of colonial administrators ruling under the British 
State in name, but acting with relative autonomy in practice relying on governance through 
selected patronage networks of caste elites in the subcontinent. The difference between this 
form of imperial governance and the commercial network of the British East India Company 
and those before it, that is the Holy Roman Church and Dutch East India Company, was the 
cooperation with internal native elite networks of the colonial administrators whose patronage 
was owed to the British imperial State. The British Empire’s indirect governance in this period 
can be seen therefore as indirect governance over its colonies through the networks of 
administrators in confluence with native elite caste networks. 
 
II. British East India Company and the British Empire 
 




In the initial period of the Company’s establishment between 1600 and 1757, the British 
Empire’s ideological basis was rooted in Protestantism, commerce, freedom and maritime 
navigation.1 In part, these ideas arose out of the British Crown’s rivalry with the Spanish 
Empire’s excursions to colonize native lands in the East Indies by conquest.2 For reasons of 
imperial commercial rivalry and religious rhetoric, such as trade as a right of all civilized 
nations, the English attitude towards encounters with non-European natives assumed a 
different form. The Spanish Empire’s colonial expansion was based on the acquisition of 
territory from natives. This forceful acquisition by conquest was justified on the basis that the 
natives, as infidels, did not possess sovereignty.3 English thinker Samuel Purchas (1575– 
1626) questioned the justification given by the Spanish Catholic Empire for their conquests 
by relying on the writings of Spanish jurist Francis de Vitoria (1492–1546).4 As David 
Armitage points out, Purchas used Vitoria’s writings on the limited authority of the Pope in 
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was illegitimate.5 In his first book, Pilgrimage published in 1614, Purchas also relies on 
Vitoria’s emphasis on the importance of cooperation between nation states, even non- 
European infidels, for trade as part of the natural Law of Nations that cannot be prohibited.6 
Within the context of inter-imperial rivalry at the time, another jurisprudential question 
that has an important role in formulating the ideological basis of British commercial empire 
was sovereignty over the seas. As the idea of Mare Liberum (the free sea) opposed Spanish 
and Portuguese claims over trade routes, the British Empire relied on Hugo Grotius’ (1583– 
1645) conception of the free sea as a means to oppose Portuguese dominance in the East 
Indies.7 This was marked by, as Lauren Benton has noted, a time when the ocean was 
imagined as space through which flows of exchange occurred throughout the globe.8 Central 
to this understanding of the ocean is how the law was instrumental in conceptualizing the 
ocean space.9 On the one hand, as a backdrop for trade and travel, the ocean is described as 
being incapable of occupation and thus a lawless expanse.10 Yet, there remained a  possibility 
of legal regulation even within the domain of the ocean. Imagining trade routes and 
jurisdictional corridors in the ocean for sovereign states was common, as captains believed 
they carried the authority of the sovereign through the ocean routes they took.11 
As much as these discussions were pertinent to the development of international legal 
argument over ocean disputes, their necessity came about due to inter-imperial trade 
competition. In this context, Benton’s work has focused on how imperial knowledge on 
geographical imagination was codified in and through law.12 Thus she shows how and why 
geography and sovereignty were imagined for imperial ambitions in maintaining trade 
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Paying attention to Grotius and international legal discourse within this period it is also 
possible to appreciate the operation of the networked institutions themselves; i.e. how through 
international legal discourse powerful states supported network institutions’ monopoly over 
trade routes and trade ports in peripheral colonies. In taking into account this line of thought 
against the historical background of 16th-Century conflicts over trade routes and rights over 
territories ‘discovered’, Hugo Grotius’ Mare Liberum, published in 1609, is an illustrative 
interpretation of sovereignty.14 I have explored this in the previous chapter, where I discussed 
how the Grotian conception of sovereignty justified the idea of ‘freedom of seas’ by thinking 
about sovereignty through the idea of property. Not only did Grotius’ distinction between 
jurisdiction and ownership allowed him to justify the capture of the Portuguese vessel Saint 
Catherine, but it also gave an infrastructure for the territorial control over shores for trading 
ports.15 In its expansion to establish a/the monopoly of trade in the Spice Islands, the Dutch 
East India Company relied on its jurisdictional control over the shores by fortifying ports.16 
These fortified ports were integral to the East India Company’s virtual control over trade in 
these islands.17 These chains of fortified ports allowed the Dutch East India Company to exert 
influence over both natives and trading companies attempting to trade with the natives.18 This 
influence manifested in violence and coercion against the natives to reject any agreement with 
other trading companies or forcing the trading companies to leave voluntarily.19 Nonetheless, 
it is particularly the success and model of the Dutch East India Company and its approach to 







The conflict over the Portuguese vessel Saint Catherine came to happen before the actual publication of 
Mare Liberum as a textbook in 1609, as it was primarily where Grotius developed initial arguments for his 
two-part volume on the Law of War and Peace. 
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Both Grotius and Vitoria advanced different thinking on sovereignty to facilitate the operation of 
commerce and, particularly in Vitoria’s case, religious networks in the Native territories. While in Vitoria’s 
writings this assumed a form of natural law thinking surrounding debates on Thomist theology on jurisdiction 
and sovereignty, Grotius relied on the idea of private property as a jurisprudential component of sovereignty. 
Nonetheless, in engaging with ideas of sovereignty in relation to non-European ‘savages’, Grotius relied on 
Vitoria in both Mare Liberum and later on the possession of prize and booty in his commentaries on 
sovereignty. In the previous chapter I have discussed despite having different contexts and different juristic 
roots, the intellectual movement of legal thought by Grotius in his usage of Vitoria allowed him to make a 
case for interactions through treaty making with the non-European as an integral component of sovereignty. 
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Along with Purchas’ reference to Vitoria for cooperation with ‘infidels’ as part of the Law 
of Nations, Grotius’ Mare Liberum also became an important juridical concept for inter-
imperial rivalry. While Purchas’ interest in Vitoria was underpinned by broader concerns 
about Protestantism, his interest in advancing British colonial ventures was reflected in his 
support for the explorations of the Virginia Trading Company.20 Before Purchas, Richard 
Hayklut (1553–1616), a philosopher, was among the chief propagators of British commercial 
imperialism during this period. His interest in the area of sea sovereignty also led him to 
translate Hugo Grotius’ Mare Liberum.21 Hakluyt’s writings, before he translated Mare 
Liberum, largely propagated British commercial supremacy and the right to navigate.22 
Despite Purchas’ theological background and approach, his interest in advancing British 
commercial interest led him to collect the works of Hakluyt on the Principles of Navigations 
in the Sea.23 
Hakluyt’s translation provided the English thinkers with an opportunity to engage with 
the Dutch East India Company’s arguments founded on Grotius’ thesis on the free seas. These 
translations were to be utilized in the series of conferences between the British and Dutch 
from 1613–1618 concerning primarily two questions; one of British access to ‘spice islands’ 
or the Indonesian archipelago24 and the other of fishing in the coastal region north of England 
bordering the coast of the Dutch Empire. Firstly, in the Anglo-Dutch conflict over access, 
Grotius, who was himself present at the commission for the resolution of the conflict, replied 
by suggesting that a right to jurisdiction can also become legitimate when consent is given by 
its occupants.25 In the second conference, British lawyers used Grotius’ text on the difference 
between property and occupation to argue its right over the coastal region.26 Later on, this 
idea of consent from those occupying the inland of the shore was then cited by John Selden 
(1584–1654), a Scottish jurist, to develop a reply to Grotius’ Mare Liberum principle. John 
Selden had initially written a reply to Grotius’ text on the freedom of seas in the form of 
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Martine Julia Van Ittersum, Profit and Principle: Hugo Grotius, Natural Right theories and the Rise of 
Dutch Power in the East Indies 1595-1615 (Brill 2006). The conference was also a diplomatic attempt to 
negotiate with the restrictions on fishing without licence off the northern British coast as well an Anglo-Dutch 
alliance against the Spanish merchants as part of a condition to allow access to trade in the Indonesian 
Archipelago. 
25
 See in chapter 3 on Grotius’ response to this as part of his conception of exclusivity of trade with the 
natives of Kingdom of Johor. 
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Mare Clausum.27 The purpose of this text, Mare Clausum, was to justify the English 
Crown’s right to shores of surrounding islands. 
 
After Selden, Sir Phillip Meadows (1626–1718), a British diplomat, reiterated the same 
principle of jurisdiction over property by the Crown or private individuals.28 This particular 
idea of private individuals gaining jurisdictional control through consent became the 
underlying logic of commercial activity in Britain.29 Coupled with Vitoria’s ideas on dealing 
with dominium of ‘infidels’ and the natural condition of Christian people to exchange and 
trade around the globe, British commercial policy was imbued with a very similar logic as the 
Dutch East India Company.30 A hallmark of this was how jurisdictional control over shores 
could be had through dealing with ‘infidels’ as well, which became a necessity and asset for 
establishing commercial networks. Despite different debates surrounding jurisdiction over 
coastal shores, the underlying purpose remained the imperialistic appropriation over 
resources. Nonetheless, Grotian conceptions about the control over shores remained an 
important aspect of British imperial concerns about global trade. Thus, as Edward Keene 
observes, British imperialism through commerce and trade was similar to the Grotian 
conception of the international legal order; in which a hierarchal view of civilization was 
entwined with toleration for exchange and cooperation with the native population.31 
Thus, after an initial voyage in 1591 to the Spice Islands with a failed attempt to establish 
trade with the East Indies, it was not until 1600 that the British East India Company was 
formed.32 Influenced by the success of the Dutch East India Company trade monopoly in the 
Spice Islands, the British East India Company sought a royal charter that would allow it to 










The British legal thought in this period developed through different juristic schools, primarily relying on 
Hobbesian and Bodinian discourses of absolute sovereignty. Relying on these conceptions of sovereignty 
allowed for the supremacy of the British Crown and the power of the State. However, in attempting to compete 
with Spanish and Portuguese empires, as well as conflict with the Dutch, English thought engaged with 
Grotian conceptions the most, especially with respect to trade settlements with non-Europeans. Thus, later 
writings of John Selden and then Sir Phillip Meadows derived their approach towards gaining jurisdiction 
over non- European territories by private individuals through Grotius’ writings. 
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particularly the commercial competition with the Dutch East India Company that motivated 
London Merchants to form the British East India Company.34 Richard Hakluyt, the translator 
of Grotius’ Mare Liberum, had made an argument for the establishment of the English East 
India Company by relying on the Dutch practice of establishing trade settlements through the 
maintenance, occupation, use, possession and improvement of the jurisdiction in question.35 
In the same year, Queen Elizabeth granted the British East India Company a royal charter for 
the monopoly over trade in the East; ‘for the honour of our nation, the welfare of the people, 
the increase of our navigation and the advancement of lawful traffic to the benefit of the 
commonwealth’.36 
Taking into account the influence of both Grotius and Vitoria on British thinkers during 
this era, this turn to rejecting papal authority, coupled with Freedom of Seas as a principle 
derived from thinking about sovereignty through the property, gave the British Empire the 
basis for competing with the Spanish and Portuguese dominion on trade.37 As a result, the 
English Empire’s approach to its expansion was based on trade settlements in new found 
territories rather than right by conquest. Thomas Poole thus observes that the East India 
Company, modelled on the Dutch East India Company, was rooted in a trade policy that was 
directed towards ‘administrative repertoire of delegation and government by license’.38 
Regardless of the initial difficulty of the Company in establishing trading relations with the 
native rulers in the Indian subcontinent, the British State had effectively given the Company 
sovereign agency in the form of the royal charter based on the concept of divisible 
sovereignty.39 This was again inspired by the Grotian conception of thinking about 
sovereignty through the concept of property.40 This required both consents from native 
occupants and license from the State to enable a private person – such as the Company – to 
exercise government over such territory. Through the royal charter, the Company retained 
elements of a sovereign in establishing a government in the settlements.41 
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Regardless of the Company’s exclusive license and sovereign-like attributes dependent upon 
the renewal of the royal charter after its first one granted in 1600,42 it is important at this point 
to understand it as a networked governing institution in and of itself. That the Company 
operated as a separate, autonomous, governing body is a significant factor in its opposing 
interests with the State. Phillip Stern, in particular, has argued for the importance of looking 
at the British East India Company as a governing political body.43 He demonstrates that even 
before the mid-18th Century, the British East India Company was operating as a self-governing 
political and executive institution.44 Stern goes on to state that, before its dominance over 
Indian territories, the British East India Company had a political and social character that laid 
the foundations for its future transformation into a governing networked institution.45 This is 
based on the fact that, even in the initial charter, the Company was recognized as a ‘corporate 
body politick’.46 
As the idea of corporate body traces back to Roman conceptions of associations in society, 
its purpose and intent were characterized in an early digest of corporate laws as ‘for better 
government’.47 The Company, in the light of Stern’s analysis, is a form of a group bound 
together through common sets of rules, laws and purpose.48 The Company as an association, 
beyond trade, had governing attributes in that it could ensure its mercantile purpose functioned 
smoothly.49 Thus it could tax, police, fortify its settlements and administer day to day 
functioning of them.50 
On its own thus it is possible to see the Company as a separate self-governing political 
entity. As Sundhya Pahuja observes, the existence of both private and public company duties 
was part of the reason that a jurisdictional conflict persisted between the State and the 
Company in the exercise of public authority.51 Elaborating her argument on the 
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jurisdictional conflict, Sundhya Pahuja, notes how in this period when the idea of the State 
was not well formed, other forms of associational life with their jurisdictional authority 
existed.52 These forms of associational life included Companies of Merchants, Church, City 
states, and Communities of Belief.53 Furthermore, far from being part of the State, 
companies/corporations of various kinds predated the State.54 As forms of associational life, 
they were commercial, political and personal; overlapping with other self-governing 
communities.55 Thus a royal charter in the initial period of the Company did not mean that the 
Company was an extension of the State, but merely that it had been provided special rights 
and powers by the State.56 In return, the Company had to provide financial support in forms 
of loans to the State. This is what leads Stern to observe that the Company itself, especially 
due to its exclusive rights to trade in the Indian territories, can more aptly be described as a 
Company-State.57 
The Company’s exclusive rights through the charter allowed it to exert and maintain 
jurisdictional control over the entry and exit into the Indian territory as well as the routes 
leading to land. Broadly the charter had given license to the Company to ‘explore and navigate 
all ways, passages, islands, ports, havens, cities, creeks, towns and places of Asia, Africa and 
America, or any of them wherever trade was to be discovered, established or had’.58 Thus the 
charter prohibited any other English subject to ‘visit, haunt, frequent, or trade, traffic or 
adventure into Asia without the Company’s permission and license’.59 These permissions or 
licenses were in the form of passes or passports that the Company granted  for a fee to any 
private individual, even native settlers, for sea lanes under the Company’s jurisdiction.60 The 
implementation of these passes came in the form of criminalization, labelling anyone rejecting 
or opposing Company ‘passes’ as interlopers against the Company and the Kingdom.61 


























settlers, they were deemed, according to Company officials, ‘worse than pirates and 
deserved to be hanged’.62 
It is important here to note that already the subcontinent could be understood as a large 
territory of multiple loci of power and governance.63 The encounter in the early period of the 
British East India Company had to be one of cooperation and within the socio-economic 
configuration of the territory they had entered, which was ruled by the Mughals. The 
subcontinent, regardless of its historical or spatial temporality, already existed within a socio-
economic hierarchy, slowly encoded in primarily Vedic scripts (later homogenized in the 
‘Hindu’ religion) created and collated between 1500 and 1000 BC, through a caste structure.64 
What were identified as ‘religious’ communities, later on, were clan-like endogamous groups 
maintaining socio-political, spiritual hierarchies (based on purity/pollution), passed through 
paternal hereditary lineage to gain material benefit and claim superiority.65 While centered 
primarily at ‘Brahminism’, the priestly caste, as well as in some context through the 
‘Kshatriyas’, warrior-king caste, caste-like structures have also permeated other pre-colonial 
communities such as those who claimed ancestry from a warrior-clan or Brahmins as a way 
to reassert their positions in the Mughal courts and to gain social and material capital.66 More 
importantly, in either case, of both Mughals and Brahmin or Kshatriya kingdoms, those 
deemed ‘lower’ i.e. ‘sudra and atisudra’ have often maintained labour or servicing to upper 
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outside the caste hierarchy i.e. the indigenous communities pre-Brahmin, termed Avarna, 
who were mostly the Adivasi or Dravidians.67 
During the high ruling period of Mughals, i.e. in the early 17th Century, those claiming to 
be descendants of Kshatriyas or Brahmins negotiated their place as royal guards, 
intermediaries between the peasant caste/labourers and the royal courts of Mughals, 
designated themselves as ‘Rajput’ or ‘Nayara’ or in Punjab as ‘Jutt’.68 The logic of caste 
structure thus was present and facilitated through the Mughal rulers, more so by Akbar, Shah 
Jahan and Aurangzeb, to the extent that the ‘Rajput’ assumed positions of land ownership, i.e. 
zamindars, for revenue collection from labourers and peasantry.69 Mughal Rule, therefore, as 
historian Bandyopadhyay argues, was dependent and contingent on caste formations, i.e. 
through the intermediary caste of Rajputs, Jatts, or Nayaras, to function militaristically, 
economically and administratively.70 Putting aside the ‘orthodox’ Brahmin rule in South 
India, particularly Maratha, this complex and fluid rule established by the Mughal became the 
foundation on which the British could expand, build alliances, give and gain military support 
and claim territory. These included communities claiming caste positionalities of Brahmin, 
Kshatriya and Vaishya, which included merchants, record keepers, those claiming scholarly 
literacy and land revenue collectors, most of whom they were dealing with on a 
commercial/administrative level.71 
Amidst this slow decline of Mughal rule with rising regional powers, including the 
Brahmin-Kshatriya rulers of the South, the consolidation of merchant caste, Rajput soldiers, 
land revenue collectors, record keepers as elite native caste in Mughal India, The East India 
Company had its juridical logic of territorial control and commercial and administrative 
alliance with the native elite caste leaders and communities. For the Company, having 
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where peasantry, i.e. Sudra caste72 who were mostly weavers and labourers, worked for the 
benefit of both the native elites and them was just as important as their juridical justification 
for creating territorial and juridical control over the settlements they built and established in 
the subcontinent. As Arasatnam points out, the relationship between weaver caste 
communities as labourers only strengthened as the Company’s governance over the trading 
ports got stronger, hence by 1770, the Company itself gained an economic stranglehold over 
the weaver caste communities through bonded labour in their cotton plantations.73 
Trade settlements were understood as, under the complete authority of the Company 
administration, they were secured and fortified to ensure ‘security for trade’.74 In this instance 
as well, even the native elite traders living in the settlements were taxed for the security 
provided by the Company.75 Even though native elite leaders maintained that the fortifications 
were neither necessary nor required, the justification the Company gave was that security 
infrastructure was necessary for the protection of commercial trade from interlopers. By 
arguing that the Company was always inclined towards ‘peaceful cooperation of trade’ with 
the native subjects, the Company policy explicitly distinguished between ‘territorial conquest’ 
and ‘security of the trade settlement’.76 
This securitization was part of its alliance building, cooperation with native elite caste 
leaders and communities. As Stern and Roy observe, the Rajput caste was employed as 
soldiers as well;77 replicating a similar caste-based alliance logic that the Mughal employed, 
the British East India Company relied on ‘native’ soldiers claiming ‘warrior/Kshatriya’ 
ancestry – some already having been guards for the Mughals – to create their forces in the 
settlements.78 This interaction with the existing caste structure into the socio-economic and 
administrative life of the merchant network also revealed another violence brought about by 
the confluence of Company and the native elites, that of separating an inherently political, 
exploitative structure in a naturalized ‘social’, ‘religious’ and ‘cultural’ reality of the 
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subcontinent.79 As Anupama Rao, amongst others, has pointed out, this violence was part of 
knowledge production around the ‘caste structure’ produced by those occupying local 
positions of power i.e. dominant caste leaders and communities.80 
In comparison to Dutch VOC merchant network, in the case of the British East India 
Company, there was a cooperation between a certain minority elite-caste community of 
natives with the pre-existing structure of hierarchical power and the Company. Thus, while 
treaties remained a significant instrument of relationship between the native population and 
the merchant company, the approach of the English was facilitated more squarely by and 
alongside native elite caste communities, instead of a more violent private war justified 
through enforcement of ‘law’ through unequal treaties. It also is a different modality of 
colonialism due to the difference in the specific political, imperial configuration existing 
within the subcontinent which became crucial to the British to develop their patronage 
networks with native elite caste communities and leaders later on in the 18th–19th Century. At 
the same time, this kind of policing, securitization and administrative control were 
characteristic of jurisdictional control over the territories controlled by the Company. 
Furthermore, it is also this control of territory through fortification and control over travel 
routes, fortifications and securitization that allowed the Company to expand its networks to 
build more alliances with Brahmin/Kshatirya caste leaders later on in the 18th Century when 
it solidified its rule over the subcontinent.81 
The violence that the Company bought to the subcontinent was both new, in that it 
militarized the ports heavily, and contingent on existing forms of caste violence in the 
subcontinent as they gave more capital to the merchant caste to exploit the marginalized caste 
peasantry and labour. As historian Susan Bayly rightly observes, it wasn’t so much that the 
British ‘invented’ the existing social caste stratifications and system, their presence intensified 
the already existing violence.82 This particular confluence is what makes the 
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merchant network of British East India’s encounter in the subcontinent particularly different 
from the Dutch VOC, who only justified violence through ‘cooperation’ based on unequal 
treaties. Whereas in the subcontinent, already existing pre-Mughal social stratification 
facilitated by the Mughal rulers further had provided an opportunity of mutual benefit which 
later translated to indirect rule over the subcontinent. 
 
The dialogical interplay between international legal discourse and merchant network in 
this case also became grounded in more militaristic policing and securitization in confluence 
with a small native elite group (specifically dominant caste communities and their networks) 
rather than complete domination/control based on enforcement of commercial treaties.83 Thus 
the violence of the merchant company, and later on the British Empire, can be understood 
through this encounter between the native caste elites and Company merchants as a confluence 
of ‘multiple, overlapping, forms of colonialism’,84 both internal and external, for mutual 
benefit. 
 
III. British Empire’s network of imperial administrator 
 
a. The state/company conflict 
 
 
Following the emergence of political parties in England in the 1670s, the ‘Tories’ and the 
‘Whigs’, the King and the Company’s interests aligned far more than they had before.85 King 
James II shared the ‘Tory’ vision and thinking of imperial British expansion in territorial 
terms.86 Sir Josiah Childs, a Company man who had significant control over its direction, also 
became the economic advisor to the King.87 King James II also provided an expansive new 
charter to the Company; giving it rights to set up admiralty courts in the West Coast of India, 
to coin money and to set up Martial law.88 This new charter also granted territorial rights and 
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Christian people.89 Despite a confluence of interest and support from the Crown, the 
Company faced, however, opposition from the Parliament.90 
This shift in the late 17th Century saw intensified support of the Crown for the Company’s 
jurisdictional control and policing over its trade settlements. As a result of opposition by 
merchants who were supported by the Parliament against the Company’s monopoly in Indian 
territories, in 1682, the Company brought proceedings against Thomas Sandys for an 
unauthorized voyage to the East Indies. This case, the East India Company v. Sandys, was 
brought in front of the Court of Kings Bench as a constitutional matter by the Company and 
raised discussions about the monopoly and trade in territories of the New Indies.91 However, 
the decision and arguments raised in the case were significant in terms of the international 
legal discourse on sovereignty and jurisdiction on overseas trade with the ‘infidels’. Sandys’ 
argument relied on the simple reasoning that monopolies were illegal.92 Specifically 
concerning international legal discourse, Sandys argued on the basis of Grotius’ thesis on the 
Freedom of Seas that a ‘King cannot take away man’s goods that he has got by his trade, much 
less can he take away his whole trade’.93 This case replayed, in many ways, arguments based 
on the Grotian conception of sovereignty, used by the British State against the Dutch East 
India Company during the Anglo-Dutch Fisheries conflict during the early 1600s. However, 
in this instance, it was a conflict concerning a commercial network – the British East India 
Company – whose expansion had benefited the state as much as the commercial network had 
benefited from the state. 
 
In replying to Sandys’ argument, the Company produced an argument that relied less on 
countering the Freedom of Seas, and more on emphasising an exception to the blanket 
application of the principle of free seas. The Company argued that it was not a monopoly 
since it did not outright restrict trade, only gave licenses to other merchants because of its 
special position given by the King.94 Elaborating this point regarding its special position, it 
was pointed out that as the Company maintained trade, built infrastructure, administered 
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smaller traders would not have by themselves.95 Adding to this argument, it was said that the 
nature of ‘infidels’, their alien culture and the dangerousness of distance were significant 
factors to only allow those with ‘knowledge of how to trade with natives’ to be in control of 
trade traffic.96 Taking this reasoning further, the Company reiterated their policy on 
maintaining security as opposed to conquest and war in more relatable terms to its special 
position. Christendom, the Company stated, is in a natural and perpetual state of war with 
infidels.97 In dealing with the ‘infidels’, its policy of maintaining government over them 
through trade settlements was a way of avoiding warfare.98 This echoed its policy over 
fortifying ports on the basis that there was a difference between war and peaceful cooperation 
based on maintaining security for better conditions of trade. Such a temporary peace could 
not happen through individuals, but through the prerogative of a Christian prince and from a 
‘subject’ on his behalf.99 
The court’s decision inclined towards the Company’s argument and extended it to reflect 
how close the Company’s policies were to British engagement with international legal 
discourse. Judge Jeffery argued that since the Company had been exclusively given rights  by 
the Crown and that it worked for the public good, it was an exception to the illegality of 
monopolies.100 More specifically, Jeffrey referred to John Selden’s use of Grotian principles 
to argue that the world being in its original state was common to all mankind, except when 
common consent necessitates administration over ‘private property’ which was given by a 
government.101 For this reason, the King was responsible for governing foreign trade and 
could even claim sovereignty over plantations discovered and occupied by private 
individuals.102 Hence, if Mare Liberum was meant to apply at all, it was relevant only to nation 
states and not to private individuals.103 
While the Kings Bench decision ruled in favour of the Company, it put forward a third 
side in the argument; that of the Crown. Stern argues that Jeffrey’s reasoning for siding with 






















control trade traffic, authority over settlements and possessions held by private persons.104 
Jeffrey further emphasised that the Company was only an extension of the State105 and its arm 
of enforcement in the world.106 Dismissing the Company’s claims to trade with infidels, 
Jeffery argued that even if the Asian continent was Christian, the King would have the 
prerogative to restrict trade traffic.107 Explaining the relation of the Crown and Company more 
specifically, Jeffrey stated that the Company was according to the Kings charter 
‘Embassadours of the King to concert peace’, thus it was the King’s duty to maintain peace 
through the Company’s settlements in the East Indies.108 Despite this assertion by the King’s 
Bench, Poole observes that the decision gave the Company the green light to operate as the 
exclusive controlling authority of trade in the East Indies.109 This argument of the Company 
as an extension of the State did not change how the Company functioned as a separate political 
body in the East Indies. As Pahuja, Stern and Poole note, the Company’s jurisdictional 
practices intensified;110 relying on prohibiting and taking to trial ‘interlopers’ within its 
admiralty courts in the East Indies,111 and not in the land where they ‘were under another 
Law’.112 
Within the context of my argument, the Sandys decision nods to how an imperial state 
explicitly uses international legal discourse to support a merchant network’s growth in a 
peripheral non-European territory while also being informed by the network’s particular 
interaction with the peripheral non-European territories. The Company’s response in this case 
also alludes to this particular building towards the international legal discourse on ‘governing’ 
as an indirect form for the Crown and its religious mandate. Jeffrey’s insistence on the 
Crown’s prerogative over territory despite the occupation, control and jurisdiction of a private 
individual shows an attempt to maintain imperial governance over a settlement, even if this 
comes in the indirect form of a commercial ‘emissary of peace’; i.e. the Company. Moreover, 
by reiterating how the Company maintains peace, on behalf of the Crown, the Kings Bench 
decision entrenches the view that settlements of trade through the administration of the 
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Thus, the King’s Bench, only in a different way, reiterates the Company’s policy on how 
administrative control and security are part of peaceful cooperation with the ‘infidels’. This 
understanding of the administration of trade settlements implies a distinction between violence 
as exclusively imagined through public war and violence in the form of the Company’s 
administrative control, policing and criminalization of ‘interlopers’.  
 
This use of discourses on sovereignty and the avoidance of war through peaceful 
cooperation by the King’s Bench gave impetus to the Company’s growing territorial 
ambitions. Thus, following the Sandys case, the Company’s policing over settlements to 
maintain jurisdictional control intensified. Particularly in Bombay, following a mutiny against 
the rising influence over the territory by Company men, the Company increased its military 
presence and maintenance of armament stores.113 Due to both the support received by the 
Company and King James II’s orientation towards territorial expansion, the Company 
expanded its jurisdictional control to Siam.114 This was both an attempt to solidify the 
Company’s governance in the region as well as to increase its strength through establishing a 
network of enclaves.115 Benton notes how this chain of forts and enclaves allowed the 
Company to maintain a military presence over the trade routes to East Indies.116 
After the revolution of 1689, the overthrowing of King James II and the ascension of 
William III and Mary II, the British parliament’s renewed interest in competing with the 
Company’s monopoly led to the creation of a new company. Only after a decade of 
competition with the new company, conflicts with the French Company in Siam, and an 
increasing reliance on the public finance given by the Company through its trade settlements 
did the parliament reach a peaceful conclusion, however temporary, with the Company. The 
merger of the two companies came out of the necessity of preserving the financial interests 
of all the stakeholders of trade in the East Indies, particularly to sustain the military presence 
of the Company in the East Indies. 
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Hence, in the mid-18th Century, the government left the Company unhampered in its 
management; the only controls sought were financial. In 1754, the Company was allowed to 
raise an army in India. It was also allowed to wage war, sign peace treaties, and appropriate 
booty and plunder in the course of war undertaken for its defence. 
 
It was not until after the Company’s political control over Bengal, after the Battle of 
Plassey (1757), that the Parliament renewed interests in the Company’s affairs once more. 
The late 18th Century also marked growing discussions among jurists and economists within 
the British State who laid the foundations for the shift in imperial attitude during the mid- and 
late 19th Century. The Company’s rule over Bengal after the Battle of Plassey in 1757 gave it 
control over the flow of trade to and from Bengal.117 As the richest state in India, Bengal 
produced revenue for the British East India Company through its trade flows.118 These 
revenues facilitated military excursions further north in India and later against the Marathans 
in the south.119 As Bayly notes the Company’s dealings with the native merchant networks, 
particularly the dominant caste elites, had been highly beneficial to its accruement of revenues 
as well the native merchant caste’s increase in economic capital.120 After the 1764 battle for 
the city of Buxor against the Mughal Emperor, Shah Alam II, the Company gained effective 
territorial control over the province of Bengal.121 
The Company’s territorial expansion throughout the 1760s gained the attention of the 
Parliament and King George III. Desai notes that it was the shifting attitude of the British 
Crown, in particular, that first brought attention to the Company’s growing territorial claims 
in India.122 King George III, who ascended to the throne in 1760, was more concerned with 
rule over the Empire as he believed the Indian territories belonged to him.123 He maintained a 
general hostility towards the Company’s rights,124 to the extent that he broke the general 
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approach of the British State in maintaining its relations with the native rulers through 
accepting the Company as its emissary. Instead, King George III sent an ambassador to Nawab 
of Carnatic pledging English friendship.125 
 




The British government’s attention towards the Company was primarily drawn through the 
criticism by English thinkers and ministers in the Parliament. The general concern drew from 
the advantage in the form of revenue generated by the Company.126 Historian Michael Duffy 
notes how this concern for greater revenue was expressed by the British parliament because 
of the need to develop its naval and military strength against France in the Napoleonic War.127 
The revenue from Bengal was demanded by the British State not as a territorial claim or right 
but as a matter of expediency. This expediency, according to the critics of the Company’s rule 
in Bengal, was because the Company could not handle the territories it had acquired now in 
India.128 It was argued that governing the acquired territories needed ministerial control from 
the State, as a commercial entity could not be trusted to control vast territories.129 
The Company’s response to these claims relied on arguments the British State gave to 
French claims in 1762 regarding the seizure of the French Company’s possessions by the 
British East India Company.130 The English government had replied that ‘every dispute 
thereto must be settled by the English Company, the Crown of England having no right to 
interfere in what is allowed to be the legal and exclusive property of a body corporate, 
belonging to the English State’.131 Citing this reply of the British Crown to the French in 1762, 
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This idea of the private property remained a legal argument for the Company to fall back 
on, particularly as the argument was derived from the Company’s initial settlement and 
jurisdictional control over ports in India. As discussed in the previous section, in the earlier 
period of the British expansion into Indian territories, this was also supported by the Crown 
and intellectual figures in the early 17th Century as it allowed the British to compete with its 
imperial rivals at the time. This conception of private property was influenced by the Dutch 
East India Company’s adoption of Grotian discourses on sovereignty. For the British East 
India Company, the Dutch East India Company was again an example to argue how no annual 
payment was asked by the Dutch government.133 The Dutch East India Company’s territorial 
acquisitions, it was argued, were treated as possessions of private individuals.134 
It was also this idea of private property that had allowed the networked growth of the 
Company in India in conjunction with its encounter with, and active facilitation from, the 
native elite-caste communities in establishing a system of indirect governance in the 
subcontinent. In this renewed conflict between the British State and the Company, financial 
advantages of the expanded territory in the Indian territories, specifically the control of trade 
networks and flows that the Company had gained, were central to the State’s insistence of 
greater share in the commercial profits of the Company. 
 
To gain some ministerial control over the Company’s territories the British parliament, 
under the direction of Lord North, passed the Regulating Act of 1772.135 The purpose of the 
Act was to reconfigure the relationship between the State and the Company. Clauses that were 
part of the Regulating Act included control over appointments within the Company’s 
administration, specifically within the Supreme Court of Bengal and nominations for 
members of the Bengal council by the Crown.136 Parliamentary discussion on the Act raised 
concerns about how these provisions possibly contravened the jurisdictional authority of the 
Company in Bengal by giving the Crown ‘full and absolute power over the possessions of the 
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declared open purpose of conveying the whole power and management of East India Company 
directly or indirectly to the Crown’.138 Having this supervision and Crown involvement in the 
Company’s administration was, as Lord North later put, to bring a form of legal regulation 
and systematic legislative uniformity over the Company’s jurisdiction in Indian territories.139 
In this sense, Lord North aimed to gain greater control to govern over the territories managed 
by the East India Company – particularly as any overt interference  of the Crown to take over 
possessions of the Company was met by the legal defence of private property. 
 
The Hastings proceedings raised broader concerns of imperial attitude towards rule over 
India. Edmund Burke, a statesman and a political thinker of the late 18th Century, was a 
leading critic of the Company’s governance over Indian territories. His thinking on the native 
governance and British values at the turn of the 19th Century were instrumental in imperial 
thinking of the 18th and 19th Century.140 He promoted a paternalistic liberalist perspective on 
colonial rule, emphasising the rule of law and the tutelage of natives to progress to stages of 
civilization.141 
Burke’s opposition to the Company’s rule in India followed similar oppositions to 
parliamentary ministers in the 1760’s, that the Company did not adhere to British laws in their 
dealings with the native population.142 A system of bribery, nepotism and private profiteering 
was justified by the Company based on a ‘geographic morality’.143 ‘Geographic morality’ as 
a policy of the Company rule over Bengal was explained by Hastings as a reason for 
differential treatment of natives to people and laws of civilized nations. Considerations such 
as longitude, latitude and temperature justified a harsher approach to governing the native 
population of Bengal.144 It was for these reasons, Hastings argued, the law of Britain did not 
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always been, as Stern and Pahuja have observed, one of its policy and jurisdictional 
authority.145 
However, the Company policy and encounter, as I have argued above, was not in isolation 
simply because it was a state-like authority in the subcontinent. It was specific to the existing 
structure of the native elites which the British both took advantage of and justified for its gain 
through building patronage with elite caste networks. Hastings’ ‘geographic morality’ was 
thus specifically about the indirect governance that the Company had built with the existing 
information and orientalised notions of marginalized caste communities created and actively 
pushed by caste elite communities in the subcontinent. In this case, the network of merchants 
had learnt from native caste elites and, through this mutually beneficial relationship, informed 
– as I will argue – a development in the international legal discourse in the 20th Century.  
 
Of particular consequence to this development is this conflict over jurisdiction between 
the State and the Company – and the response to Hastings provided by Edmund Burke. Burke 
argued that this idea of ‘geographic morality’ was contrary to a ‘universally’ accepted 
conception of the Law of Nations.146 For Burke, the positive obligations of a legal system and 
normative order were integral to any society. The rule of law, he argued, was present even in 
the Indian society albeit in a different normative order.147 Any government over Indian rule 
should not then dispose of ideas of the ‘rule of law’ and positive obligations regarding the 
adherence of legal principle based on ‘geographic morality’.148 Burke’s suggestion seemed to 
be a form of pluralism, which has a singular moral ‘universal’ basis common to all nations, 
concerning the governance of a colony. As Jennifer Pitts aptly observes, however, although 
this approach towards the Law of Nations based on legal universalism and pluralism seemed 
inclusive, it was not at all anti-imperial.149 The inclusiveness of Burke’s legal universalism, 




Stern (n 35); Pahuja (n 51). 
146 









perspective on the civilized nature of British values.150 
A significant element of Burke’s discourses on the trust of government over Indian 
colonies was how he characterized native people of India as part of the imperial British 
society. Referring to natives as ‘distressed fellow citizens of India’, Burke’s legal 
universalism and cultural pluralism were underpinned by notions of a British  commonwealth 
as a global whole.151 Pagden observes how this co-option of native identity as part of the 
British Commonwealth, yet culturally pluralistic, was the governmental mentality of state 
interference in colonial peripheries.152 Especially concerning India, Burke maintained that 
trust over governing territories requires barter and compromise.153 For Burke, it was important 
to ‘sacrifice some civil liberties for the advantages to be derived from the communion and 
fellowship of a great empire’.154 In keeping with the moral obligation to civilize as a social 
right, governing over native Indians following British moral values was a part of keeping the 
trust.155 For Burke, British values when applied to the administration of natives to help them 
achieve a civilized status could maintain a state of peace and progress for the natives. 
 
This view as the underlying reason for cooperation and administration of native territories 
was different from the reason given by Judge Jeffreys in the Sandys case as we saw above. In 
the case, natural law precepts on the duty of commercial enterprises to be emissaries of peace 
were integral to cooperation and administration of non-Christian native territories. Burke’s 
thinking marked a shift from natural law reasoning to a social right thinking that, as Boisen 
puts it, justified imperialism on the ‘basis of an obligation to ensure a moral community that 
facilitated native prosperity’.156 More importantly, as Mithi Mukherjee has argued, Burke’s 
inclusion of natives as ‘citizens’ of the empire was a unique contribution to British imperial 
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‘de-territorialized juridical-imperial sovereignty’ which was meant to serve the native interest 
as part of the greater Empire.158 What Burke had effectively argued for was a juridical-
legislative control over Indian colonies through oversight by Parliament and judges in the 
Indian courts, criticizing the arbitrary administrative policing of the Company rule.159 
Mukherjee notes that Burke’s original contribution was to suggest a kind of ‘supra-national’ 
imperial overseeing of native interest based on ‘universal’ values of morality and rule of 
law.160 
Furthermore, notions of pluralism and the civilized nature of British values were 
contingent on a hierarchy, i.e. one could be a ‘loyal citizen’ of Britain given they adhere to 
‘British values’. This inclusion, contingent on British values, was consistent with the oriental 
imagination and encounter with the native elite caste communities and leaders in the 
subcontinent. This encounter with native caste elites was based on active cooperation for 
mutual benefit and indirect rule rather than simply an orientalist imagination on its own.161 
From the experience of colonial officers of the Company and later the British State 
administrators, the imagination of subcontinent would increasingly take on this pluralism and 
moral universalism as a way for native caste elites to maintain their positions of power under 
British rule which they positioned during their interaction and cooperation with the East India 
Company. 
 
Thus, Burke’s suggestions also became a perfect fit for the indirect governance over the 
subcontinent and, in one way, were not that different from Hastings’ suggestion of differing 
‘geographic morality’, except that it evolved the discourse around private property ownership 
to the ‘social obligation of the state’.162 What Burke moved towards in his opposition to 
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over Indian territory as a trust and benefit for all mankind.163 In his famous speech on Fox’s 
East India Bill of 1783, he surmised this as: 
 
political power which is set over men, ought to be some way or the other exercised 
ultimately for their benefit. If this is true, none of the privilege which can be original, self-
derived rights, or grants for the mere private benefit of the holders, then such rights, are all 
in the strictest sense a trust: and it is the very essence of every trust to be rendered 
accountable.164 
Camille Boisen notes how this denotes a shift to governing over the colony as a social right 
from jurisdiction over colonies as the private property of an individual. This led Burke to 
understand government over the colonial territory of India as a trust to be upheld.165 This trust 
to govern was given to the British Empire as an ‘incomprehensible dispensation of divine 
providence in our hands’.166 To abuse it, he argued, as Hastings had, was not just morally 
offensive but threatened the very existence of both the ‘British Constitution’ and ‘the 
civilization of Europe’.167 For Burke, then, the idea of trusteeship was a way to refute strict 
claims of private ownership by the Company. At the same time this conception of ‘trust’, as 
we shall see in the later section, also informed who were to be trusted within the native elites 
– which were, for the most part, the caste elite leaders and communities - or rather what was 
closer to the universal ‘values’ of British morality and acceptability in terms of pluralism. 
 
In a sense, this attempt was similar to Parliament’s aims to gain some kind of regulatory 
control over the administration of Bengal through the nomination of council members and the 
Supreme Court of Bengal. While Lord North’s efforts in the 1760s attempted to separate the 
idea of commerce from governmental administration through some parliamentary oversight, 
it was Burke’s legal arguments which provided a rebuttal to the Company’s claim of 
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Despite the failings of the initial measure for regulation and control over the local 
administration of India by the British State and the acquittal of Warren Hastings, the events 
at the turn of the 18th Century provided the foundations for the State’s eventual control over 
Indian territories. There was a growing consensus within intellectuals and British political 
circles about ‘good government’ of Indian territories. Even as Burke and Lord North’s efforts 
did not result in as effective control of the State as envisioned by these figures, the idea of 
State as the only just governmental institutions for colonies grew within Scottish 
enlightenment scholars. 
 
James Mackintosh was, as observed by Oni Gust, one of the earlier Scottish enlightenment 
scholars whose writings influenced British political identity in the 19th Century.168 His 
discourses on the Law of Nations were reflective of his experiences through the era of Scottish 
enlightenment as well as his time as a Judge in Bombay, India.169 In thinking about the Law 
of Nations as part of the common nature of man, his writings were influenced by Grotius’ 
natural law thinking about the idea of private property as part of the nature of man.170 He 
emphasised the importance of the cultivation and labour of ‘private property’ as an ethic of 
intercourse between men.171 More importantly, Mackintosh emphasised this ethic of 
intercourse as a means to an end for the progress of man.172 Gust argues how this idea of 
progress for Mackintosh was specifically drawn from the context of Scottish enlightenment 
specifically in the Highlands,173 where ideas of the civilization of the Highlands were 
accompanied by a notion of progress based on ‘enabling agricultural improvement through 
enclosures, building churches, schools, prisons’.174 The concept of property, Mackintosh 
argued, is the central subject that marks the progress or stage of civilization as property needs 
to exist for the wellbeing of mankind.175 As a marker of civilization, it needs to be developed 
from the ‘transient occupancy of a savage’ to the ‘comprehensive minute code of property 
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civilization’.176 Additionally, this progress can only be made by the institution of the State 
and its ancillary administrative functions of legislation, judiciary and police.177 
State control of property and its development was central to Mackintosh’s conception of 
the Law of Nations which he explained as an ethic of intercourse between men who need the 
best of government. The best of government, and civilization, is one where the progress is 
measured through the development of the property.178 This can only be done justly by the state 
institutions as any other form of government that places powers in a single authority such as 
a commercial body, religious institutions or an autocratic rule would lead to despotic 
government.179 In this sense, Mackintosh’s argument made a direct link to state government 
control over property, its development through legislation and policing with the civilizing 
mission. William Christian argues that it is particularly this difference drawn between State 
government and other forms of government, in addition to meeting with Burke, which 
influenced Mackintosh’s approach to the Law of Nations.180 
This thought process which drew from existing ‘racialized’ perceptions of Scottish 
highlanders as ‘savages’ in need of civilizing also fit within the corollary of the orientalized 
construction of the marginalized caste as the ‘other’ by the native elite caste leaders and 
communities readily accepted by the British colonial officers.181 As historians have observed, 
both the British and other European traders understood caste-based slavery and hierarchy as 
a corollary to racializing forms of servitude and slavery already practised by the European 














William Christian, ‘James Mackintosh, Burke and the Cause of Reform’ (1973) 7(2) Eighteenth-Century 
Studies 193. Another factor to which the British East India Company connection to Mackintosh and Burke is 
instructive is that Mackintosh was appointed Recorder at the Bombay Supreme Court in India after his 
meeting with Burke. During which time he wrote law of nations and nature. His influence of the Scottish 
enlightenment thinking, along with his engagement with Grotius and Burke, resonated in his time in colonial 
India. More so because he was also surrounded by intellectual thinkers who were moving towards an 
argument for greater State control of Company territories. 
181 
This can be surmised by the Company’s hiring of soldiers based on a ‘racial/caste’ basis as having 
‘fighting spirit’ in the subcontinent with comparison to Scottish Highlanders as noted by Gavin Rand and 
Kim Wagner, ‘Recruiting the “Martial Races”: Identities and Military Service in Colonial India’ (2012) 46(3-
4) Patterns of Prejudice 232. 
182 
Dirks (n 79); Rao (n 80). 
121 
 
concerning ‘caste’ by the colonial state, as well as native elite caste itself later on when the 
British Empire took complete administrative control after 1857.183 
As the Company started to claim control, jurisdictional and administrative, it also brought 
with it the ‘civilising’ socio-cultural changes with the building of English schools, court 
systems and administration for its governance to run smoothly.184 As was pragmatic and 
convenient in its own experience as a mercantile network, the company relied on native elite 
dominant caste communities to fill these positions in its bureaucratic and administrative 
offices as they also had the most exposure to English through their previous interactions with 
them as ‘literate’ natives of the land.185 
It is also in this ascendancy and control of the East India Company, particularly after the 
takeover of Maratha in 1818 defeating the then ruler Peshwa Bajirao II, that the colonial 
modernity came to be both accepted, and furthered, through the ruling elite caste of 
Maratha.186 As Rao observes, the secularisation of caste through the making and description 
of ‘Hindu’ religion started to transform into an orientalised discourse.187 
As I have mentioned in the last section, the initial encounter of the East India Company 
was with the merchant and priestly/scholarly caste, most of whom retained positions of land 
control, revenue collection, book keeping and trade with the British merchant networks.188 In 
its increasing territorial control, these were the same native elite caste leaders and 
communities with whom the alliances were built to claim jurisdictional control over 
territories.189 
 
IV. The violence of British imperial administrators 
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In the late 18th Century and the early 19th Century, imperial thinking about governance of 
British India began to shift towards political and economic liberalist philosophy. This new 
attitude argued for increased governance over the Company’s settlements in India and a move 
towards ‘cooperation’ with native people that would be beneficial to the Crown and the 
colonies. This new kind of cooperation based on international liberalism became the 
foundation of paternalistic imperial thought in the mid-19th Century. Underlying this 
paternalistic liberalism was the idea of stages of civilization leading to better government that 
the natives could reach through the British Empire’s tutelage. The Company’s idea of 
‘geographic morality’ through its merchant network’s interaction with the existing native elite 
caste leaders and communities was replaced by Burke’s conception of ‘trust’ over the property 
mediated best by the state as espoused by Mackintosh. 
 
The idea of British paternalism in guiding the colonies, which was part of Burke’s and 
Mackintosh’s discourses, became the shifting imperial policy for the control of trade in the 
Indian territories. More importantly, the intellectual movement towards free trade liberalism 
became part of thinking about colonies as a ‘trust’.190 This intellectual inclination of the 
State/Commercial network relationship became associated with ‘free trade’ ideology in the 
early 19th Century. Free trade was particularly understood as an idea that could be 
implemented by State control over property as a civilizing mission for the progress of 
peripheral colonies.191 This was not just like an imperial ideal but was a form of rhetoric for 
peace movements in the early 19th Century that argued for free trade as a way to end 
warfare.192 Cooperation regulated by the British State’s control over free trade in the globe 
would lead to peace.193 
Parliamentary ministers, intellectuals and private English merchants drew  influence from 
Adam Smith’s seminal piece ‘Wealth of Nations’ in 1776 on the role of free trade as a liberal 
political ideology that was attached to civilization progress in colonial peripheries.194 The 
logic of political and economic liberalism of the empire, especially Mackintosh, argued 
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that peace would be achieved through progress governed by the State leading to liberty.195 
Through the 19th Century, there was continuing rhetoric of governmental control of the State 
to control social chaos as well as to mitigate warfare. The basis of security and governmental 
control that would lead to eventual peace shifted from the Company’s despotic and arbitrary 
government to the State’s responsible government. However, the administrative, juridical and 
colonial policing over natives were now justified through a ‘trust’ and legal uniformity 
implemented by the Crown. Similar to the 17th to mid-18th Century Company government, 
the presence and control over the native population were distinguished from a need to avoid 
violence through public war. 
 
As the logic of imperial presence changed from Company monopoly to free trade, the 
Charter Act in 1813 opened up trade for other British Merchants.196 The Charter Act of 1813 
essentially weakened the power of the Board of Directors of the Company significantly.197 
Apart from opening up trade in the Indian territories to other private commercial enterprises, 
the Charter Act 1813 only allowed re-export of Indian goods to Europe by the British East 
India Company on the condition that commerce and territorial accounts would be kept 
separate.198 Additionally, a clause was inserted for the missionaries to proceed to  India under 
a licence.199 The Crown also had the right to veto any nominations the Company directors put 
forward for posts in Indian territories,200 even though this was, as  Bowen states, a ‘regulated 
monopoly’ in terms of the control over the access to the properties of the commercial activity 
in India.201 The additional clauses regarding access to missionaries and vetoes over 
nominations of posts in Indian territories were a step towards the 19th-Century approach of 
imperial administration of the British Crown over colonial territories. 
 
With the Charter Act of 1833, when the Crown assumed full commercial control of Indian 
territories, the power to govern indirectly through juridical-legislative means was solidified. 
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her Majesty’.202 This Act also centralized all administrative powers under the post of 
Governor General of India. The Governor General could repeal or alter any laws or 
regulations; however, the power to veto the laws remained with the Board appointed by the 
Crown.203 The British parliament itself could now pass any law for Indian territories. The Act 
essentially established what Burke had envisioned as a juridical imperial sovereignty over 
Indian territories. Furthermore, with the establishment of a commission to codify Indian laws, 
the Crown took steps to follow intellectual thought on the codification and writing of laws 
advanced by Scottish enlightenment scholars, specifically Mackintosh, at the end of the 18th 
Century. 
At the time of the 1833 Charter Act, as a witness to a Select Committee, Mills reserved a 
more practical approach than his radical view on the codification of law in India.204 He argued 
that what was needed was an approach to codifying customs that did not necessarily modify 
customs so much as put them in principles or maxims that can be passed as legislation.205 This 
more reserved approach to codification is arguably closer to what Burke imagined as respect 
for ‘native sensitivities’. 
 
As Den Otter argues, Mills’ change of thought could also be attributed to his time in 
India.206 The commission, headed by TB Macaulay, was what led to the Charter Act 1833, 
following a similar opinion on the codification of laws in India.207 Macaulay argued against 
the British commission in England as they would not fully understand the language, customs 
and situation of native people.208 Instead, he favoured a small commission of four people in 
England and India who would take the lead to draft a legal system in Indian territories.209 
Macaulay argued that the codification did not mean complete assimilation of native  customs, 
but that he would remain sensitive to existing rules and customs by maintaining an 
understanding of difference.210 This sensitivity to ‘existing’ rules was of course the ones 
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was a uniformity in law that would lead to greater regulation and government over the native 
population by the British Crown, even if it was indirectly through the Governor General, 
Judges and codified legislation in India.211 
Even though with the 1833 Act a more institutional structure for parliamentary control 
was established, administrators still had to deal with problems of enforcement and 
observation.212 Burroughs argues that Mills and McCauley’s aims for the codification of law 
to govern were not entirely a direct rule by the Parliament.213 It instead took form in a partially 
devolved administrative and juridical system that depended on establishing relationships with 
natives,214 and by natives they meant elite dominant caste natives who held their power of 
position and patronage with their British sovereigns. Macauley describes the native dominant 
caste elites as ‘Indian in colour and blood, British in taste, in attitude and intellect’.215 In 
another instance, he also describes these elites as ‘persons fit to serve the state in the highest 
function, and in no ways inferior to the most accomplished men who adorn the best circles in 
Paris and London’.216 In the imperial orientalist imagination of Macauley, thus the native elite 
dominant caste leaders were part of the British civilization ladder, which was underpinned by 
liberal imperialism as part of the discourse of international legal development making them 
part of the British imperial administrative network. 
 
These relationships based on loyalty to the British administration in India were exploited 
for specific knowledge creation of the social fabric of the subcontinent’s culture, rules and 
history to classify and label it in a way that could work to the benefit of the British colonial 
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Specifically, however, the roles of creating ‘Hindu law’ and rituals, and the social colonial 
imagination of the ‘Raj’, were built by the chosen native elite dominant caste leaders.218 This 
organization of colonial knowledge was central to the maintenance of authority and 
legitimization of administrative and juridical codification of laws in India.219 As Otter 
observes, even when judges sought to rely on colonial knowledge to take into account 
sensitivities of Indian natives, they ended up interpreting the laws according to the 
classification, labelling and ordering of native customs according to an Anglophonic 
perspective of civilization.220 
Additionally, the British colonial policy of education and acceptance of dominant caste 
elites as ‘English in taste, intellect and culture’ was in line with their internal push by the 
Tories to develop ideas of ‘citizenship’ to enfranchise the Jewish population within Britain.221 
Viswanathan notes how this particular call for change in the idea of citizenship, led 
specifically by Macauley, had underlying motives of bringing the Jewish population closer in 
proximity to the British evangelicals as well as building a justification for broader imperial 
liberalism to justify the British involvement in colonial governance oversees by the 
conservative Tories.222 
This codification of ‘pluralistic’ laws that served the interest of both the British and the 
native elite caste communities was consistent with how the idea of property was 
conceptualized as a ‘trust’ which extended concepts of ‘imperial citizenship’, ‘loyalty’ and 
proximity to ‘British values’ to the governance of the subcontinent, within the politics of 
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the institutionalization of the subcontinent were consistent with Burke and Mackintosh’s 
intellectual visions of the changing role of the British Empire’s relationship to its colonies as 
a ‘trust’. 
 
Imperial liberalism served also to juridify the conception of state ownership, control  over 
land, governing of populations through ‘public’ and ‘private’ spaces, defining of ‘religion’ 
and systematizing indirect governance over the subcontinent through categorization of the 
population. The logic of ‘loyal citizenship’ and ‘civilizing hierarchy’ as a way to justify trust 
over land translated into targeting particularly indigenous ‘Adivasi’ communities, other caste 
marginalized communities and even trans-communities in the subcontinent through the 
Criminal Tribes Acts in 1871.224 
The Criminal Tribes Act 1871 was enacted not only in conformity with an existing 
hierarchy of Brahmanical knowledge provided by native elite dominant caste, but also with 
expedient reasons for criminalizing marginalized caste communities, Adivasi (indigenous) 
communities, and other communities deemed ‘immoral’.225 In this sense, the Act incorporated 
Brahmanical varna logics, which is some non-Brahmin castes are born in ‘sin’, along with 
British Victorian ‘universal’ morals on criminality and who is a ‘good citizen’.226 The 
dominant caste landlords were assigned as those who would notify and be notified of any 
‘tribe, gang, class’ of person was believed to be ‘criminal’.227 Descriptions of who was to be 
a ‘criminal’ were not exact but depended on profession, residence and conditions in which a 
person was notified to be ‘criminal’.228 The notifications for identifying criminals was entirely 
based on identifying social practices which happened to be lower caste, trans- people and 
iterant communities which did not fit both the Brahmanical and Victorian notion of ‘civilized’. 
Thus the Act itself gave power to the dominant caste leaders and landlords to 
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enact the violence of governance by the British codification of criminality as a matter of 
‘civilizing’ which overlapped with existing caste logics. 
 
These penal logics based on control of land for use was used also particularly against 
Adivasi communities in princely states indirectly governed by the British, particularly forest-
dwelling communities in Chattisgarh, order to extract timber during the late 19th Century, 
particularly through the Forest Act 1878.229 While initially introduced as a way to ‘preserve’ 
the forest, it was essentially an attempt to manage the resources of the forest for their uses by 
the British along with their dominant caste zamindars i.e. mostly associating themselves with 
Brahmin/Khastriya caste (Rajputs), who acted as intermediaries between the indigenous 
Adivasi community and the British administrators.230 The Forest Act particularly was a way 
for the British to interact with the otherwise isolated, tribal communities who depended for 
their livelihood on the resources of the forests, through the intermediaries i.e. dominant caste 
elites, to control access to the forest and extraction of specific resources.231 These restrictions 
had left many Adivasi communities displaced and were also met with resistance from 1855 
to1895.232 
 
b. Socio-economic violence of the ‘patronage caste networks’ 
 
International legal discourse in this time of British imperial bureaucratic networks was built 
on changing the perception of sovereignty associated with state control. Particularly important 
here was the idea of property as a social ‘trust’, whether public or private, held by the state 
for the benefit of ‘loyal citizens’. While the violence of caste hierarchy itself is much older 
than the British encounter and eventual colonization over the subcontinent, international legal 
discourse intensified, and hid caste violence perpetrated by elite dominant caste natives. This 
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of liberalism particularly ‘pluralism’, ‘moral universalism’ and ‘trust’ for tutelage to civilize 
especially in the 19th Century.233 
Here, the role and position of dominant caste native elite leaders and communities, i.e. 
Brahmanical and Kshatriya caste, in providing information and occupying positions of 
privilege in administration and bureaucracy became the knowledge producers for the British 
colonial officers.234 Peter Burroughs argues that this led administrators of India to 
pragmatically accommodate indigenous societies.235 This pragmatism was essentially built on 
suppressing any resistance to British rule but also on justifying existing forms of exploitation 
perpetrated on the labour/peasantry caste community both by the colonial state and by the 
landowning native elite caste leaders and communities. 
 
Notably, it is here we also see, what Rupa Viswanath calls, the exceptionalization of caste 
as a social, religious cultural form ‘specific’ to the subcontinent which was used by the British 
to justify exempting slavery of marginalized caste from the abolition of slavery in England 
and other colonies in 1833.236 This was particularly so that the British could extract as much 
tax revenue as they could from the peasantry caste237 which served also the landowners whose 
economic, social and political dominance depended on the peasantry caste continuing to be 
exploited for the maintenance 
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of the ‘caste hierarchy’. In Madras, at this time, this included the Pariyar, Pallar and 
Chakkiliyar caste, all of whom were categorized as ‘Pariah’ by the British as a derogatory 
term to assert connotations of ‘outcast’ or not fit for society due to their lower ‘intelligence’.238 
Thus the caste hierarchy in which they were placed by the local native elite dominant caste 
leaders also became part of the British empire’s institutionalized ‘civilizing’ mission.239 
The criminalization of ‘tribes’ as well as ‘castes’, followed by the rebellion of 1857, also 
reiterated in the exceptionalisation of caste or the ‘fencing’ of caste within the ‘Hindu’ religion 
as the British policy after 1859 was not to intervene in ‘native religion’.240 Native religion was 
construed, following the construction of the ‘Hindu’ religion by the dominant caste elite 
leaders and communities, as ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’.241 Thus this construction of the ‘religious’ 
identity of the subcontinent for the British to speak to their own administrative indirect rule, 
through pluralism, tutelage and proximity to British values, was turned in to an administrative 
issue devolved to judicial courts led by the dominant caste’s exclusionary violence towards 
the marginalized caste. Thus any complaint of caste violence was fenced within a ‘native 
religious’ issue, even as the British administrators were complicit in codifying and 
constructing the ‘religious’ identity.242 Thus, British imperial 
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liberalism constructed particular ideas of ‘religion’ and ‘native matters’ as part of their 
pluralism and moral universalism to both intervene and justify their right for paternal tutelage, 
as well as, later on, pragmatically staying silent and letting elite dominant caste networks 
perpetrate violence on the marginalized caste communities. 
 
These constructions of pluralism, trust over property and moral universalism, where the 
normative standard is one of the ‘Victorian English’, were all part of a development in the 
international legal discourse which allowed for a form of indirect governance over the 
subcontinent with the active help and support of native elite networks. The violence of these 
native caste elites particularly through cementing their logics of caste hierarchy in liberalism’s 
discourses of pluralism, was integral to the development of international law at the time. 
Particularly in how underlying ideas of trust, pluralism and moral universalism became part 





In this way, it is possible to look at the governmental system of the Empire as a juridical- 
legislative network of colonial administrators that functioned with relative autonomy and 
separation from the British Crown. Burroughs argues that the imperial governance of India, 
for example, showed how routine administration and management within the governmental 
structures of ‘India’ did not conform to a direct rule in the form of parliamentary interference 
in ‘Indian’ affairs.243 The imperial state could be seen as a network of colonial administrators 
whose governance of the colonies was done autonomously through mediation with natives,244 
with broader ideological imperatives of the Crown underpinned within the way they processed 
and implemented laws codified in native territories. This devolution of authority was not just 
an imperial device to rule but, as Burroughs argues, had to do with the geographic challenges 
of the idea of a Commonwealth.245 Often administrators had to act within the necessity of 














after the technological boom, the idea of juridical and administrative unity was met with 
practical problems of decision making.247 
Nonetheless, late 18th Century formulations that derived the idea of colonies as ‘trust’ from 
private property, and the importance of the State as the just governmental form, were integral 
to the imperial thinking in the 19th Century. It is these international legal discourses that gave 
way to the State’s imperial network that with the devolved nature of juridical- legislative 
administration could be seen as indirect governance over the native population through an 
already willing consolidation of native dominant caste communities to benefit mutually from 
the indirect governance. Moreover, the ideology of liberalism that justified the presence of the 
imperial administrative network emphasized that government by the State was meant as a 
means for liberty and peace. This underlying claim of liberalism entrenched the view of public 
violence through war as the only contestable form of violence, ignoring and justifying, at the 
same time, the administrative and juridical violence and colonial policing that came with 
government through the State’s network of colonial administrators and their patronage 
networks of dominant caste leaders/communities. This violence can be seen in the colonial 
administrators’ systematic codification of oppressive laws, made in conjunction with native 
elite communities, and the organization of particular native elite knowledge through an 
Anglophonic form i.e. codified law. 
 
This development of ‘pluralism’, ‘moral universality’ being integral to a ‘trust’ over 
property, and the ‘civilising’ of ‘loyal citizens’ over social matters was integral to the 
development of the international legal order in the 20th Century, particularly during the 
interwar years. The dialogical interplay between imperial officers, administrators and their 
network of native elites in the form of ‘bureaucracy’ of imperial governance was a 
foundational step towards its ‘internationalisation’ in the form of the League of Nations, 
which I explore in detail in the next chapter. The contribution of the British colonial encounter 
with the native elite caste structure in the subcontinent, particularly after 1833, to the 
development of international legal discourse, was reflected in their approach towards other 
colonies in the 20th Century. 
 
247  
Robert Kubicek, ‘British Empire, Expansion and Technological Change’ in Andrew Porter (ed), The 
Oxford Handbook of British Empire Vol 3:The Nineteenth Century (OUP 1999).  
133 
 
It is important to point out that this was not through ‘direct’ domination over a 
homogenous native group, but conscious, pragmatic cooperation and confluence between a 
native elite community already present and operating through their logic of hierarchy. The 
form of the network we see developing in the subcontinent since the 1830s, and in the 18th 
Century with the merchant network of the East India Company, is a negotiation of overlapping 
powers in which one, i.e. the native dominant caste elite, ultimately continues to thrive in its 
caste dominance while gaining capital through subsuming itself under the racializing logic of 
the colonizer i.e. the British imperial legal order which extended beyond the subcontinent. 
Therefore, being closer to British values and civilization was also particularly important to 
the maintenance of caste hierarchy and superiority since dominant caste were deemed 
‘closest’ – but never equal – to British civilization. The developments on the doctrine of 
sovereignty through pluralism, moral universality, trust and the hierarchy of civilization as a 
tutelage towards the non-British, and the non-European in other cases as the next chapter 
shows, facilitated by the confluence of imperial administrative networks with their native elite 
dominant caste communities was part of the subsuming racializing logic of the British Empire. 
Thus the violence perpetrated by international legal discourse justifying and legitimizing, as 
well as intensifying, the confluence between these two powers is made invisible as it is 





Chapter 5. The internationalisation of the dialogical interplay: 
League of Nations, mandated territories and indirect rule by a 





In this chapter, I show how the dialogical interplay between networks and international law 
shifted from the imperial state’s network of colonies to an international organization i.e. the 
League of Nations. Central to this shift in the form of the network was the continuation of the 
concept of trusteeship. This concept of trusteeship over ‘uncivilized’ people of colonies was 
formally internationalised through the Berlin Conference (1884–85) as the imperial state’s 
governance reached its apex in establishing its presence through networks of military, naval 
forces and formation of administrative structures. After the Great War, the formation of the 
League of Nations institutionalized the concept of trusteeship into its vision of international 
global order in the form of the mandate system. Along with the institutionalization of the 
trusteeship system, the League presented a vision for peace defined by economic 
standardization, industrialization, and self-government to be supported through its ‘technical’ 
departments led by experts. 
 
My argument in this chapter focuses on how the League can be seen as a network 
organization, particularly when it is conceived as such through the norm making position 
given to the League’s experts, employed under the League’s technical departments, who both 
produced policy and legitimised governance over mandated territories based on a new 
‘civilising discourse’ of economic and industrial development. The League, I argue, should 
be conceptualized as rule by ‘network of experts’, whose politics are influenced by their 
transnational affiliations with imperial powers, private actors or non-governmental 
international organizations emerging at that time in the 20th Century. Through its institutional 
mechanisms such as the formation of committees, commissions on specific issues that are led 
by ‘experts’ from the League’s various departments, international norms are both produced 
and then implemented in mandated territories. Expertise here becomes an important 
component of self-legitimization as the knowledge maker for the ‘civilization’ 
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discourse of ‘progress’. Expertise, as I show in this chapter, is a continuation of administrative 
‘knowledge’ collection and categorization in the name of social liberal change, which the 
British imperial administrators had already experimented with in their indirect governance 
over the subcontinent. This particular era, i.e. the interwar period, signifies a shift from 
imperial international administration of a single empire to an internationalised ‘trusteeship’ 
system administrated by imperial powers together, rather than a single empire. In particular, 
we see a confluence between empires for indirect rule over colonized territories through an 
international legal organization for the first time in the history of international law. 
 
The norms produced by these ‘experts’ under the auspices of the League legitimised the 
exploitation of colonized communities. Specifically, I look at not only how regimes of forced 
labour and policing during the interwar years in British and French mandated African 
territories were legitimised through the League’s experts but how the League’s broader vision 
of peace through economic standardization, industrialization and self-government obfuscated 
its role in the systemic violence perpetrated by the mandate powers. By understanding how 
the League of Nations was inherently violent in its governing mechanisms, i.e. through labour 
regimes and policing, we can also reinterpret how international organizations in the present 
times are not only imperial but how international legal discourse separates itself from this 
violence. 
 
In the first section of the chapter, I discuss the rise of the imperial state network in the 19th 
Century which foreshadowed characteristics necessary for a model of an international 
organization. At the end of the 19th Century, this shift from the commercial to imperial state 
network was marked by putting the role of the state, more specifically the British imperial 
state, at the center of governance over territory. According to the particular idea of British 
imperial liberalism, the state is the only political entity that can govern territory entrusted to 
it as a trust. In the case of the British imperial state, as I have shown in the previous chapter, 
this was a gradual move away from the merchants of the commercial network to colonial 
administrators in the colonies as ‘experts’. At the apex of British imperial liberalism, 
international legal thinking consolidated with intellectuals who led the European intellectual 
136 
 
movement on international law in the late 19th Century.1 I look particularly at the work of 
European legal scholars whose writings were key to the international legal thinking 
underpinning the Berlin West Africa Conference (1884–1885).2 The legal thought at the 
conference was a direct result of conflicting imperial interest in the continent of Africa. The 
Scramble for Africa, as it came to be known, became a site of colonization as great powers of 
Europe including Britain, France, Germany and Portuguese empires concentrated their efforts 
in establishing settlements to acquire and mark their territorial boundaries in Africa in the late 
19th Century. In the process of the carving up of Africa to avoid conflict between empires, the 
language deployed was a combination of British imperial liberalism, i.e. free trade, and what 
has been referred to as the internationalisation of territory.3 The political and legal effect of 
the Berlin Conference has been described, however, as the partitioning and acquisition of 
Africa. Within the context of European colonial history, this internationalisation has also been 
referred to as ‘New Imperialism’ where, as Mieke Van Der Linden describes, ‘a Geist of 
nationalism and competition resulted in the scramble for Africa’.4 
This ‘institutionalization of the process of acquiring territory in Africa’5 has also been 
referred to as an example of a ‘conceptual terra nullius’6 i.e. ‘no man’s land’ as it marked an 
era of exploitation and colonization of Africa.7 Matt Craven8 and Andrew Fitzmaurice,9 
however, reveal a more complicated picture of this New Imperialism as both a moment of 
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transitioning into a new logic of imperialism while also giving rights to natives. In the context 
of my overall argument in this thesis, and this chapter in particular, the important shift in this 
New Imperialism is that it is both ‘colonial and anticolonial’10 as a result of the changing form 
and character of the imperial state network. The Berlin Conference and the colonization 
process of Africa marks a period of the internationalisation of dialogical interplay. Following 
a period of collapse in building relations within Europe that resulted in the eruption of the 
Great War, a new world order emerged led by the victors of the war. With the advent of 
international organization in the 20th Century coming into play even before the war broke out, 
an idea for a political successor, materialized in a more institutional form, was led by the 
American and British intellectual and political forces. This came to be known as the League 
of Nations. I argue that despite major historical events and changes between the time of the 
Berlin Conference and the formation of the League of Nations, the two represent an attempt 
at the shifting from the imperial network of the colonial government to a system that relies on 
internationalised regulation through international organizations. 
 
In the case of the League, internationalisation of rules became institutionalized, lending it 
a sustained organizational structure that gave it the legitimacy to pursue social, economic, 
legal and political objectives defined by a network of ‘experts’ employed under the League’s 
various departments. The League’s experts would hold leading positions on not just 
departments of the League, but be part of inter-departmental committees and commissions 
formed to advise on social, economic and humanitarian issues. 
 
I look at the rise of internationalism in the early 20th Century, and particularly imperial 
internationalism, as it led to the formation and foundations of the League of Nations. In more 
orthodox terms these norms of ‘international society’, as they arose in the interwar period, 
have been explained by international relation theorists Adam Watson and Hedley Bull, as an 
emerging global order of inter-state, supra-state relations and interactions between societies 
as a promise of global peace and cooperation.11 While the movements and organizations that 
arose during this time held a similar view,12 I look particularly at the League of Nations’ 
embodiment of internationalism that was inherently imperialistic. The 
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League as a separate entity had a mechanism for deploying administrative and legal apparatus 
that were based on civilizing discourse. I look at how indirect rule, which was already utilized 
by the British, as I have shown in the previous chapter, became as a technique of 
administration within the mandate system and the League’s international corporation through 
the provisions of Article 23 were part of its overarching imperial internationalism. Moving 
beyond just an examination of the League’s operation as a networked organization, I take into 
consideration how legal discussions by Georges Scelles (1878–1961) on the League of 
Nations’ international cooperation demonstrate its relevance to international law rather than a 
separation from it generally assumed in orthodox literature.13 I argue that it is particularly in 
viewing the mandate system and transnational cooperation through the paradigm of imperial 
internationalism that we can understand the League as a form of international organization 
that can deploy networks of social, administrative, economic and legal structures that can 
shape governance over mandated territories at the same time as these networks justify and 
expand the imperial internationalism of the League. 
 
In the last part, I turn to the violence of the League of Nations expert networks. I argue 
that the internationalisation of the dialogical interplay between expert networks and 
international law shows the operation of international law similar to its different iterations 
throughout its history, i.e. the imperial state, the merchant network and the missionary 
network, as I have explored in the previous three chapters. Specifically, it renders the violence 
of the network external and invisible to international law’s operation. On a broader scale, the 
League’s legal and political vision of international global order defined peace through 
economic progress and industrialization, replacing the idea of military presence with policing 
structures for public order. Along with this particular idea of peace, the League’s network of 
experts, through committees on specific issues such as Slavery, Native Labour and Penal 
Sanctions in mandated territories, legitimised the exploitation of natives particularly in the 
British and French Mandated African territories of Kenya, South Africa, Uganda, Sudan and 
Northern Gold Coast in the interwar years. In the examples I show, violence was systemized 
through forced labour regimes utilizing indirect rule as a means of governing over the people 
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II. From imperial state administrators to international administration 
 
 
International legal thought as it developed in this time also contributed to and facilitated the 
growing expansion of the imperial state network at this time. The underlying presumption of 
this political and legal thought was that the culture, economics and social position of the 
European powers made them superior rather than a civilization anchored solely in a natural 
law given by God to the Christian communities. This thinking was entrenched quite clearly 
within 19th Century British Victorian legal thinkers. 
The early British Victorian intellectuals in the 19th Century carried on thinking more 
clearly about the state and its place within the international legal order within Britain, 
particularly in universities. As Casper Sylvest observes, international legal thought as a 
discipline was ‘increasingly professionalized and slowly consolidated within universities’.14 
Victorian scholars became a ‘well connected intellectual-cum-political stratum in British 
society’.15 During the early and mid-19th Century in particular, when international legal 
thinking was still referred in terms of ‘Law of Nations’, the intersection between religion and 
scientific thinking was the hallmark of political and intellectual thought.16 The discussions of 
‘Law of Nations’ within this particular intersection of religion and scientific thinking revolved 
around the discipline as part of an evolutionary progression of the human state. This thinking 
about the evolutionary nature of the human state was particularly pronounced in thinking 
about colonial governance. 
 
In the mid-19th Century, it was in Cambridge that evolutionary thinking on Law of Nations 
became prominent. Notably, historian Henry Sumner Maine (1822–88), who took  on the 
Whewell Professor of International law in 1887, argued that it is because of the historical 
progress of the ‘Law of Nature’ that we have the ‘Law of Nations’.17 His reasoning for 
associating an origin for the ‘Law of Nations’ to the ‘Law of Nature’ was based on the idea 
that the evolution of society linked to the progress of history has brought the ‘civilized’ 
nations to the point where only a morality through consent could lead to 
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peace.18 In this sense, for Maine, international law was both positivist i.e. based on 
codification and naturalist i.e. based on morality. A key characteristic of Maine’s argument 
was how he viewed history as showing progress within the civilized world throughout time. 
This progress, according to Maine, is enabled by the ‘Law of Nations’ as derived from the 
morality of the ‘Law of Nature’, enabling the civilized world towards a better society i.e. the 
Victorian era.19 
This particular line of thought that linked progress of history to the progress of the civilized 
society, that is towards benchmarks for a civilized society which included codification of law, 
was also prevalent in European thinking outside Britain. The 19th Century jurists, as Matt 
Craven observes, categorized historical progress in terms where the non-European could be 
geographically and temporally distinguished as ‘behind in time’.20 Describing the historical 
theorization in international law in the 19th Century, Matt Craven surmises that juridical 
thinking on non-European places made them open to the ‘possibility of maturation and 
change’.21 
This line of thinking also lent itself to the ‘new rationality of imperial rule – the production 
of civilization through beneficent colonization’.22 International legal thinking in the 19th 
Century then not only found itself justifying imperialism through very specific modes of 
discourse on ‘tutelage’, but was inherently different from ‘empire’ through commercial 
monopolies, as that would jeopardize ‘free trade’ philosophy. 
 
Within British intellectual thought and European empires, the key elements of the new 
rationality of imperial rule were, in fact, the same i.e. the codification of international law or 
a move towards contractual thinking and the exportation of civilization through contract. 
These elements in the intellectual thought in the 19th Century were also ultimately a reflection 
of the practices of imperial governance through trade treaties at the time. As seen from Ed 
Keene’s study of British anti-slavery treaties to establish free trade regimes, trade treaties in 
unequal terms were often a means to secure naval routes, have inspection rights over vessels, 
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native people.23 The British Empire free trade regimes involved naval forces as officers to 
implement the necessary changes for the ‘civilization’ of Africa. These were meant to, along 
with consulate officers, oversee the anti-slavery regulation to maintain a presence in the 
different parts of Africa where the British Empire had established trade agreements.24 It is 
particularly in terms of what the navy, as a military force, and foreign officials, as the 
administrative officers, were able to do through trade treaties within the colonial territories 
that show a distinctive reason for an increase in treaty making.25 Keene rightly observes that 
treaty making represented what Wilhelm Grewe describes as the ‘intensive inclination 
towards contractual specification and codification of international law’.26 
To add to Ed Keene’s suggestion of why there was a rise in treaty making,27 I argue that 
the rise of treaty making within and outside of Europe can also be explained by a shift in the 
mode of imperial governance from the commercial network to the imperial state network 
which was gradually reaching its apex. Trade treaties were a product of implementing a 
different way of imperial governance over colonial territories, which included settling in those 
territories that were yet to be colonized, for example, the continent of Africa. With the 
dissolution of charter companies as network governance, the move towards a state-centric 
governance over colonies through trade regulation required a new legal modality to justify 
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These changes in adopting legal forms like treaties to create military and naval supervision through sea 
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Treaty making became an important way to help the British Empire and other European 
powers to secure routes, maintain a presence, intervene and control native territories under 
the guise of a new form of legal discourse that was essentially another form of imperialism.29 
In this sense, the increase in treaty making as a way to govern through naval and administrative 
stipulations leading to annexations under the discourse of ‘tutelage’ can also be seen as 
characteristic of the new form of imperial state governance through networks of international 
administrators. 
 
The political impact of this legal thinking on imperial governance in the 19th Century  can 
be surmised from the influence of the institute de droit internationale. The institute was formed 
in 1873 in Ghent, Belgium as a private association of international legal thinkers whose 
purpose was and remains ‘furthering the codification and progressive development of 
international law’.30 In its inception, the main objectives of the institute mirrored a consensus 
on international legal and political order at the time. Under Article 2(1) of the institute’s 
founding charter, the progress of international law would be made on ‘principles based on the 
juridical conscience of the civilized world’, cooperation towards progressive and gradual 
codification, ‘acknowledging principles in harmony with needs of modern society’ and 
‘contributing to peace and observance of laws of war’.31 
This shift in intellectual thought, as I have mentioned in the last chapter, also marked a 
transition in the identity of the British Empire as defined through the commercial Company- 
State i.e. the British East India Company to the entity of the British imperial state. The 
ideology of the British imperial state as a tutor towards self-government and a bastion of free 
trade philosophy was utilized to expand to other territories. It is at this juncture that the 
imperial state network’s techniques of utilizing trade treaties in the 19th Century and the 
reliance on the codification of law as part of the evolutionary thinking about civilization 
became central to its imperial logic. However, using treaties as a way to claim tutelage over 
native territories and thus enact forms of governance over them was not only a British tactic. 
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civilization translated into and resembled, as William Bain points out, ‘ideas of trusteeship 
developed by the British Empire’.32 
 
a. The Berlin Conference as a model for internationalisation 
 
 
European legal thought along with colonial policy in the 19th Century concerning the non- 
European world developed to the point where they had essentially facilitated the expansion of 
the colonial network of European empires. Territories in Africa, in particular, became a centre 
point for such expansionism. The primary legal mechanism to occupy territories at the time 
was trade treaties with native territories in Africa. As competition over occupation through 
treaties grew so too did the fear of an inter-imperial conflict. 
 
Nonetheless, the African continent was an important place of resource for European 
empires. Along with the legal thinking on state-centric regulation over commerce in the 1800s, 
the ‘Scramble for Africa’ began with the growth for material and markets in Europe.33 As 
Makua Matau observes, ‘the scramble began with the French invasion of Algeria in 1830, and 
the British take-over of Suez Canal and Egypt’.34 The British and French intensification in 
acquiring land in Africa was also envisioned through establishing a presence through trade 
treaties. Inter-imperial rivalry for the ‘Scramble’ did not come to the point of conflict, 
however, until the Belgian trading company owned by King Leopold II established itself as a 
governing institution in the Congo and the German Empire’s interest in acquiring land in the 
continent of Africa also grew.35 
In 1884, Otto Von Bismarck, the newly appointed Chancellor of the German Empire, 
called for a meeting in Berlin of recognized members of the community of nation states to 
contain the rivalry over land in Africa.36 The call for a multilateral conference was primarily 
motivated by the growing competition over the acquisition of territory and access to territory 
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in the continent of Africa. Specifically, as Matt Craven points out, the origins of the 
conference could be traced to letters exchanged between Bismarck and the French foreign 
minister Jules Ferry over terms of a possible Franco-German alliance to undermine the 
expansion of the British Empire’s informal empire.37 For Germany, Britain’s influence in the 
African region also hampered its interests in Cameroon, Angora, Fiji and New Guinea.38 With 
the foothold of King Leopold II’s trading company in Congo and the possibility of an Anglo-
Portuguese agreement to recognize sovereignty over the Congo Basin, there was a need for a 
multilateral involvement of parties who had competing trade regimes in the African 
continent.39 
The Berlin colonial conference was held for three months between 15 November 1884 
and 26 February 1885.40 The General Act of the conference signed on 16 February 1885 was 
meant for ‘the development of trade and civilization in certain regions in Africa’, ‘furthering 
the moral and material wellbeing of the native populations’ and to prevent ‘any 
misunderstandings and disputes which might in future arise from new acts of occupation on 
the coast of Africa’.41 The most important aspects of the General Act included the freedom of 
navigation that banned any monopoly on the coastal sea around the continent (from Congo to 
Zambezi), and the access to any territory, coastline, rivers or lakes. Despite a protectorate 
having sovereign rights over such a territory, the territory would be open to ‘all flags’ and the 
powers would bind themselves to the preservation of the native tribes and care for the 
improvement of the conditions of their moral and material wellbeing’.42 
Trade treaties and access through the acquisition of territories through such treaties were 
central to the underlying economic system proposed by the Berlin Conference – free trade. In 
the decades before, as I have noted earlier, imperial policy regarding non-Europeans was 
marked by an increasing interest in both codifications of international law – treaty making  as 
a hallmark of such a codification and the evolutionary thinking about European civilization 
which must be exported. Like the British approach to trade treaties, the Berlin Conference in 
many ways replicated past and existing European practice in the 19th Century. The powers at 
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anti-slavery as an ideological discourse to overshadow the economic and political advantage 
of acquiring territories from the natives of African territories.43 In this way the conference 
only formalized, as Makau Mutua as observed, ‘illegality already committed’.44 
At the same time, Fitzmaurice argues that the novelty of the conference was in how it 
deviated from the British and French imperial practice of acquiring land through treaties.45 
The primary juridical tool employed to do so in the conference was the creation of the concept 
of ‘territorium nullias’. Andrew Fitzmaurice argues that the acquisition of property by the 
colonizing powers at the Berlin Conference could not follow the same reasoning as acquiring 
territory through settlement or occupation.46 For the most part, the juridical reason being that 
if trade treaties were made between European merchants and African tribal chiefs, there was 
an assumption that the natives had a legal right to the ownership of such territory. Politically, 
anti-colonial sentiments were a growing part of 19th Century liberalism which also included a 
growing concern, domestic and international, for the general will of the people in the 
appointment of a sovereign even when it concerned colonial ventures outside of Europe.47 
Furthermore, from a pragmatic point of view, there was a growing political consensus that 
acquisition by force required resources, both in resisting possible rebellion from natives and 
inter-imperial conflict that could no longer be afforded.48 
Nonetheless, the main concern for the imperial powers at the Berlin Conference was to 
devise a concept to justify the establishment of imperium, or sovereignty over the use of 
territory, rather than ownership (dominium). The concept of having imperium (or the right to 
the use of territory) was tied into the concepts of trusteeship and the civilizing mission of the 
European powers over the territories they occupied. The two main elements that legitimised 
imperium were consent through treaties and the occupation of those territories for the 
betterment of the territory that might be left ‘uncultivated’. From this perspective, the 
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lines between the occupation of a protectorate and annexation as part of the imperial state 
were often quite blurred and unclear.49 
However, as Fitzmaurice argues, the protection of African ownership over their territories 
within this concept made the particular structure of this concept anti-colonial.50 Thus as 
Fitzmaurice explains, what stood out in the Berlin Conference was how to resolve the question 
of the territory when it came to ‘backwards’ people. As Fitzmaurice explains, the concept of 
the territory was distinguished from the concept of land as far as rights to govern were 
concerned.51 The native people of Africa were understood to have rights over the land 
ownership; however, because of their lack of utilization over the land, the territory could not 
be classified as ‘property’.52 Thus, having no property rights over them, since the nature of 
the land has not been utilized, left the question of sovereignty hinged on what position the 
native people occupied on the ladder of civilization.53 Nonetheless, Fitzmaurice argues it is 
pertinent to consider how, for the idea of dispossession through terra nullius to work, there 
needed to be legal recognition of land ownership of the native Africans.54 According to 
Fitzmaurice, this shows how 19th Century liberalism did present opposition and resistance to 
colonialism through recognition of native land rights.55 In Matt Craven’s opinion as well, the 
conference could be seen in a more nuanced sense as putting restrictions on colonial powers 
through the banning of both monopoly and tax or tariff collection for revenue.56 In both 
Fitzmaurice and Craven’s argument, the conference reflects a moment of international legal 
thinking having values of liberation and rights of the colonized as well as an imperial 
character. 
 
b. Indirect rule and the Scramble for Africa 
 
 
However, the extent to which the doctrines developed in the conference, specifically terra 
nullius, could be held as both colonial and anti-colonial can be re-read by paying attention to 




Craven (n 8). 
51 










Craven (n 8). 
147 
 
network during the mid-19th Century. The underlying logic of terra nullius depended on 
effective occupation through the consent of the native community – by way of the treaty and 
the undertaking of protection under colonial rule. While it may be that native rights were 
protected even if to advance colonial ambitions, as Fitzmaurice and Craven point out, I argue 
that the protectorate system agreed upon made it justifiable to politically and legally create 
the basic infrastructure of an administrative and armed presence in native territories. The 
administrative and military presence of the great powers, justified through a particular 
understanding of ‘territory’, allowed them to expand and sustain a network for colonial 
governance. The Berlin Conference was a concentrated multilateral effort of imperial powers 
at the time to define and adopt the legality through which territory is not only dispossessed 
but then occupied to establish a form of governance through its networks of administrators. 
Thus, even though this idea of ‘effective occupation’, fleshed out and agreed upon 
multilaterally in the Berlin Conference, did not create a new mode of colonial governance, it 
created conditions necessary for imperial powers to adopt colonial governance through 
indirect rule.57 
Indirect rule, in its earliest iteration, was a technique necessary for the expansion and 
viability of the imperial state network. It essentially made colonial governance, an otherwise 
costly enterprise, financially bearable for empires.58 Even though the term indirect rule is 
attributed later to Fredrick Lugard (1858–1945), the British colonial administrator who went 
on to become and to be most famously known as the first Governor General of Nigeria 
between 1914 and 1919, political scientist JC Syers argues that its earlier conception could be 
traced back to a British encounter with natives of the territory of Natal in sub-Saharan Africa 
in the 1840s.59 According to Syers, its creator was Theophilus Shepstone (1817–93), the 
British government’s diplomatic agent to the native people of Natal, who was the first one to 
implement indirect rule in Africa.60 Indirect rule was developed as an imperial form of 
governance where, instead of imposing a domestic, that is British, political structure to govern 
the natives, pre-existing native political structures were used for the interests of the colonial 
power.61 Mamdani describes this as ‘decentralised despotism’.62 In this sense, 
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indirect rule was in some ways already an approach that the British Empire began to utilize to 
create the patronage network of members from native elite dominant caste leaders and 
communities in India as part of its approach to indirectly govern, which included codification 
of rules in colonial India in Anglophonic terms.63 As Mamdani  and Ochonu also point out, 
the system of indirect rule was an accruement of British colonial experience in the 
subcontinent, where the British utilized existing political structures through which to create 
an administrative and economic system for their benefit.64 
As I point out in the last chapter, this was a particularly convenient fit for the British 
administrators given the existing socio-economic gradations of inequality produced through 
the caste system within the subcontinent. The British, in confluence with the elite dominant 
caste leaders and communities, subsumed the existing structuring within their civilizing 
hierarchy, codifying and labelling the caste structure into Anglophonic terms to integrate them 
in the judicial system of the colonies. The codification and utilization of native elite dominant 
caste hierarchy in Anglophonic terms did not just make it easier for the British administrators 
and judges to rule over the population but also meant a subsuming of it within the racializing 
logic of the British Empire beyond the subcontinent i.e., in this case, the African territories. It 
also marked, as I argue in the previous chapter, the shift from the commercial to imperial state 
network as the British East India Company devolved its power and made way for the British 
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The indirect rule, then, was very much dependent on the Anglophonic construction of 
native community structures. In the case of Natal in the 1840s, the idea of chieftains as 
understood by the delegate of the British Empire did not exist.65 The British needed a clear 
line of political authority to flow from the Kings through chiefs to households which could 
justify the cessation of rights to use of land through a ‘consented’ treated treaty by such a 
chief.66 In this way, the ideas of native political structure required by British delegates to set 
up an administrative system to secure their effective occupation did not, as Jason Myers put 
it, ‘fit the anthropological concept of the chief’ as an elite political leader.67 Mamdani too 
describes the British indirect rule in Natal and other ‘stateless’ communities’ insertion of 
‘tribal chieftains’ in a similar way. He observes that consolidating support to landed elites as 
‘chiefs’ to create a hierarchical structure to control land revenue, labour, taxation, penalization 
was how the British incorporated indirect rule.68 In places where the exact structures of 
‘chieftaincy’ did not exist or had ceased to exist, the British delegates resorted to 
‘manufacturing and manipulation of chieftaincy’ for a system of indirect rule to operate.69 
The basic necessity of indirect rule in this earlier form was to control the institution of 
tribal political structures, not just the ‘chieftain’ or political elite.70 Apart from the benefit of 
having native loyalty ensuring fewer risks of rebellion, it was both financially viable and 
politically expedient to fit the narrative of self-rule within domestic, i.e. British, political 
thinking. More importantly, the indirect rule allowed colonial rule to be sustained with the 
least amount of resources through a network of administrative offices and armed presence 
while gradually subverting native epistemology and juridical/political thinking. Its hallmark 
was not a direct force in the form of war that was more visible within the international legal 
discourse of justifications of war in the ‘hinterlands’ of Africa and other parts of the colonial 
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In one of the earliest interactions of the British Empire with the Northern Nigerian Sokoto 
Hausa Muslim caliphate, Reynolds and Ochonu argue, we see that the British found the most 
intuitive fit for their indirect rule in this particular pre-existing political rule.71 Here the British 
utilized and intensified the Sokoto caliphate for their own colonial rule approximating them 
as efficient rulers who could facilitate the expansion of British colonial rule in other African 
territories.72 Historian Muhammad Omar describes the indirect rule of the British in Northern 
Nigeria Hausa Muslims as a way of assimilation, control and surveillance by constructing 
Islamic discourse for administrative control of the region.73 The British approach to indirect 
rule within Africa was by no means the same across the continent but was informed by how 
they could translate existing socio-political configurations, whatever form they were in, 
whether Afro-Islamic such as the Sokoto caliphate, or stateless communities of Igboland, into 
their homogenous system of social, political and economic governance of territory through 
intermediaries loyal to the British.74 
At the core of the structure of chieftaincy as appointed by the colonial administrators, the 
governance was based on despotism marked by racial and economic segregation. Myers points 
out that a hut tax, introduced in Natal in 1848, was collected by the chief from the natives 
along with providing one labour per every eleven huts.75 A relationship between the colonial 
protector and the natives was mediated through the chieftaincy structure as devised 
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by the colonial administrators. Earliest native labour codes, specifically the Natal Native Code 
in 1891, were also embedded within the indirect rule of the British Empire, as Mamdani notes, 
to continue forms of slavery i.e. ‘forced labour for public works, defence or needs of the 
colony’.76 Rules within the territories did not define ‘natives’ but operated on the assumption 
of two separate systems; one for tribal natives and one for European settlers.77 
It was in the land allotment policy, however, that, on the ground level, the racial/economic 
segregation and inequality reflected the broader legal thinking put forward in the Berlin 
Conference for the ideological motive for effective occupation. Land allotments were done 
purely based on a right to use for cultivation and betterment of land instead of ownership.78 A 
similar logic differentiated the right of the protector to the land, that is imperium, and the 
native’s right to ownership in the discussions of the Berlin Conference. In the discourses on 
the concept of legitimate effective occupation resulting from the Berlin Conference, the 
colonial protector of the native land would only work to cultivate and better the territory, 
which the native was not capable of doing. Land allotment policy would always, as Myers 
points out, work through patronage and discretion of the chief appointed by the colonial 
administrator.79 The chief would allot land to cultivate to the European settlers, the protectors, 
who also manipulated and controlled the institution of the chieftaincy.80 Indirect rule created 
a structure where the natives were systematically excluded through racial and economic 
divisions while benefiting European settlers or those that were appointed to be native 
‘chieftains’ by the colonial protectors.81 
Structural violence, in the form of racial segregation tied with economic and political 
disenfranchisement, of this kind was part of indirect rule, a concept that international legal 
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thought about sovereignty as terra nullius within the Berlin Conference made possible. Not 
only that but by attributing the control of ‘war’ as part of the protectorate system in addition 
to the material wellbeing of natives, the General Act of the Berlin Conference accommodated 
an imperial mode of governance hiding the violence that was part of it. 
 
In every sense, then, the Conference had significance for a shift in imperial governance of 
colonies, the extent to which that can be said to be anti-colonial as much as colonial in the 
way described by Craven and Fitzmaurice may be doubtful. At best the restrictions on empire 
building within the doctrines in the General Act were only a necessary step for the 
development of indirect rule. More importantly, the ‘anti-colonial’ character of the Act 
foreshadowed the need for imperial governance which could be sustained through co- imperial 
collaboration and consensus. In this way, the conference essentially marked a European 
multilateral consensus on legal rules with relation to non-European natives. Its ‘anti-colonial’ 
character, as described by Craven and Fitzmaurice, was only a reaction to liberalism’s 
criticisms of colonialism at the time and not a native perspective of anti-colonial sentiment. 
Additionally, the ‘restrictions’ on monopoly and tax tariffs were at the same time a controlling 
mechanism to prevent inter-imperial conflict rather than a truly ‘emancipatory’ ideal for the 
native community. The system of or practices that resemble indirect rule ensured that an anti-
colonial political and legal structure representative of native thinking is subverted to be used, 
as I have argued, for the interests of the European occupiers. 
 
III. League of Nations: The internationalisation of dialogical interplay 
 
The aftermath of the Berlin Conference saw an increase in the Italian, French, Belgian, 
German and English empires moving to secure their occupation in territories in Africa. The 
internationalisation of the protectorate system which required effective occupation also meant 
that securing administrative rights through treaties was imperative if any claim to legitimacy 
of terratorium nullius could be made. International legal recognition of the process through 
which protectorates are claimed as territories became just as important as simply occupying 
by force. 
 
While this was true until a few years after the conference, Bismarck’s attempt at a 
formalized approach to colonial expansion which would make indirect rule a possibility was 
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interrupted through aggressive competition between the imperial rivals.82 Hence effective 
occupation through administrative control and military presence became a way of enforcing 
spheres of influence to prevent other European powers from negotiating with natives or 
penetrating territories or access to such territories with mineral-rich resources.83 The 
objective, especially for the British at this time, remained to secure passages and through- 
fares across the empire’s reach – ‘from Cape to Calcutta’.84 This expansionist vision was put 
forward by mining magnate Cecil Rhodes who was responsible for the British expansion in 
South Africa.85 Even if legitimization through effective occupation was not the main approach 
of empires anymore, the core purpose in ‘securing passages’ for an imperial state network 
remained the same – i.e. control of access to territories and routes under the guise of the 
civilizing mission. By the turn of the century, as Martti Koskenniemi notes ‘colonial 
protectorates, spheres of interest, hinterland claims and forms of indirect rule had become part 
of empires’.86 
This is also why, after the Conference, settlements through trade treaties with natives often 
also came with the creation of commercial companies, for example, the incorporation of the 
British South African Company in the territories of Matabeleland and Mashonaland in 1889 
and the Royal Niger Company in Niger Delta in 1886.87 As chartered companies became a 
mode of expanding the imperial state network, claims to territories nonetheless were defined 
as colonies of the empire and not territories of the commercial companies. 
 
However, the idea of colonial protectorate that the conference had formalized raised 
questions and contentions as to the extent to which a commercial company could be 
recognized as a political and governing entity. At the turn of the century, this became 
particularly relevant in criticisms against the international association of Congo – King 
Leopold II’s private venture which turned to a privately owned state separate from the Belgian 
Empire. Even though a major part of the conference was aimed towards discussing the 
position of Leopold’s company and actions in Congo, its recognition over the use of territory 
in the Congo was justified on a ‘humanitarian basis’. As the rest of the European 
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powers struggled to gain ground in Africa through commercial companies and annexing 
territories as ‘colonies’, Leopold’s company reaped greater profits through draconian labour 
policies that amounted to enslavement and violence.88 
After the 1900s, as the working of the Free state of Congo became controversial as it was 
reported to be ‘inhuman’ and against the rules established in the Berlin Conference, its 
recognition as a political entity was questioned especially by the British Empire.89 The British 
government initiated the process of calling into question the legitimacy and legality of the 
actions of Leopold’s regime in Congo by transmitting a diplomatic note to the signatories of 
the Berlin Conference. In 1908, the Belgian Parliament moved to annex the territory of Congo 
as part of its colony.90 The British government and the pressure by other European powers on 
the matter was also a case of using formalized rules as a basis for challenging competition 
posed by a private venture on its own.91 It, however, also signaled the need for claiming and 
enforcing the legitimacy of the imperial state network and its mode of governance – i.e. 
indirect rule – as the only acceptable colonial policy. The colonial protectorate essentially 
should be by this logic an extension of the state i.e. by being its colony. The colonial 
protectorate was essentially also an international protectorate. This idea of international 
protectorate also meant that, along with having a duty to the betterment of natives, there was 
also a responsibility to the rest of the civilized world. 
 
The underlying notion of protection of natives in the Berlin Conference was to make the 
civilizing mission a global international obligation held by the European civilization. Even if 
the Berlin Conference only resulted in one concentrated attempt at formalization of 
international legal rules for this ‘protectorate system’, leaving the actual implementation to be 
done through imperial state networks, it, nonetheless, signified a concert of European powers 
legitimizing forms of indirect rule through mutual agreement on international legal doctrines. 
It is for these reasons that William Bain refers to the Berlin Conference and its aftermath as 
the time of ‘internationalisation of trusteeship’.92 This particular characteristic of the 
conference, along with how it helped set up the structural violence through indirect rule, is 
what makes it an apt precursor to the new form of dialogical interplay between the network 
and international legal discourse in the 20th Century i.e. the League of Nations. 
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a. The institutionalization of ‘internationalism’ 
 
 
The turn of the 20th Century saw the peak of imperial state network not only crystallized as a 
mode governance but also legitimised through a call for a globally regulated and formalized 
legal order and state relations. The 19th Century ‘concert of Europe’, that is an informal 
relation for the maintaining of global legal order epitomized most clearly in the Berlin 
Conference, was seen to be one example of the internationalisation of global legal order. 
Regulation over war i.e. the Geneva Convention of 1864, trans-boundary formations of non- 
state actors such as the International Red Cross in 1864 and the Universal Post Union (1878) 
were other examples that called for a globally regulated convention or formalized set of rules 
for the international society.93 
In the orthodox understanding of the history of international relation from scholars like 
Hedley Bull, this ‘internationalisation’ of rules signified a cohesion of ‘universal’ rules and 
the inclusion of all states – including colonial dependencies – to preserve global political 
order.94 For Bull, it was the European society that took the lead in ingraining values of 
territorial integrity into the non-European international society.95 Of course, critical legal 
scholars have questioned the assumption of territorial integrity as an egalitarian concept. 
Antony Anghie’s work, in particular, makes the point that territorial sovereignty is 
imperialistic and that the ‘universalization’ of the international society was manufactured for 
the assimilation of colonial dependencies at the turn of the 20th Century.96 The same 
skepticism applies also to the codification of rules of war in the Hague Conference of 1899 
and 1907. In more orthodox history, as well as contemporary thought on rules of war, the 
codification is taken at its face value as brought about for humanitarian ends to alleviate 
human suffering in global conflict. Its codification as a matter of international administration 
of legal rules is also is seen as the global leaders coming together to impose a set of standard 
rules meant to apply equally to all states. Critical legal scholars again have questioned the 
neutrality and objectivity of the rules in how they legitimised violence 
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against colonial dependencies.97 Internationalisation of rules and the historiography 
constructed around it is criticized for ignoring the inequality inherent in the process as it 
corresponded to the civilizing discourse of the time. In most cases, rules that were codified 
were by and for the benefit of international society defined as European or, later, American. 
 
The First World War that lasted between 1914 and 1919 is understood as the impetus for 
the formation of an international organization to maintain peace and security in the world, 
along with other matters of trans-boundary concerns to the global community. David 
Armstrong observes, however, that even before the League of Nations the need for 
international organizations became necessary due to the increase in commercial activities 
owing to the industrial revolution.98 Commercial interactions across boundaries required 
standardization of rules between states to accommodate the rise of international business 
transactions.99 The first term coined for an international organization was ‘public international 
union’ and institutions were formed to internationalise matters ranging from the Universal 
Postal Union in 1878 to the International Office of Hygiene in 1907.100 The institutionalization 
of these concerns to standardize regulation further emphasises them as matters of ‘general 
concern’ rather than just domestic issues. This also meant that it was central to create 
institutions that would be responsible for coordinating, supervising and drafting rules that 
allowed nation states to sustain these ‘general concerns’ as common issues of the international 
society.101 
During this time of the industrial revolution, the internationalisation projects on different 
commercial, legal and social matters started to take the center stage. The economic 
competition between great powers created the necessary tension and opportunity for total war. 
As Christopher Clark observes, the political tensions within the Balkan region might have 
sparked the war but the existing competitive economic structures can explain the readiness 
with which the war also became a ground for imperial expansion.102 Hence, with the outbreak 
of the war, a ‘new scramble for Africa’ began and with their defeat in the war, the Germans 
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Pacific’.103 As Michael Callahan observes, during this time, ‘Britain and France sized half of 
this overseas empire’ which included Togo, Cameroon, and the German East Africa’.104 
Amidst this opportunistic seizure of territories as part of the war, the intellectual and 
political critiques of the colonial rule persisted. Especially within the United States, foreign 
policy maintained that the US would not fight for conquest or any material compensation but 
rather to make the world ‘safer for democracy’.105 Being surrounded by an anti- imperialist 
and anti-war sentiment that was already building up, even if that was within a liberalist 
intellectual framework, the British War cabinet withheld any decision as to the rearrangement 
or official annexation of the territory captured during the war.106 With the Bolshevik 
revolution in Russia in 1917 that was concerned with peace without any annexations or 
indemnities,107 the powers that held territories as a consequence of the war were under greater 
pressure. 
 
The internationalisation projects and sentiments before the war and the later part of the 
19th Century also picked up after the war.108 As Daniel Gorman observes, there was a far more 
concerted effort in internationalised institutions and projects then there were before  the 
war.109 The range of groups that mobilized was also from a wider spectrum which included 
‘international communities of feminists, humanitarians, religious leaders, athletes, academics 
and ethnic minorities’.110 The spirit of internationalism beyond politics was a massive impetus 
during the 1920s for the initiation of international projects which Gorman refers to as the 
‘emergence of the international society’.111 Thus the era of internationalisation can be seen as 
a proliferation of various networks guided by various liberal imperial goals. What is important 
to note for this thesis in particular, as we will see in the next section, is which particular 
networks became central to the norm creation within the international organization, the 
League of Nations, in its global project to be imperial tutors for peace, economic development 
and social progress. 
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As both ideas of growing internationalism beyond politics that relied on rules to be 
followed and regulated globally and the political imperative of self-government as a critique 
of colonial structures took shape, America’s growing influence and interest in forming a ‘new 
world order’ was already underway. In 1915 two former presidents of the United States, 
Theodore Roosevelt and William Taft, sponsored a pressure group, ‘The League to Enforce 
Peace’, whose objective was to push for a collective system of global security to impose some 
kind of sanctions on aggressors who broke agreed upon rules.112 The League  to Enforce Peace 
put forward the notion of an international organization based on two principles: collective 
security and enhancing the status of international law.113 While the approach proposed by 
Tusk and Roosevelt resonated as a possible reformative period based on international law, its 
legalist-sanctionist character got overshadowed in the domestic American sphere by 
Woodrow Wilson’s vision for a new international legal order.114 
In 1918, Woodrow Wilson delivered his fourteen point speech in front of the United States 
Congress wherein he called for a diplomatic structure which he described as ‘a general 
association of nations for the purposes of affording mutual guarantees of political 
independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike’.115 The Wilsonian vision 
of an international society, as Stephen Wertheim observes, was based more on informal 
relations and diplomacy and it carried a strong commitment to ‘self-determination’ as a central 
principle of any international global order.116 It was not long after that the British, who were 
the largest holders of colonial territories at that point, took the steps to form a commission to 
draft a plan to make the theory of such an association a reality. The plan, named Wilson’s 
Plan, incorporated elements of a British vision of internationalism. Wilson’s retraction from 
a legal sanctionist approach to internationalism and emphasis on informal relations with a 
push for ‘self-determination’ for all nations, at least in principle, fit in perfectly with British 
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Furthermore, Mark Mazower observes, in his study of the imperial internationalism of the 
League of Nations, how Jan Smuts, the British Statesman who was also appointed to be the 
Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa between 1919 and 1924 and later on between 
1939 and1948, was central to putting forward a British vision of internationalism.118 Smuts, 
as Mazower points out, was one of the main architects involved in the drafting of the League 
of Nations Covenant. He described the formation and purpose of the League as running as a 
closer model to the British Empire’s colonial governance in the form of the Commonwealth. 
Smuts imagined the League of Nations as a world government akin to British rule over its 
colonies which he described as the ‘only successful experiment in international 
government’.119 In particular, the disregard for a sanction-based institutional structure and 
reliance on moral rhetoric of respecting native sovereignty was something the British were 
already quite familiar with in their colonial governance through indirect rule in India and its 
territories in Africa, particularly Natal in the 1840s.120 
In 1919, a peace conference was conceived in Paris where Woodrow Wilson was 
appointed to draft the constitution to the League of Nations. Through the involvement and 
influence of the United States and Britain, the League thus had elements of both the English 
liberalism of the late 19th Century which operated through the logic of indirect rule and the 
Wilsonian vision for a diplomatic institutional forum.121 Its informal character based mostly 
on supervision, recommendation and overseeing with actual implementation ceded to the 
states, or the Allied states more specifically, has led Stephen Wertheim to argue how the 
League’s internationalism was essentially a step back for international law – i.e. international 
law understood an obligatory sanction based system of accountability.122 This observation can 
also be surmised from how during the initial formation of League, efforts to coordinate and 
incorporate codified laws of war were pushed aside by the founding fathers of the League.123 
Nonetheless, internationalism of the 20th Century, in whatever form envisioned – whether 
legal sanctionist, through codification and standardization of laws or as a 
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diplomatic forum – was inherently an imperial form of internationalism. The reason being that 
internationalism, even when it embodied matters relating to other social causes or 
humanitarianism that were prevalent during the time, was ultimately based on a hierarchal 
view of what it meant to be a ‘part of the universal international society’. This is precisely 
why the League within its main objective, and throughout its obligations, gave the great 
powers the status of ‘high contracting parties’. The League’s internationalism then is based 
on a view of international society as envisaged by the ‘High Contracting’ Parties. 
 




The League embraced the idea of extending its purpose beyond a political international body 
for the security of the world, but also to ‘promote international co-operation’.124 This idea of 
also having a scheme for international cooperation, suggested by General Smuts, incorporated 
matters that were understood as trans-boundary issues at the time.125 The British vision as put 
forward by both Smuts and other legal and political leaders of the British Empire, notably 
Robert Cecil, was ultimately an international organization of the nature of a commonwealth. 
In his address on ‘international cooperation through the League of Nations’, Robert Cecil had 
even described the League as an ‘international experiment’ that is a middle ground between 
the old European concert system and a punitive, sanctionist supra-state.126 International 
projects at the time were also concerned with similar issues and for the principal authors of 
the League, particularly the British, incorporating matters of international morality was also 
part of the new organization of the world.127 These were encapsulated in Article 23 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, which stipulated international cooperation and mutual 
support in the fields of human traffic, suppression of opium and other dangerous drugs, 
maintenance of freedom of communication, equitable treatment for the commerce of the 
Members of the League, and health.128 
The political and legal arm of the League was devised for the ‘safeguarding of peace’ 
and the core component of this was the building of a new global legal order through the 
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mandates system. The mandate system, stipulated in Article 22 of the Covenant, set up an 
administrative system based on classification of territories acquired after the war.129 The 
principle behind it was that the high contracting parties ‘were advanced nations who, by 
reason of their resources, their experience and their geographical position, can best undertake 
the responsibility’.130 The result of this administration was to be a guiding force for the native 
people ‘for their wellbeing and development’ as part of the ‘sacred trust civilization’ so that 
they may also be part of the international society.131 While its rhetoric was based on moving 
away from colonialism, annexations of territories or extensions of an empire, how it 
approached a new global order resembled the imperial logic of the Berlin Conference. For the 
League, this rhetoric of ‘sacred trust of civilization’ was meant to fulfil the Wilsonian push 
for self-determination of all nation states, with the advanced states leading the less developed 
into international society for their social progress.132  Accordingly, territories were divided 
based on ‘backwardness’ and giving classes of A, B, and C, with B and C having the lowest 
progress of ‘civilization’.133 Class ‘A’ mandates included Turkey, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon 
and Mesopotamia (Iraq), Class ‘B’ included territories of Central Africa i.e. Togoland, 
Cameroon, and East Africa and Class ‘C’ included territories in South West Africa including 
Samoa, Nauru.134 
The division of social progress embedded within the mandates system was not separate 
from the idea of international cooperation.135 These two aims, the social and political, were 
interdependent,136 not just in the sense that they embodied what international society meant 
for the League but also in how the world would be divided and interdependently administered 
according to the League’s ideas of social and moral values.  Specifically, within the Mandates 
manual of the League of Nations, Mandate Class ‘B’ territories were explicitly linked to 
Article 23 general social, economic and moral concerns. The manual describes conditions 
under which mandated territories of ‘B’ class territories are to be administered subject to 
‘maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of arms traffic and liquor … and 
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Members of the League’.137 Robert Cecil went as far as explaining the international 
cooperation function of the League to include ‘control of backward races’.138 To do this, 
mandate administration through indirect rule was an integral concept and one that was not 
only a part of Article 22 but essential to give effect to the conditions, as described in the 
Mandates manual, of social, moral and economic concerns that were part of Article 23. 
Despite the underlying intellectual and political discourses as mentioned within the  League’s 
manual being underpinned by a politically charged idea of a ladder of civilization, the 
League’s trans-boundary work is presented as ‘common to all mankind’.139 The incorporation 
of Article 23 or international corporation as embodying the moral universal discourse of the 
20th Century essentially separated itself from the politics of the international organization as 
made up of interests of member states and the bias of ‘international society’. 
 
This ‘depoliticization’ of social, economic and moral concerns can be seen in both the 
political discourses of the League and intellectual legal tradition at the time. Robert Cecil, for 
instance, argued that the League would essentially act as an organization where ‘civilized’ 
nation states, despite political differences, as part of ‘an interlocking world’ can discuss how 
the ‘progress’ of science, arts and economics of the world can affect the wellbeing of their 
nations.140 Cecil presented the League as the answer to the solution of a globalized 
interconnected world where the social, moral and economic condition of one state can affect 
another.141 Giving the example of global economic markets, he argued how ‘American grain 
and British coal are both controlled by operation in all the markets of the world’.142 Political 
upheaval or war could affect the demand and thus the price of commodities in the global 
market, hence the work of the League in this way was to indirectly also preserve the global 
market for, as Robert Cecil points out, both England and America.143 Jan Smuts also 
emphasised that the League was to bear a great burden in the economic ‘progress’ of the 
civilized world. From the perspective of the British 
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administrators such as Smuts, the League as an international organization could not only build 
a new world order to bring peace, but could also allow the civilized states to regulate trans-
boundary social and economic issues that are presented as necessary to a peaceful world.144 
This trans-boundary work is presented as essentially lacking political character, as it affects 
all nations equally and can only be governed under the League’s supervision and through 
peace preserved by the League. 
 
This particular division is also implicit in the writings of International legal jurists of the 
time, notably, Georges Scelles. Scelles, for example, envisioned the League as employing a 
‘double function’; one between the nation states i.e. political/diplomatic and the other 
common issues of global concern shared by the world as a community.145 For Scelles, it was 
in the latter that the success of the League could be measured. For Scelles, then, the moralizing 
rhetoric or the second function of international law was not problematic, but a necessary step 
for the global legal order. 
 
As a whole, the League was a separate entity that not only resembled the blueprint for 
colonial governance set out in the Berlin Conference, but was also an institutional structure 
that oversaw the implementation of indirect rule over the territories assigned to ‘high 
contracting powers’. In other ways, it went further than the conference system by making 
social and moral progress on trans-boundary matters a part of its core aims. By interlinking 
trans-boundary work with its political divisions of the international society based on a scale 
of civilization, the League created a governance structure that draws its legitimacy from a 
moralizing discourse of progress. 
 
Sovereignty at this juncture is then linked to the capability of mandated territories to 
conform to the ‘universal’ moral and social issues of the international society. Empires could 
no longer establish a presence in colonial territories through a military and naval presence as 
‘self-government’ and ‘de-escalation of military presence’ became part of the League’s vision 
of international society. The League as an organization created a different method of 
governing through collaboration and connection between departments and organizations 
under it. In this new ‘internationalised’ network governance, experts assumed a greater role 
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In all respects, the League was a separate entity even if it was an assembly of member 
states. It had a bureaucratic structure which included a Secretariat, an Assembly, and 
Council.146 The League had a further prerogative to initiate separate commissions, 
committees, and bodies that coordinated, supervised and collected information at the 
Assembly and were given approval by the Council.147 These separate committees initiated by 
the League through its Assembly, specifically concerning international cooperation that is of 
relevance to my analysis, include the committees of the economic and financial organization 
of the League, the Permanent Mandate Commission, the advisory committee established 
under Article 23 of the Covenant for the prohibition of the traffic in opium and dangerous 
drugs, the traffic in women and children, and the committee for intellectual cooperation. The 
League secretariat was the technical expertise body of the League, which consisted of civil 
servants as well as ‘independent experts’ on subjects of technical duties.148 
These ‘independent experts’ nominated by the Council and appointed to the sub-bodies 
served as advisors on the various committees of the sub-bodies.149 Even within the structure, 
publicly the underlying assumption presented was that these were independent bodies i.e. 
independent of politics and interests to serve technical duties common to all. Formally, as 
Patricia Clavin observes, policy making and influencing across boundaries is not explicit 
within the League’s functions and parameters.150 This formal stance is consistent with the 
vision presented by the leading architects of the League; those mentioned above, i.e. Jan 
Smuts and Robert Cecil, specifically maintained that despite being an international 
organization the role of the League would strictly be supervisory, advisory and for discussion 
on common issues.151 While both ideologically and structurally there was an emphasis on the 
‘depoliticized’ work of the League’s technical organizations as part of its international 
cooperation objectives, in reality, this was not the case. 
 
Clavin observes that even though the League Council appointed members to lead the 
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members in the Council were involved to select ‘independent experts’.152 Clavin argues that 
it was left vague as to what background these ‘experts’ came from e.g. if they were to be 
economists or bankers.153 These committees would be formed as part of ‘technical duties’, for 
example the League of Nations Gold Delegation formed under the economic and financial 
organization’s committee.154 These sub-committees would often be created for specific topics 
under the technical duties and the ‘experts’ leading them would have transnational affiliations 
and connections to think tanks, other international organizations and universities.155 
This structure of the League of Nations formed, as Clavin explains it, a ‘transnational 
network of expertise’, which is a similar formulation through which I conceptualize the 
League as a network of experts.156 This transnational network of expertise affiliated to 
international organizations and think tanks would inform how these experts both produced 
and influenced policy. Quin Slobodian, for example, observes how the League of Nations’ 
involvement in the World Economic Conference 1927 was led by economists who would later 
be identified as progenitors of neoliberal economic thinking.157 With the help of these 
economic thinkers, a blueprint for economic governance was produced that codified 
opposition to trade obstacles which included any tariffs or wage concerns of labour as a threat 
to economic development.158 Slobodian’s observation on the ideological basis of the League’s 
economic and financial organization not only shows that the transnational network of experts 
was connected through affiliations across boundaries, but the legitimacy, authority and 
structure to organize at a global scale provided by the League enabled these experts to promote 
and push for policy beyond boundaries.159 
Taking the economic and financial organization and its committees as a prime example of 
her study, Patricia Clavin argues that informally ‘the international experts’ chosen and 
approved by the Assembly and Council to be admitted into the League secretariat and head 
its different sub-bodies/committees would both draft and promote specific policy objectives 
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and promote and pressure governments into adopting policies.160 In mandated territories,  this 
ability to produce, implement and give reports on how policy is implemented was more 
pronounced due to the governing capacity of the Permanent Mandate Commission and the 
mandated government who effectively controlled the territories under the Mandates. 
 
In other areas of technical duties, Clavin argues the same mechanism for appointment of 
‘transnational experts’, and their ability to informally push for policy, worked in much the 
same way.161 Stephen Legg, for instance, argues how, under the committee for the prevention 
of trafficking of woman and children, a travelling investigation commission was made and 
led by the head of the League’s Department for Opium Traffic and Social Issues, Rachel 
Crowdy (1884–1964), to pressure and involve itself within the local as well as state 
regulations on prostitution in colonial India.162 The initial impetus for a provision on the 
trafficking of women and children was derived from the ‘white slave trade’, which emphasised 
racial victimization of European women.163 This and other movements, such as the 
Association for Moral and Social Hygiene (AMSH), that focused on moralizing the 
international society often did so with racial and religious stereotypes about the depravity of 
the east.164 Crowdy, who led the travelling commission, understood the issue of trafficking as 
not a racial or ethnic problem but as gendered.165 This generic division, between global 
patriarchies and women of all races, was a hallmark of the imperial feminist movement at the 
time,166 where the native intersectional experience was blatantly absorbed and represented 
only as of the international – i.e. European – experience.167 The League’s travelling 
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of moralizing the ‘social evils’ i.e. in this case prostitution, in the domestic sphere of native 
nation states to address properly its international character.168 
Both the League’s economic and financial organization and the League’s opium and social 
issues department’s ideological basis could be traced to transnational bodies of experts who 
had a specific ideological basis for their views on the social and economic issues. The 
humanitarian outlook of the League’s opium and social issues departments reflected the work 
done by the imperial feminist movement and activists from the British Association against 
White Slave Trafficking and the Association of Moral and Social Hygiene.169 In their own 
right, these organizations could be seen as individual networks consisting of activists and 
economists but, due to sharing the imperial liberal basis of the League’s broader objectives, 
they were mediated and acted through the League on, for example, economics or humanitarian 
issues. The League, through its universalization of international morals and economic 
progress as depolitical factors to be promoted and sustained throughout the world, provided 
legitimacy, authority and most importantly the structure to these networks to translate their 
ideological reforms into governmental policy. 
 
The League of Nations, then, can be understood as a form of a network of experts that, 
while operating through categorization of nation states through the ladder of civilization, also 
gave the structure and means for the transnational network of experts to translate their 
ideological reform into policy through its trans-boundary governmental channels, travelling 
commissions, international expert missions, and inter-departmental committees on issues of 
international concern. Indirect rule thus also became a crucial part of the interwar era 
administration of mandated territories.170 
In conceptualizing the League in this manner, we can also question the supposed 
separation of the League’s imperial governance through the Mandates Commission and 
technical trans-governmental function as two different arms of the League. Trans- 
governmental or transnational functions of the League, i.e. the social, humanitarian, economic 
agendas, were meant to bring the rest of the world to modernity.171 Modernity 
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now, instead of being defined by empires as was the case in the 19th Century, is formulated 
by technical experts.172 This civilizing objective of the trans-governmental function was the 
same underlying principle behind establishing the mandate system. By depoliticizing the 
technical/transnational function of the League, orthodox literature also inadvertently 
separated the civilizing discourse of its technical duties from those of its more political 
function – i.e. the Mandates Commission. I argue that by unveiling the functioning of the 
League’s transnationalism as underpinned by the same logic of guiding the world in modernity 
we also understand that the imperial governance through mandates commissions did not 
operate in a silo of its own. The League’s trans-governmental work intersected with the 
Mandate governments in implementing the social, economic and humanitarian reforms of the 
technical experts. As such the creation of certain conventions and policy relating to especially 
the mandated territories was a result of interconnections between League Departments or 
more specifically its network of experts. 
 
The creation of the League not only brought into fore a new form of a network but set a 
model for the dialogical interplay between networks and international law for decades to 
come. The dialogical interplay had moved from imperial networks where civilizing discourse 
and governance was a result of part of imperial states, to an international governmental 
structure where technical experts supported by overlapping national, private and transnational 
interest that were instrumental in the governance of former colonies. This form of a network 
through expertise not only created transnational expert rule as a form of governance but 
depoliticized the civilizing discourse inherent in international law. With the added 
universalization of sovereign equality and self-determination, dialogical interplay in this form 
also obfuscated its role in violence on people of colonial territories ruled under the mandates 
as these were considered matters relating to challenges in colonial governance rather than a 
result of the international legal order envisioned by the League. 
 
a. The violence of the League of Nations 
 
a. The League’s economic vision: ‘peace’ through social control 
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The kinds of violence, I argue in this section, were the result of not only policy created and 
applied by the League’s expert networks but also an underlying discourse of the civilizing 
mission. Concerning the latter, I look at how the interconnectedness of the League’s 
departments and their experts creating policy led to violence that was part of the Mandate 
administration. Here, I look at how, primarily, the experts of the Permanent Mandate 
Commission and ILO of the League created a policy regarding employing a native labour 
force which resulted in forced labour, harsh working conditions, the creation of penal codes 
as part of establishing a system of policing in mandates, and violent punitive measures when 
employment contracts were broken or resisted. 
 
Here, two important aspects of the League as an organization can be seen to have made 
more systemic forms of violence invisible; firstly, the idea of the economic development of 
the world, especially the ‘lower countries’ as part of the League’s mission, and secondly the 
shift from military presence to the creation of policing structures in mandate territories. 
Implementing both these broader policies with the underlying notion of civilizing natives was 
the technique of indirect rule as part of colonial governance through a network of experts. 
 
In relation to economic development, as I have argued above, economic, social and 
humanitarian departments were established within the League to show how transnational or 
international cooperation in these matters can sustain a period of peace. Creating a consistent 
system for economic and financial standardization was equated to being a deterrent to war. In 
a Proposal for an Economic Conference at the League of Nations Assembly, the French 
delegation emphasised how ‘most frequent scourges of war have been a result of an economic 
struggle between different countries’.173 Broader principles enshrined in the creation of its 
departments were meant to complement the idea that the standardization of economic, social 
and humanitarian principles need to be consistent with each other. Hence another agenda in 
the Proposal for an Economic Conference suggested at the League of Nations Assembly was 
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to set up a ‘preparatory committee for preparing work for the Economic conference with the 
help of technical organizations of the League and the international labour organization’.174 
The French delegation, in particular, emphasised the involvement of the transit and 
communication department, the ILO and the League’s economic and financial departments in 
forming and setting up the agenda for an Economic Conference. As I have argued in the above 
section, through its network of experts employed mainly in the economic and finance 
department of the League there was a push for a free trade policy that among other things 
focused on the removal of trade barriers including the construction of better communication, 
transport and transit as well as production capacities in industries with more labour 
employment.175 Hence, the creation and agenda of the transit and communication department, 
creating greater transportation and communication, links directly to the League’s economic 
principles to ensure both industrial and economic growth. 
 
The broader aim of greater industrial growth, specifically concerning the mandated 
territories, held an exceptional position. Like the Berlin conference, the League covenant 
encapsulated under its obligations to colonial territories a ‘sacred trust of civilization’. 
Colonies taken over by the German Empire were elaborated in terms of ‘people not able to 
yet stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world’ and that ‘there 
should be applied the principle of wellbeing and development of such peoples form a sacred 
trust of civilization’.176 In applying this sacred trust specifically to African mandates 
territories, where the British and French Empires were given greater control, Article 22 
specifies the ‘need to secure equal opportunities for trade and commerce of other countries’, 
emphasising not just ‘development’ of the natives but also ‘economic opportunities for 
Members of the League’. In addition, read with Article 23(e) of the Covenant’s reference to 
territories affected by war to ‘secure means of communication and transit for the equitable 
treatment of the commerce of all Members’,177 the mandated territories held a specific role for 
the economic and industrial growth and creation of infrastructure to facilitate the commerce 
of the Members of the League. Specifically, as these were underpinned by the discourse of 














and development’ of natives, but the League Members are also supposed to benefit from the 
administration, particularly in terms of commerce and trade. 
 
This exceptional place of both trusteeship and commercial ‘benefit’ to imperial powers 
responsible for guiding the ‘lower’ countries was the underpinning logic of the League’s 
economic work. It was in the area of industrial labour that this underlying logic of the 
economic imperative of the League and the place of mandated territories as a ‘trust of 
civilization’ took a systematically violent turn. 
 
b. Policing forced labour and the indirect rule of ILO administrators 
 
 
The League of Nations formation also included the creation of the International Labour 
Organization under the League. While the ILO was established as a separate organization that 
was to work under the auspices of the League it is also considered part of the League’s 
technical functions. Article 23(a) of the League of Nations Covenant stipulated that the 
League Members ‘will endeavor to maintain fair and humane conditions of labour … and will 
establish and maintain the necessary international organizations’178 and in the ILO 
constitution of 1919, the first reference is to the League of Nations as being established for 
‘universal peace, and such peace can only be established by social justice’.179 Its significance, 
within the broader ideas of economic peace, was also apparent in how labour was referred to 
as central to the economic development in the call for an economic conference.180 
When the international labour department was set up in 1920 with the international labour 
office placed in Geneva, the Permanent Mandate Commission was given a permanent seat at 
the international labour office.181 Moreover, when it came to annual conferences and advisory 
committees, administrators from the Permanent Mandate Commission were to be involved in 
the policy making as well. The practical effect of this relationship between the Permanent 
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mandated territories were understood and stipulated as exceptions to the social protection 
promised by the International Labour Organization. 
 
The International Labour Organization’s constitution, for example, while giving 
assurances as to protection for sickness arising out employment, leave from work, hours of 
work and living wages, and prevention of unemployment, did not necessarily apply these 
protections to all ‘colonies, protectorates, not fully self-governing’.182 Article 35 of the 
Constitution of the ILO stipulated that members engage to apply conventions which they have 
ratified under the present treaty except where ‘owing to the local conditions the convention is 
inapplicable or, subject to such modification as may be necessary to local conditions’.183 This 
Article as Luis Rodriguez-Pinero observes refers to ‘different categories of colonial territories 
existing within the legal phraseology of the time’ i.e. the mandated territories.184 Regardless 
of how the Article already provided an exception to the protection of native workers in 
colonies and protectorates, the mandate powers contested the inclusion of this Article based 
on the fact that it interfered with colonial governance.185 
Nonetheless, in the further development of creating a separate labour code for native 
workers, this exception based on ‘local conditions’ became a way of excluding the protection 
for native workers in mandated territories – particularly in the territories of Africa. The 
argument of ‘local conditions’ was used particularly to create regimes of forced labour 
especially in the creation of infrastructure, transit and communication, or ‘public works’ as 
they were called, as well as private industries for the agenda of economic development pushed 
by the League’s economic department.186 
The mandate powers incorporated ideas of economic development into the rhetoric of 
mandate administration that emphasised the ‘development of native’ as well as the 
commercial benefit to League Members. This was also the underlying logic of indirect rule, 
an administrative technique that in its previous iteration, was meant to control the ‘native 
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but preserving the imperial network’s own interest.187 With the publication of the Dual 
Mandate in British Tropical Africa (1922) by Fredrick Lugard, indirect rule was explained as 
a system where ‘native chiefs were constituted as an integral part of the machinery of 
administration’.188 Lugard, a British representative of the Permanent Mandate Commission as 
well as the former Governor General of Northern Nigeria controlled by the British, argued 
that the rule of the native chief has to be ‘consistent with British officials’ and his rule must 
‘subordinate to protecting powers in certain well defined directions’.189 Referring to the 
League of Nations language used also in the Versailles treaty of 1919 Lugard points out that 
indirect rule recognizes limits on the native rule as ‘the subject races are not yet able to stand, 
and that it would not conduce to the happiness of vast bulk of people – for whose welfare the 
controlling power is a trustee – that the attempt should be made’.190 
The indirect rule thus preserved imperial control while maintaining service to Wilsonian 
conceptions of self-government. This also meant that implementation of policy, as well as the 
involvement of making policy at the international level, rested solely on the mandate powers. 
For instance, the exemption for the application of international labour to colonies and 
protectorates given to mandate powers was used to justify forms of forced labour and coerced 
employment through the rhetoric that it was tied to the future ‘development’ of the natives as 
well as benefit to the League Members.191 
Thus native labour was the foundation of ‘public works projects’, that is railways and 
industrial infrastructure.192 Notably in French West African territories from 1918 to 1946, 
forced public works labour were employed and referred to as the ‘deuxieme portion du 
contingent’, or men left over from military recruitment after the desired number of soldiers 
were sent off.193 These labourers served on roads and other ‘public works’ enterprises and, 
while given wages, worked under bad conditions. Another form of forced labour that was 
structurally embedded through indirect rule was referred to as prestations, service of a villager 
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governments in its West African territories.194 This kind of labour was more of indirect 
pressure from native chiefs and would respect the affinity and power of the chief to work 
without wages for private enterprises and not just public works.195 
In the British mandated territory of Kenya in the 1920s as well, indirect pressure to assign 
native labour without wages through native chiefs was a common practice that was, as 
Fredrick Cooper writes, more covert than the French approach where actual factors that led to 
forced labour were not brought up such as land seizures.196 In British mandates territories, 
Lugard suggested, the policy of tax payable by those that do not work and may pay taxes in 
the form of labour was explicitly made part of indirect rule.197 Lugard writes that for natives 
that ‘are found to be living in idleness and drunkenness, special taxation is perhaps justified 
for their own best interest’.198 During the Interwar Years, in British controlled Uganda, the 
practice of substituting a month of labour for payable taxes, while contested as not being 
‘forced labour’, was common practice and equal to ‘forced labour’.199 Despite claims by 
British administrators, the use of forced labour was not just limited to ‘public works’; in 
Northern Territories of the Gold Coast between 1920 and 1924 there was a surge in 
government assisted recruitment of labour to work in mines owned by private British gold 
mining companies.200 Mining companies became part of government’s recruitment scheme 
where native chiefs were asked to recruit workers from their villages as well as through 
recruitment depots to get ‘casual’ protectorate labour coming in from other African 
territories.201 
This push for more labour that led to the recruitment of migrating natives led the chiefs to 
select workers who were not only unhealthy but made to work in the harsh conditions of the 
mine. Beyond just the dangers of working in the mine, this led to an increase in death rates in 
mines in the Gold Coast.202 The exploitation of natives through forced and coerced means of 
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powers. Systemic violence embedded in indirect rule, then, did not change much from the 
violence following the Berlin Conference. This time, instead, it was legitimised and 
centralized on an international level through the experts of one institution: the League of 
Nations. 
 
As anti-colonial voices, mostly activists and missionaries voiced their anger at what was 
considered ‘practices analogous to slavery’; the League was forced as a matter of public 
opinion to suggest reform.203 The inhumane treatment, bad conditions of forced labour 
prevalent as a result of the exception given to the mandated powers through the underlying 
logic of ‘trust of civilization’ embedded in the League’s vision of international order became 
a point of contention. In 1925, the Temporary Slavery Committee of the League of Nations 
was tasked with drafting the Slavery Convention of 1926.204 Among the members of the 
committee were representatives of mandated governments. Notably, Fredrick Lugard was one 
of the experts who sat in the Expert Committee from 1925 to 1941.205 The experts appointed 
for the Temporary Slavery Committee also, as part of their drafting of the Slavery Convention, 
focused on forced labour in Article 5 of the Convention.206 They stated that regulation for the 
abolition of slavery and practices analogous to slavery should include ‘prohibition of forced 
labour or compulsory labour, except for essential public works and services and in return for 
adequate remuneration’.207 Rodriguez-Pinero observes how the Slavery Convention of 1926 
not only failed to ban forced labour but ended up creating an exception, i.e. the use of forced 
labour for public works in mandated colonies, with the League of Nations Assembly 
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The discussion by the Temporary Slavery Committee led to a separate movement to draft 
a convention exclusively for native labor standards as a separate category within international 
labour regulation.209 A separate native labour code was underpinned by the same civilizing 
discourses, albeit more explicit than the International Labour Convention of 1919.210 
However, as Rodriguez-Pinero notes, even in the native labour code, ‘a novel reading of 
civilization was couched in economic, modernizing terms’.211 The resultant 1930 Forced 
Labor Convention (no.29) was in line with the Slavery Convention in that it did not outright 
ban forced labour but put it in a transitional period. Through language that left the practice of 
forced labour, especially concerning ‘public works’, open to the interpretation of mandate 
powers, the convention only legitimised the use of forced labour.212 Thus forced labour 
continued even after 1930 particularly in French Mandates, specifically in the Upper Ivory 
Coast where pseudo-military labour, as well as a form of prestations i.e. recruitment through 
native chiefs, was very common for ‘public work projects’.213 
The labour conditions were another form of violence, i.e. policing and maintenance of 
public order that was also made invisible through the League’s conception of ‘peace’. In this 
respect, Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant specifically focused on the 
‘maintenance of public order’ and the ‘prevention of the establishment of fortifications or 
military or naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes’.214 
The perception of removal of military bases, disarmament and prevention of fortification fell 
under the rhetoric that military aggression between states was what led to the Great War. 
Economic Peace requires the colonial practice of fortifications and bases in mandated 
territories to be prevented. It also focused on, as Article 22 states, an exception to training for 
police purposes.215 Policing and maintaining public order was crucial in this way as a 
replacement for military fortifications and were in line with colonial governance preferred by 
the mandated powers at the time. Martin Thomas notes that creating a policing structure that 
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colonial governance, especially in the case of indirect rule.216 Creating a policing structure 
was also consistent with the purpose of indirect rule i.e. to effectively govern a territory that 
was vast with lesser costs than would normally have come from military presence or bases. 
 
Concerning the discussion above on labour regulation as a form of violence, policing 
within the interwar years was focused on wage labourers and their places of work. Colonial 
policing of labour as Martin Thomas observes was ‘the perennial feature and an increasingly 
prominent facet of police work in the inter-war years’.217 As part of the policing of waged 
labour in the mandated territories, penal sanctions on breach of contract were common, 
particularly used as a tactic by the British in their mandated territories in the 1920s.218 As 
Archibong and Obikili observe, a primary way of imposing forced labour was through those 
who were in breach of contract for ‘voluntary’ or prescribed labour for ‘public works’, who 
were penalized and then convicted to labour as a punishment.219 Thus, in a cycle of  violence, 
any resistance to forced labour on public works was penalized and translated into another form 
of forced labour, i.e. convict labour which was also exempt from ban through the Forced Labor 
Convention 1930.220 In French West African mandates these ranged from summary 
punishments and fines to threats to life.221 During the 1930s and 1940s, as part of the forced 
labour scheme for the ‘office du niger cotton production scheme’ in French Controlled Sudan 
policing became central to forced labour.222 Workers were rounded up and relocated in curfew 
compounds, women workers were threatened that their husbands would be beaten if the work 
was unsatisfactory.223 The response at the international level, along with the native labour 
convention of 1930, was the parallel Abolition of Penal Sanction (Indigenous Workers) 
Conventions 1930 that did not outright ban penal sanctions for ‘breach of contract’ but put it 
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The relationship between the ILO and the Permanent Mandate Commission not only 
reflects the interconnectedness of League experts from different departments but also shows 
how the civilizing mission of the League mandate system was part of other technical, 
depoliticized organizations of the League. The policy created by the network of experts sitting 
in different committees and creating international regulatory codes discussed above were part 
of and lead to the systemic violence through the creation of forced labour regimes, policing 
and punishment to enforce labour contracts. At the same time, the ideas of ‘economic peace’, 
the emphasis on policing for the maintenance of public order with the reduction of 
fortifications and the place of mandated territories as a trust of civilization created the rhetoric 
that administrative violence was part of mandate governance rather than a result of the 





The internationalisation of dialogical interplay through the League of Nations was realized in 
two specific ways. Firstly, it institutionalized the ‘internationalism’ of the 19th Century that 
was based on a hierarchical ladder of civilization. Secondly, the violence that was part of the 
administrative structures deployed by the League of Nations through indirect rule and Article 
23 of the League of Nation Covenant, International Cooperation was implicitly a  part of what 
is understood as a peaceful global legal order. Ideas about ‘social progress’ and ‘wellbeing’ 
of natives within this period of international cooperation along with separate codification of 
the Laws of War within the 20th Century essentially rendered any other mode of violence 
external to the operation of international law. 
 
More importantly, another aspect of this shift from the state’s administrative imperial 
network to the international organization as a network was the de-politicization of trans- 
boundary relations from the civilization rhetoric which was part of ‘international society’ as 
it was being conceived at the time. This particular depoliticization was not just useful in 
making a very specific idea of morals of international society universal, but also in the 
assimilation of native thought into modernity. The seeds of this thought were already present 
in the British encounter with the caste elite leaders in the subcontinent, where indirect 
governance developed through ‘pluralism’, ‘moral universality’ and tutelage of the British to 
‘help’ natives climb the ladder of civilization. These forms of thinking, which were tied to 
the conceptualization of territory as a trust by the British in the subcontinent,
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were seen also in their interaction with the African communities where tax, revenue collection, 
labour, and the building of public works were all part of their extractive presence in the 
colonies. In this chapter, we see these techniques of indirect rule applied to the territory of 
Africa with, in the case of South Africa, a mix of settler colonial logic of also creating separate 
racialized regimes – one for settlers and the other for natives. 
 
The forms of indirect rule became the common mode of imperial presence which was 
particularly informed by a shift in defining territory in the Berlin Conference. This set the 
stage for imperial cooperation which led to, as I show, the League of Nations. In the interwar 
era, the dialogical interplay thus moved into the realm of ‘international’, where 
transnationalism became a separate field of inquiry from the civilization logic and imperatives 
of international law post-1945. Colonial administrators became, through the international 
organization, experts of these fields of inquiry with their objectivity justified through the 
separation of social from political, thus hiding their civilization logics through the discourse 
of social progress. Further, the techniques of indirect rule advocated and used by colonial 
administrators, now experts, also became part of mandated rule over colonies through the 
League of Nations’ imperial internationalism. In the course of a history of dialogical interplay, 
this internationalisation through an international organization became the foundation for post-
1945 development in the dialogical interplay between international law and local state 
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In the previous chapter I examined the League of Nations and its network of experts. The 
League established a form of colonial governance primarily through international experts and 
introduced techniques of governance which had long lasting effects. These continuities 
particularly of international administration thus, particularly, in the 20th Century, carried on 
more fluidly into the post-Second World War era. However, the outbreak of the Second World 
War also precipitated a greater move towards political decolonisation which pushed for 
independence from colonial control towards self-governing territories. Throughout the 20th 
Century many of these former colonies calcified as ‘nation states’ equal in their political 
legitimacy to ‘former’ imperial states. In this chapter, I focus on how the dialogical interplay 
between networks and international law, specifically international expert networks, became 
complimented by local expert rule from within newly formed states. This expert rule from 
within, which I term a multilateralisation of the dialogical interplay between networks and 
international law, internalised the notion of the modern nation state through the  development 
agenda. This resulted in the state itself perpetrating violence on its most marginalized 
populations – particularly by making them the subject of ‘modernisation’. This violence is 
explained as structural violence of dispossession of land, dislocation, worsening socio-
economic conditions and erasure of local knowledge in the name of modernisation and 
development. 
 
In the first part of this chapter, I explore how this internalisation of the ‘modern nation 
state’ was a project both of Allied forces and of some ‘decolonised’ nation states pushing for 
development as a paradigm for a new global order. Part of this process of ‘internalisation’, or 
a multilateralisation of the logics of the modern nation state through ‘development’, was 
through the further entrenchment of the ‘formal’ separation between transnational forces and 
the political and military matters of the world. The state, now conceived as an independent 
unit of the international global order, could through its sovereignty engage in transnational 
legal orders such as the cross-regional work of international organizations and their trans-
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governmental policy networks. This particular separation between transnational and 
international within the orthodox literature at the time did not consider the role of networked 
actors within international organizations as part of an underlying discourse of civilization in 
the form of development. 
 
In the second section, I look at how we can conceptualize the local expert network by 
understanding how the internalisation of development thinking was done through the early 
years of the World Bank policy on training and development projects in countries of the global 
south. Through this process, we see the international legal order that separated the 
transnational from the international, by relying on the language of ‘technical expertise’, as an 
apolitical one geared towards universal progress for those on the path to development. It is 
here we see how the World Bank’s practice of deploying political reform under the guise of 
universalising concepts of ‘development’ is a process of changing the nation state or making 
it from the inside out as a linear scale for states to step into modernity. 
 
In the last section, I explore the violence we can see as a consequence of local expert 
networks. Like the previous form of network, particularly the League of Nations’ expert rule, 
within the second half of the 20th Century local experts also replicated developmental logics 
and policies that led to systemic forms of violence, such as the erasure of economic and social 
protection. Furthermore, while policing, disarmament and economic peace were the 
ideological rhetoric that hid the violence of League experts, in this era, the same function was 
performed by the association of ‘development’ with human security from the very early 
inception of the idea of development in the 1950s to its explicit policy-driven literature during 
the cold war period and then intensifying in the post 9/11 era. Particularly through the 
militarization of postcolonial ‘nation states’, state failure was associated with under- 
development, lack of governance and control, and internal conflict. These elements of 
international law where war and ‘development’ were interlinked separated the violence 
perpetuated through systemic policies on governing of nation state pushed by trans- 
governmental policy networks invisible and unaccountable. 
 
II. Decolonisation and the ‘new political order’ 
 
a. The United Nations: from the League to Bretton Woods 
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The formation of the United Nations as a new international organization was charged with 
similar questions. This time, however, questions of sovereignty as a universal principle and 
the political global order were reformulated to address the ‘failings’ of its former model.  
 
According to Guy Fiti Sinclair, the remaking of international organizations after the 
Second World War was driven also by the decolonisation movements in colonies.1 
Specifically from the politically active natives that had become part of the 20th Century 
‘modernisation’ of colonies under the Mandates had now become political actors in their own 
right.2 A challenge European rule as guides for the globe was made more prominently within 
the Indian subcontinent.3 Jawaharlal Nehru of the Indian subcontinent presented a vision of 
internationalism where the same power dynamic of the League of Nations should not be 
reproduced. In Nehru’s writing as well as among prominent political natives of the Indian 
subcontinent, the ousting of British imperial rule had been a common thread since the 
establishment of the Indian National Congress. For Nehru specifically, the ‘English were self- 
professed democrats acting like fascists’.4 
In the more European orthodox historical account of the formation of the United Nations, 
the making of the United Nations is attributed directly and exclusively to the lessons learnt 
from the ‘failure’ of the League of Nations to keep the peace.5 As Luard writes ‘a new 
organization would symbolise the birth of a new world, in which peace would now, at last, be 
more effectively safeguarded’.6 Winston Churchill of Britain and Franklin Roosevelt of the 
United States of America drafted separate proposals during 1943 suggesting a security 
collective of Europe and Asia as separate regional blocs. Both put forward, at the same time, 
a post-war system where power would be wielded exclusively by great powers.7 
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Roosevelt, in the same year, organized a conference of the United Nation Commission for 
Europe, comprising of the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union and its European allies 
including France. In the same year at Moscow, it was agreed by the Allied powers, specifically 
the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States, that some form of permanent post-war 
organization was to be made which led to a conference in Washington in 1944. The initial 
plans for a renewed post-war organization were made in two major conferences, one in 
Dumbarton Oaks, Washington and the second in San Francisco. 
 
More importantly, in both conferences, especially Dumbarton Oaks, the conceptual link 
between peace and economic wellbeing was reiterated in much the same way as had been 
done by the architects of the League of Nations after World War I. In the Dumbarton Oaks 
proposals social and economic matters were to hold as part of the functions of the new 
organization, led by subsidiary bodies, as had been done under the League.8 In the historical 
narrative, what has been referred to as the League’s successful legacy, its economic and social 
i.e. technical organizations were always meant to reform and in fact intensify.9 Within both 
the League’s depoliticization of technical functions carried out by experts, and the intellectual 
literature on the ‘successful’ legacy of the League, the adoption of the same thinking about 
technical departments was a logical step. This carrying forward of the League’s social and 
economic departmental work, whether through its Economic Council, the International Labor 
Organization or its social and humanitarian department, was built on the same assumptions 
about the technical functions being ‘apolitical’ and led by ‘experts’ for the good of all 
mankind. 
 
In this period, intensifying and creating an international organization that was subsidiary 
to and independent from the United Nations became a sign for global victors of the Second 
World War of taking the ‘best’ of the League era internationalism and improving on it. Apart 
from the Economic and Social Organization of the League which was reformulated into the 
independent Economic and Social Council linked to the United Nations, other bodies to which 
the United Nations economic and social mandate was connected included, during the early 
post-Second World War years, the International Bank for Reconstruction (IBFR), the 








came into operation.10 Other bodies, no longer identified as departments but as ‘specialised 
agencies’, ‘funds’ and ‘subsidiary organizations’ included the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Children’s Fund, the 
Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO) and the UN Development Program (UNDP).11 
Most of these organizations were reformulations of the League’s technical departments 
and the work done by those departments. UNESCO was a successor of the League’s 
international institute of cooperation department.12 The statistical data collected as part of the 
League’s economic and financial organization was carried over to the IMF.13 Luis Pauly notes 
that the United Nations economic bodies i.e. the IBFR and IMF were direct successors to the 
League’s economic and finance departments.14 
The administrators and colonial officers of the League of Nations also moved onto the 
United Nations and the international financial institutions.15 Apart from Sinclair’s thesis on 
how developmental thinking can be traced to the early formation of the International Labor 
Organization,16 the continuities of colonial and postcolonial expertise are described, 
particularly, in literature tracing the roots of technical experts on agrarian reforms.17 In 
particular, as Christophe Bonneuil observes, 1930’s settlement schemes for agrarian reform, 
specifically by the British in Sudan and the French in West Sudan which were meant to create 
agricultural ‘experiments’ to irrigate land to harvest cotton, continued in different forms after 
World War II.18 Knowledge systems specifically concerning medicine, public health and 
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Developmental experts influenced largely by American notions of the interdependency of 
technology and development.19 
The continent of Africa was always, as Bonneuil notes, termed as ‘experiment’, 
‘laboratory’ and ‘tests’.20 For the British, French and Dutch, Africa, as well as South East 
Asia, was a place of extending developmental thinking to continue earlier extractions for 
improving standards of living in the metropoles,21 towards a post-war reconstruction  through 
continuing development in these regions.22 As Hodge and Holt point out, the 1940s and 1950s 
saw a strong attempt by the British, Portuguese and French to keep a hold of their colonial 
territories through the logic of developmental training to justify its continued presence, for 
example the British colonial office saw an increase in recruiting technical experts in various 
areas such as agriculture, engineering, education, town planning, forestry and medicine 
between 1945 and 1952.23 
One of the more direct continuities has been mentioned by Clavin specifically concerning 
the economic and financial organizations of the League and the United Nations.24 Clavin notes 
the same network of ‘experts’ that occupied positions at the economic and financial 
organizations of the League were key contributors to the formation of organizations of the 
United Nations on economic and social matters. Specifically, the economic view on free 
markets, the gold standard and economic standardization policies that were part of the 
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Referring to the ‘experts’ that collaborated in Princeton University with Alexander 
Loveday and the Rockefeller foundation as the Princeton Mission, Clavin shows how this 
group pushed for more autonomous, permanent international economic organizations.26 In this 
sense, the commitment of this group was to the ‘internationalism’ or the structure of policy 
making through expert networks the League had formulated rather than the idea of an 
international organization itself. 
 
This became evident later on when Loveday, along with the United States Governor 
Herbert Lehman, became a practical advisor in the intergovernmental negotiations that began 
between the ‘Big Four’ in 1943. They advised specifically on ‘the problems involved in 
making any international organization work successfully’.27 In plans for creating new 
international organizations associated with the United Nations’ mission for economic and 
social wellbeing, the Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) leaned their plans 
heavily on the League’s experience of how to recruit staff and manage relations through the 
intergovernmental representatives as well as experts.28 This ‘entangled history between the 
League’s expert networks and the United Nations became evident’29 when the UNRRA 
established its Headquarters at the Palais des Nations and Arthur Salter, the former head and 
main architect of the League’s Economic and Financial Organization (EFO) departments, was 
made one of the deputy directors.30 
As an organization that relied on ‘expert’ networks employed and working together across 
departments of the organization under common ideological aims, the United Nations’ 
 
 
Albert Radice of the New Fabian Research Bureau, his colleagues at the EFO and the US-based Rockefeller 
Foundation sought to lay a detailed plan in 1939 on what kind of global economic system was to be 
incorporated in the new political order. In his focus on post-war ‘reconstruction of the global economic 
system’, Loveday found support from the US State Department and Treasury. Even as the League’s fall was 
seen to be evident nearing the end of the Second World War, with the support of the US State Department 
and the Rockefeller Foundation, the League’s economic and financial department was moved to Princeton 
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approach was similar to that of the League of Nations. Underpinning ‘expertise’ were notions 
of social progress and development, tied to technology and later on – as I will show 
– the nation state itself. The very structure of networked actors as policy experts was not only 
carried forward as a success of the League but it also further entrenched the separation 
between the ‘political’ and the ‘technical’ aspects of world order. This neat separation, as I 
have argued in the previous chapter, hid both the underlying politics of expert networks as 
well as its working as norm making actors. It is also in this way my thesis on how the League 
and international organizations operate as forms of network and differ from literature within 
the international organization/institutional law.31 Specifically, I emphasise how the actors 
within these organizations operate as norm producing networks and how these actors derive 
their legitimacy from international legal norms just as they actively advance the international 
legal discourse. 
 




The culmination of the economic and financial organizations’ efforts and its remnants in the 
Princeton Mission was, Clavin argues, partly what brought the Bretton Woods institutions 
forward. For the argument made in this chapter of the thesis and in the thesis more broadly, 
however, it shows the continuity between the expert network structure of the League and its 
departments and the United Nations and its ‘sister’ Bretton Woods institutions. Thus, the 
Bretton Woods institutes, when seen as the result of the continuous work of the League’s 
economic and financial organizations transferred to Princeton University, as Clavin points 
out, they also represented the rhetoric of a ‘better global order of peace’.32 Additionally, like 
Cooper33 and Binnoeul,34 amongst others,35 note, the expertise-dominated presence in other 
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knowledge, continued its earlier iterations in the interwar era – and before the 1920s in 
different forms – into post-Second World War colonial developmental policies. 
 
The early foundations of Bretton Woods institutions can also be understood within the 
context of the influence of American ‘development’ thinking. As Eric Helliener points out, 
the World Bank was initially in the form of the first draft for an inter-American bank.36 
Helleiner argues that the foundations of Bretton Woods need to be read through the presence 
of South countries, specifically and most importantly Latin American officials along with 
Chinese, Indian and Eastern European officials.37 This support was primarily based on the 
state-led development agenda that a new international economic order could bring to these 
respective countries.38 
The formulation of the nation state as part of the international legal order was already 
being constructed throughout the 19th Century specifically, as Luis Eslava,39 amongst others,40 
points out, through the Latin American contribution to the international legal order in the 20th 
Century. Since the decolonisation movement emerged in the 1920s, Latin American countries 
already had the experience of consolidating themselves in forms of statehood.41 As Eslava, 
Obregón and Lorca point out, the Latin American influence on the international legal order 
was primarily through the creation of a ‘nation building’ imperative which brought 
heterogeneous and plural communities, already divided in accordance to varying degrees of 
socio-economic hierarchies, into a single unitary consciousness.42 The building of nation 
states in Latin America was thus pushed through a homogenized hierarchical view where the 
interests of the region were based on what the political and technocratic elite of Latin 
American states thought was required for its progress.43 The progress of a nation state, then, 
translated to the development of its ‘rural’ areas, a push for modernisation through industrial 
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and technological ‘advancement’ in urban areas, ultimately defining and in many ways 
following suit to previous colonial notions of ‘progress’ attached to ‘modernity’ implemented 
in the continent of Africa.44 
The imagination of modernity thus in this sense attached to nation building had its 
corollary roots in Latin American intervention and contribution to the international legal order 
as part of global governance of the old empire,45 also translated into its backing and support 
for the Inter-American Bank and later the Bretton Woods institution.46 As I have mentioned 
earlier, even after the decolonisation movement after the Second World War, developmental 
thinking effectively continued to be a form of imperial capitalization by former empires.47 
This also translated in the juridification of the nation state in the international legal order 
through the United Nations and its Charter. Specifically, while territorial sovereignty was 
articulated through a separation from intervention through the idea of Article 2(4),48 
‘territorial integrity’, it was also contingent on the creation of a nation state free from ‘colonial 
rule’ towards self-government as per Article 73.49 Article 73 can be understood, as Pedersen50 
amongst others has argued,51 as a continuation of the trusteeship system of the League of 
Nations mandate system. 
 
Unequivocally, Article 73 also connects the development to a self-government by an 
oversight of colonial powers to ‘develop a self-government, to take due account of the political 
aspiration of people, and to assist them in the development of their free political institutions, 
according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its people and their varying 
stages of development’.52 Additionally, the trustee could use their discretion to ‘promote 
constructive measures of development with a view of practical achievement of social, 
economic, and scientific purposes’.53 The new trusteeship system thus became attached to 
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ideas of development, self-rule and nation state becoming the means through which former 
empires could continue to justify their developmentist policies led by technical experts as part 
of the new international legal order.54 
However, decolonisation did not always follow the simple map of trustee control given 
over to ‘newly formed’ postcolonial states. It included decolonisation movements and the 
culmination of these movements being the UNGA resolution 1514 declaration on the 
independence of colonial countries and peoples in 1960. Nonetheless, the nation state that 
emerged from this trusteeship system and decolonisation movements during the 1950s and 
1960s formed or, as Rose Parfitt describes, ‘reproduced’ the understanding of a particular 
‘nation state’ which was territorially bounded, embedded within notions of development led 
by modernity.55 
Throughout these processes, it is important to emphasise how important the idea of expert 
networks as apolitical experts of objective knowledge was to the formation as well as the 
internalisation of ‘development’ and ‘modernity’ as part of nation state and nation building. 
These ideas, as I have shown, had already germinated in the internationalisation of colonial 
administration.56 This was not limited to just economics but also other social fields.57 In 
specifically the case of development thinking, James Ferguson describes the apoliticization 
through scientific expertise as the ‘anti-politics’ machine.58 The political and economic 
separation to formulate the universal ‘expert’ in itself was not a novel iteration of post-war 
global order as Sundhya Pahuja,59 amongst others,60 has suggested, even if it was explicitly 
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 reiterated within the Charter of the World Bank. Within the formation of the League, 
economics and other social fields were already presented and embedded within the 
administration of the global order as depolitical even while they operated under assumptions 
of hierarchical world order.61 
The universalization of ‘modernity’ as part of development discourse materialized into a 
‘developmental state’ and especially within postcolonial states became another reason for the 
dominance of network actors. Since it is here the resistance to dominant networks turns to 
internalised adherence to modernity, development and technology as part of a new frame for 
nation building and state nationalism, which as I show, reflects a similar imperial notion as 
colonial expertise rather than a counter to it. 
 
III. The multilateralisation of the dialogical interplay 
 
a. The new language of development: building the state from inside out 
 
 
In 1944, The United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference hosted by the United 
States treasury department brought together delegates from 44 Allied and associated nations 
in Argentina.62 Driven mostly by the United States treasury department, the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and British Finance Ministry, along with 
the economists supported by the governments on both sides including John Maynard Keynes 
and Harry Baxter White, the conference was already driven by a clear Anglo- European Allied 
bloc.63 The IMF and the World Bank are two economic institutions referred to as the Bretton 
Woods institutes as they were conceived in the Bretton Woods conference, New Hampshire 
United States in 1943–44, in negotiations between the big three victors of the Second World 
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The IMF, according to Article 1 of the Articles of Agreement, has the purpose to promote 
international monetary cooperation through consultation and  collaboration, promote orderly 
and stable exchange arrangements among members, to assist in the establishment of a 
multilateral system of payments for international trade and to make resources of the IMF 
‘temporarily available’ to members under adequate safeguards to correct their balance of 
payments problems ‘without resorting to measures destructive of national or international 
prosperity’.65 These resources refer to loads provided by the IMF based on conditions for the 
member states it is loaning to that require structural changes to domestic social and economic 
policies.66 The World Bank Group consists of five separate legal entities: the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association 
(IDA), the international finance corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA) regime and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID).67 The main IBRD and IDA, collectively referred to as the World Bank, are the two 
most important entities for my purposes here. The aim of IBRD as stipulated in Article 1 of its 
Articles of Agreement includes assisting in the reconstruction and development of the 
territories of member states by supporting the investment of capital for productive purposes, 
providing foreign investment capital through guarantees or participation in loans and other 
investments made by private investors, encouraging international investment, and arranging 
loans made for useful or urgent projects.68 The World Bank essentially facilitates international 
investment to raise ‘productivity, the standard of living and labour conditions’ as well to assist 
a smooth transition from ‘war to peace time’.69 
As I have described in the last section, this notion of ‘economic progress’ as the hallmark 
of the modern state was internalised both as a necessity within the context of decolonisation 
in the political consciousness of the newly independent states and as part of the external 
structure of the global order which created norms on what constitutes as a universal, modern 
state. Even then, within a conference where some decolonised states were invited as political 
‘equals’, the discourse on what the international economic order would 
 
65 
International Monetary Fund, ‘Articles of Association of International Monetary Fund’ 1944 (United 
Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Bretton Woods). 
66 
Daniel Bradlow, ‘International Law and the Operations of the International Financial Institutions’ in 
Daniel Bradlow and David Hunter (eds), International Financial Institutions and International Law 




World Bank Group, ‘International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Articles of 
Agreement’ (as amended 27 June 2012) section 1. 
69 
Bradlow (n 66). 
193 
 
look like was predetermined and the global south sidelined.70 The reason was not only because 
the conference was a result of a confluence between powerful states but because of the 
institutional structures through which the knowledge was made authoritative and given space 
by these powerful states. 
 
The leading economic philosophy at the time, on which the Bretton Woods agreements 
were built, was driven by an amalgamation of actors who shared common ideologies on global 
economic order. Richard Peet71 and Ngaire Woods describe the conference as a predetermined 
formality that was already set in motion through political discussion between the two big 
victors, the United States and Britain.72 Thus, the ideological conversations about economic 
knowledge that would be the basis of governing the new international order were driven by 
economists from both sides, i.e. the United States and Britain, who were based in universities 
with a shared school of thought i.e. a liberal economic model of opening exports, increasing 
investment and creating a single clearing union for a centralized loan-based system.73 In 
relation to the context of a new global order, through the influence of the United States 
developmental agenda, the World Bank was tied inextricably to liberal economic policies and 
to United States foreign policy, particularly in relation to its competition with the USSR 
(Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) for control over newly decolonised states.74 Walt 
Rostow, the economic historian and Policy Planning Staff at the State Department of the 
United States, placed the burden of the West to show that the ‘under-developed nations can 
move successfully through the preconditions into a well- established take off in the orbit of 
the democratic world’ against the threat of ‘communist hopes’.75 
The Bretton Woods institutions were placed as part of the ‘twin pillar’ of the ‘new 
international order’ post-World War II,76 the other one being the United Nations. The 
underlying assumption of the international financial institutions was the same as the  interwar 
period’s emphasis on economic cooperation. This is also not surprising since the 
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presence and influence of the remnants of League of Nations economic and financial 
organization experts with the backing of the United States and the United Kingdom were 
instrumental to the formulation of the reformed global financial bodies. As Richard Peet 
observes, Bretton Woods was built on a ‘classic notion that trade prevents war and brings 
about peace’.77 Of course, this notion also has a juridical foundation beyond Peet’s 
observation that it drew on the public international law jurisprudence on the separation 
between war and peace. This went back to the League of Nations’ depoliticization of 
economics and other social fields under its technical departments, where peace was associated 
with the technical functions of international institutions. 
 
With the formation of the Bretton Woods entities as not just subsidiary bodies but as 
separate institutions, two central ideas of the new global order were being materialized – even 
as they had germinated since the 1900’s role of colonial administrators.78 Firstly, that the 
economic development of the world was to be a separate ‘universal’ ideal, even more so than 
social and humanitarian concerns. This was crystallized, reflecting the entrenchment of the 
classic notion that economic progress needed to be ‘depolitical’. Secondly, that the institutions 
set up would train and facilitate in the development of the rest of world. 
 
Hence, economic progress, both intellectually and through the process of the institutional 
structure of experts carried forward by the League of Nations technical departments, became 
a discipline of rational, calculated and universal science for peaceful global progress. As 
Pahuja points out, even if the split between economics and politics was part of classic liberal 
economics, the defining moment of this split in this era was that it was ‘juridified’ and 
‘constitutionalised’ within the international economic order as it was formulated at the time.79 
Specifically, the World Bank’s constitution incorporates this particular division by stating in 
section 5(b) of the World Bank’s constitution: 
 
the bank shall make arrangements to ensure that the proceeds of any loans are used of the 
purposes for which the loan was granted, with due attention to considerations of economy 
and efficiency, and without regard to political or other non-economic considerations80 
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In section 10, this non-political character of the World Bank is further explained with specific 
reference to its ‘officers’, going further to indicate the nature of its staff employed in a non-
political manner: 
 
The Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member, nor shall 
they be influenced in their decisions by the political characters of the member or members 
concerned. Only economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions.81 
The depoliticization of experts thus was embedded within the specific notion of staffing and 
officers within the World Bank policies. 
 




In understanding how technical ‘experts’, in the case of the Bretton Woods Institute mostly 
economists, drive policy change and implementation that is, in fact, political in nature, the 
structure that gives them this authority is just as materially significant as the disciplinary split 
between politics and economics created by intellectual thought on economics at the time. As 
an international body, the World Bank and the IMF both operate in a similar blueprint as far 
as its institutional structure is concerned. The governing body of the World Bank, specifically 
the IBRD, according to the Articles of Agreement section 1 consists of the board of governors, 
executive directors, president and staff employed under the executive directors.82 Member 
countries of the organization, also known as donor countries, are countries that control the 
decisions on policy, membership and aims of the Bank through their positions on the board of 
governors and as executive directors.83 The Bank decision making process in the board of 
governors and by executive directors is determined by voting power, which is set through 
‘quotas’ related to the amount of gold, dollar reserve, foreign trade i.e. economic might set at 
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As it stood at the beginning of the post-war reconstruction efforts, and led by the two 
economic and political powers at the time, the United States and the United Kingdom held the 
most quotas and thus the most decision making powers at the highest level of the Bank.85 
The president, appointed by the board of governors, is responsible for hiring ‘staff’ and, 
as subsection 5(c) of the Articles of Agreements elaborates, ‘the President, officers and  staff, 
in the discharge of their office, owe their duty entirely to the bank and no other authority. The 
members shall remember the international character of this duty, and shall refrain from all 
attempts to influence any of them in the discharge of their duties’.86 In the next subsection 
5(d), the Articles further state, ‘in appointing the officers and staff the President shall, subject 
to the paramount importance of securing the highest standards of efficiency and of technical 
competence, pay due regard to the importance of recruiting personnel on as wide a 
geographical basis as possible’.87 
These sections highlight not just the nature of the ‘expert’ that makes up the staff and 
officers of the Bank but also the nature of the Bank as a technical/apolitical institution. The 
loyalty of the ‘experts’ is to the Bank’s authority, and Article 8.01 of the General Conditions 
for Loans, for example, states that ‘The rights and obligations of the Bank and the Loan Parties 
under the Legal Agreements shall be valid and enforceable in accordance with their terms 
notwithstanding the law of any state or political subdivision thereof to the contrary’,88 in other 
words, the agreements have no governing law other than the agreement itself. This self-
legitimizing position and authority that the Bank retains can be seen as consistent with how it 
embodies the work done by the officers, which are generally referred to as experts. The ‘duty’ 
of these experts is to the Bank’s authority, which is autonomous from any state or political 
entity, thereby in a similar vein making these experts’ authority autonomous in its authority 
and legitimacy. 
 
While this governing ‘clause’ is meant to reaffirm the apolitical and technical nature of 
the Bank, its work and its staff, it only creates a self-legitimizing position of authority, and 




ibid Articles of Agreement, s 5(c). 
87 
ibid, Articles of Associations, s 5(d). 
88 
World Bank Group, ‘International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: General Conditions for 
Loans updated 14 July 2018 Art 8.0.1.  
197 
 
staff across the globe. This is important because the Bank presents itself as an international 
institution with its headquarters in Washington, but it is structured in a more layered way, 
through regional offices under section 10(a)89 and further mandate provided in section 9(b), 
which states that ‘the bank may establish into country offices in the territories of any member 
state’.90 
Apart from regional staff appointed by a/the president in charge of the regions, the staff 
members are meant to be experts on specific committees of the Bank and are meant to advise 
member countries on the appraisal of economic and social conditions, regulations and 
‘development’ needed to satisfy the requirements of a loan for ‘development’ projects. In  the 
first decade of the Bank, the IBRD Report 1952–53 laid out the expert committees, Bank staff 
that were sent out in different members states as part of the Bank’s mission to survey 
‘programming units for under-developed’ members of the Bank.91 This particular vocabulary 
of ‘under-developed’ was the vernacular within which the Bank operated at the time in an 
attempt to make economic ‘change’ scientific and objective, impartial to any historical, 
political, contingent factor. 
 
More importantly, this vocabulary was very much tied inextricably to the ‘authority’ and 
‘technical’ knowledge of the experts sent to these ‘under-developed’ territories of member 
states. In the Report of 1952–53, the then president of the Bank, Eugene Black, describes the 
work of expert missions as operating within a specific framework or agenda of the Bank 
reaching out from ‘village to cabinet council’ visiting nearly 54 member countries.92 An aim 
of these missions was ‘to make broad economic assessments, to consult on major policies 
affecting development, to study individual projects and examine the possibility of making 
loans for them, to assist with the problems of dealing with management, engineering and 
finance arising in the course of project execution, to help in the mobilization of local capital, 
and to gain knowledge of or consult upon many other problems of concern to the bank and its 
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how they were guides to these ‘under-developed’ countries but were sent as producers of 
knowledge and having authority to ‘programme’ institutions within these territories. 
 
Eugene Black’s reasons why these terms should be used and understood can be surmised 
by his description of the culture of ‘under-developed’ states. He states that ‘many cultures 
have placed a low value on material advance and some have regarded it incompatible with the 
desired objectives of the society and the individual’.94 The cultural difference was not the only 
aspect that made up ‘development’ as an axiomatic claim for ‘progress’, there was an implicit 
lack of recognition of colonial rule and its violence. For example Black further says, in the 
World Bank Annual Report of 1952–53, that both ‘climate and topography’  have placed 
limits on growth, as ‘centres of technological innovation and capital resources’,95 entrenching 
further the assumption that economic and social exploitation of the colonized was not a 
significant factor contributing to their position as being ‘lesser’ in economic terms as 
measured by the World Bank. By broadening economic development to other ‘interconnecting 
aspects’ such as ‘political responsibility, education, training, weak administration’ Black 
further elaborates these as possible causes for ‘lack of  development’.96 These other aspects 
can be seen in ‘developed’ countries preceding economic growth hence, Black argues, 
included ‘ideas of evolution of man, society and the physical world’.97 
Beyond this particular analysis of cultural and geographical difference associated as a 
hierarchy between the global north which is ‘developed’ and the south which is ‘under-
developed’, is how the World Bank staff were mobilized as its agent of change and guidance 
to help strengthen member states’ institutions from within. Not only were the staff deployed 
across the globe based on the division between developed and under-developed, thereby 
operating as transnational advisors/experts to country members, but they also became 
responsible for incorporating change from within the countries themselves. The two primary 
ways included advising on not just projects, i.e. the viability of loans, but also the building of 
governmental institutions that could consistently sustain the advice and periodic oversight by 
the World Bank experts i.e. governmental programming units as part of the member states’ 












at the time in the form of the National Bank for Development in the case of Brazil, the National 
Planning Council in Burma, the Planning Commission in India, to name a few.98 
This change from within was done to create institutional units that would coordinate and 
align their policy making decisions with the World Bank. The second way in which experts 
incorporated, or rather the Bank exported, the idea of expertise to align governmental policies 
from within was to initiate training programmes for the government service personnel from 
member states who were sent to Washington to be trained and equipped in the knowledge of 
‘development’ as understood by the Bank.99 Until 1953, government staff from 34 member 
countries including Pakistan, Iraq, Nicaragua, China, Thailand, the Philippines and the 
Dominican Republic were admitted to the general training programme in Bank offices at 
Washington DC.100 In 1956, to appraise economic problems under the Bank’s operation, 
Eugene Black established a development institute in Washington DC for the training of 
developing-countries officials101 with funding from the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford 
Foundation.102 
This particular approach of the Bank replicated and continued how the League of Nations’ 
expertise in the form of travelling missions103 would gather data and coordinate with native 
governmental administrations to enact change. It relied also on a more prevalent approach 
utilized as a part of network governance as early as the late 1800s and throughout the interwar 
period; that of indirect rule. Expertise was embedded both structurally, in the form of 
programming units, and personally, from within the member states, by those trained in the 
‘expert’ knowledge at the World Bank and stationed back in their home countries to usher in 
a new age of development for their countries, having strong parallels to the indirect rule of 
imperial administrators. In this case, however, the expert knowledge is exported and 
universalised from within the territories of postcolonial states as the global economic order is 
controlled solely through the institutional networked structure of World Bank experts. The 
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institutional programming units that are made part of the government retain the state’s 
sovereignty, but are guided and trained in the vernacular of expert knowledge produced by 
the World Bank in Washington DC. 
 
The expert knowledge was conceived and concentrated among a handful of think tanks, 
universities and bankers and was supported/made prominent by the United States treasury 
department as the ‘right’ economic thought through which ‘peace’ and ‘progress’ could be 
made. The World Bank, in a similar vein to the League of Nations technical department, could 
be seen as a network organization whose governance across boundaries was made possible 
through its network of experts. However, with the emphasis on economics being separated as 
the science of progress, as a completely autonomous authority spear-headed by the Bretton 
Woods institutions and the decolonisation of former colonial territories, expert networks need 
to be involved in ‘programming’ how states ‘could’ do better. This ‘programming’, as the 
World Bank’s initial reports refer to it,104 was based on creating a regulatory structure, in both 
an economic and an administrative sense, shaped from within that could allow for the 
exportation and internalisation of the knowledge with continuing oversight from the World 
Bank’s expert network. So even if the political autonomy is retained, the training given to 
government staff of the member states positioned within these governmental units established 
ensures that indirectly the knowledge of the World Bank prevails in guiding and directing 
socio-economic ideas concerning ‘development’ and economic ‘progress’. 
 
This period of post-world war II network of experts has to be seen in conjunction with the 
material connections to remnants of its predecessor i.e. the League of Nations. Specifically, 
these connections have to do with how the institutional structure operates through expert staff 
employed and the underlying set of principles on ‘development’ and ‘progress’ based on 
urbanization and technology underpinned by modernity under which these experts hold the 
authority they claim to hold. In understanding the international financial institutions as part 
of this long trajectory we can also see that what was different about the expert networks within 
this era was that they developed a technique for universalising vocabulary of authority in the 
face of resistant/dissident voices from the global south. 
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This technique is the process of state formation through an indirect rule that was 
underpinned by the bureaucratisation of modernity from within the native populations through 
institutions. The advancement of international law or legal norms specifically on what 
constitutes a nation state, in this era, came from within, through native elite ‘nation’ builders 
trained as part of the expert network of developmental bodies, most notably, the World Bank. 
In this respect, the dialogical interplay between networks and international law in this era can 
be described as a multilateralisation of the dialogical interplay, where technocratic elites from 
within the nation states are part of expert networks even as they build their networks outside 
of the expertise of the World Bank while advancing knowledge on what constitutes 
sovereignty in international law.105 
 
IV. The violence of local experts of the World Bank 
 
My approach towards governance by the World Bank and its experts, particularly in the 
violence they perpetuated, is rooted more in how the experts themselves constructed 
knowledge about violence, violence as part of the modernisation of the state and the nexus 
between development and security that underpins these two ways of looking at the violence 
of the expert network in this age. This particular approach to looking at the violence of experts 
in the World Bank can also offer another explanation as to how the resistance from the global 
south was limited in its aim. As I explain below, the violence of experts is deeply embedded 
in the logic of modernity being internalised in the formation of the modern state during the 
decolonising period. At the most fundamental level, the resistance from the global south did 
not challenge the notion of modernity as growth. Thus, there was also no challenge to the 
violence embedded within the construction of the modern nation state by the local technocrats 
who internalised developmental thinking trained through the World Bank experts. 
 
Within the League of Nations’ formulation of technical departments and experts as well 
as the post-war, underlying frameworks from which the expert network derived its authority 
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was the shift from the economic, humanitarian and social fields to the separation between war 
and peace. The definitions of violent means were restricted within this separation, where peace 
meant economics and apolitical humanitarianism while political automatically referred to 
‘war’ and included the normative narrow definition of violence. These frameworks reiterated 
and reified the dominant understandings of sovereignty that hid the material reality of the 
violence of expert policy 
 
a. Modernisation as coloniality: the violence of the developmental state 
 
Development and economic growth were embedded into the state construction process 
through international institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and even the United Nations 
General Assembly(UNGA). Priya Gupta aptly observes, within the global legal structure those 
who participate and decide the conditions of the flow of investment and its aims, called 
‘development’ agents, were primarily statesmen in the early period of post-1945 world 
order.106 
Developmental thought of the time was in line with not just the thinking that progress in 
the form of industrialization was needed in under-developed countries to ‘catch up’ with the 
powerful states, but also the particular structure through which development thinking 
operated. This structure, as I have identified through this thesis broadly, and specifically 
concerning the economic institutions is of a network of actors producing, implementing and 
informing the knowledge of various aspects of the international legal order. Reflected most 
aptly in the importance attached to both the economic experts and the profession of the 
engineer who would undertake the infrastructure project,107 developmental thinking of 
‘progress’ was already internalised through the expert networks of the World Bank in the state 
formation process of the postcolonial state. 
 
The form of developmental thinking on which the anti-imperial aims of the Bandung 
conference itself were set had already been a part of thinking about the modern state and its 
governmental/bureaucratic structure the World Bank experts had devised for newly 
decolonised states within the first ten years of its inception. 
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Even if the values of what development meant were different for the statesmen of the global 
south, the framework under which they had accepted the linear social progression linked to 
industrialization, technology and infrastructure was ultimately the same as the World Bank. 
This particular bureaucratisation of modernity108 in the postcolonial state was processed 
through the experts of the World Bank, internalised and accepted as part of a narrative of 
emancipation within the governments of the global south participating in Bandung. 
 
Understanding developmental thinking as social progress that is linear in time and place, 
i.e. the idea that, with industry and technology, bureaucratisation is a natural course of 
progress of mankind, can be seen as similar to the logic of imperial governance where the 
colonization was justified as bringing civilization and modernity to the natives. It is 
particularly this allusion of developmental thinking to imperial governance that forms a 
critique of the resistance post decolonisation. Rajagopal for example argues the assumptions 
of developmental thinking understood by the third world lawyers and statesmen essentially 
were different in terms of ‘the role of the state in the economy’ i.e. planned versus the 
market.109 However, in both cases, the goal and direction of development was always to 
‘modernise the primitives’.110 Ashis Nandy also puts this particular critique of the modern 
state form in similar terms referring to political statesmen as ‘indigenous elites’, who 
‘acquired control over the state apparatus’ and ‘quickly learnt to seek legitimacy in a native 
version of the civilizing mission and sought to establish a similar colonial relationship 
between the state and society’ by ‘finding justifications in various theories of modernisation 
floating around in the post-World War 2 period’.111 
Examples of the internalisation of ‘modernity’ as progress materialized in the case of 
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1960s, a particular kind of nationalism and nation building.112 While being anti-colonial in its 
stand against neo-colonial dependency, these forms of nationalisms, in most cases, only 
reiterated particular modernity into its developmentalist projects. These reiterations focused 
on particular visions of nationalist self-development which hinged on technological 
advancement, reformation of the rural landscape both in agrarian reform and resource 
capitalization to transform the village as an asset to ‘modernity’ led change of the nation. 
 
There was already a precedent for these developmentalist projects by colonial powers who 
were unwilling to let go of their colonies.113 The orthodox understanding, then, is reiterated 
through the World Bank’s experts being the agents of development who can both help devise 
economic policies to eradicate poverty and, in the earlier years, support governments in 
developmental projects. 
 
From the 1950s, the processes of the modernisation of developing countries involved the 
displacement and appropriation of land from people settled within rural areas. This forced 
resettlement which dominated as a technique of imperial rule even during the decolonisation 
process was embedded in a logic of the developmentalist state. Even at the level of the United 
Nations, rural development became part of the United Nations’ strategy for development 
aimed at ‘community development’. Part of the United Nations’ development strategy, 
‘industrialization, diversification and production of highly productive agriculture sector’, 
meant the creation of infrastructures like damns for large scale irrigation systems.114 These 
highly industrialized conceptions of agriculture industry led to these massive projects 
substituting and submerging fertile lands along with the forced resettlement of population.115 
This was reinforced within the thinking of the World Bank itself at the ideological level 
and through expert thinking, as well as through its involvement in the funding of large scale 
infrastructural programmes. The World Bank’s two major economic experts in the 1950s to 
1960s, Paul Rosentien-Rodan and Dragoslav Armovic, followed a very specific neo- classical 
model of economic development whereby domestic economies could become ‘self- 
 
112 
Vijay Prashad terms this forms of Nationalism as internationalist nationalism, particularly during the 
1960s, Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World (The New Press 2008) 
113 
As I have mentioned before, these emerged particularly in African colonies and territories held by the 
British, Portuguese and French. 
114
 United Nations General Assembly Resolution, United Nations Development Decade: A program for 
international economic cooperation (adopted 19 Dec 1961) UNGA A/RES/1710 (XVI).  
115 




sustaining’ through industrialized sectoral reform.116 Within this model, the older agricultural 
techniques used as a means of sustenance by farmers in the ‘under-developed’ model were 
backwards and only through advanced, industrialized sectors in the economy were fully 
developed.117 This particular thinking explained the project funding in the early years on larger 
projects like dams and mining industries. The concept of rural development or community 
development that was part of the United Nations’ development strategy in the 1950s was 
aligned with the World Bank’s idea of self-sustaining development lending for 
industrialization. This also became how British, French and Portuguese, through foreign aid 
and expert opinion in the international forums such as the UN and World Bank, incorporated 
‘villagization’ within their territories that were under the process of decolonisation.118 
The effects of this ‘villagization’ that was led through heavy scaled industrialization 
projects included mass displacement, uprooting communities from their land which was their 
sources of and means of production, turning them into wage earners in development 
projects.119 Christian Gerlach observes how this could be seen as a form of ‘sustainable 
violence’ as it causes social stratification in communities placed in these settlements often 
lacking basic needs.120 Citing particularly the case of Mozambique in the 1960s, Gerlach 
observes the social stratification between the older generations who were separated from a 
generational sense of identity attached to the socio-economic attachment to their lands that 
they were displaced from and the younger generations who grew up in these settlements 
without access to basic education and everyday needs which drove them towards insurgency 
against the controlling government.121 Development settlements became, then, increasingly 
ascribed to places of violence that needed further reform through even broader structural 
adjustment policies in the later years of the World Bank’s neoliberal reform.122 Yet, the 
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caused the social forms of violence out of basic depravities is not considered within 
developmental policies in earlier decades or recent thinking on violence and development.123 
The imposition of modernity on the ‘village’ also made it, in the context of the post- world 
war politics, a site of the ‘cold war’.124 In this context of Soviet-led communism in lock with 
American liberal capitalism, newly formed nation states were grounds for a new era of global 
politics.125 Newly decolonised nation states that participated in the anti- colonial global 
economic order, however, had to build their form of internationalist nationalism underpinned 
by socialism(s).126 Nonetheless, the native elite political class’ imagination of ‘village’ as the 
centre point of ‘development’ or rather ‘under- development’127 then manifested in different 
ways than its colonial counterparts mentioned above.128 
For example, as Prakash Kumar notes, in the case of India, Nehru’s focal point of national 
‘progress’ was the reformation of the village.129 The Nehruvian vision of agrarian reform was 
in modernizing the peasants,130 by national support for crop yield competitions to facilitate 
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privileged ‘master farmers’, termed Krishi pandits, and ambitious landlords132 were supported 
over sustenance farmers, creating a deeper economic divide in an already caste- and class-
ridden history of land use and ownership in the subcontinent.133 Beyond India, similar 
‘modernity’-led development projects for nation building made the rural a space for a newly 
decolonised nation’s identity beyond its former imperial rulers. In the case of South Africa 
specifically, reserve policy, land segregation, villagization and rural policies were informed 
by colonial developmentalists, as argued by Laura Evans, to ‘stamp out communism’ and 
‘preserve white supremacy’.134 In postcolonial Tanzania, the villagization process concerning 
fishing communities caused forced resettlements into industrialized cooperatives which had 
massive social and ecological effects.135 Communities were forced to destroy their own 
homes, or have the police destroy them for the relocation to proceed; while local knowledge 
and practices were said to be preserved, the government paid lip service to this commitment 
in favour of large scale industrialization.136 
As much as accepting the ‘universal’ conditions to be part of the international global order 
as a modern state was the price of political emancipation for the global south, the network of 
the World Bank experts and its underlying rationale of expertise to oversee and internalise 
modernity from within through governmental structures was an integral part of the formation 
of the postcolonial state. Echoing the critiques by Nandy and Rajagopal of the postcolonial 
state and its resistance to imperial powers, I see the formation of the postcolonial development 
state as being facilitated by expert networks who were the agents of development and 
modernity. This internalisation of modernity within the state was already part of the interwar 
years’ conceptualization of expert rule over mandated territories. 
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Within the decolonisation period then, the native ‘elites’, as both Rajagopal137 and Nandy138 
point out, were already also being trained whether through the World Bank as technocrats or 
as political elites through the administrative positions given by former imperial powers in 
their domestic political structure. This internalisation of modernity-led development 
reproduced logics of socio-economic hierarchization based on who was considered 
‘progressive’ and ‘modern’ within these postcolonial states thus continuing to exacerbate and 
hide structural violence based on class, caste, gender or race.139 
The framework of knowledge ultimately within which resistance, and formation of 
resistant networks through contested spaces, in the decolonisation period took place were part 
of a framework through which the expert network of the empire justified and legitimised rule 
over the natives. Part of the reason why the resistance through these spaces did not sustain or 
were not radical enough was since they not only relied on a framework similar to expert 
networks of the World Bank but were a result of expert networks’ internalisation of modernity 
in the state formation process.140 International institutions did not just transform into legally 
autonomous actors within this period of resistance.141 The forms and spaces within which 
resistance operated were already part of imperial governance through the expert network 
before the establishment of the World Bank. 
 
The presidency of Robert McNamara signified this particular shift in the economic 
philosophy of the League as criticisms of the World Bank and IMF’s developmental thinking 
became prominent alongside the push from the third world on economic and social rights. In 
an address at a conference on development in Columbia University, McNamara described the 
development agenda as ‘beyond the measure of growth in total output and provide practical 
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project’.142 Modernisation here imbued as part of development thinking was framed in terms 
of poverty alleviation and the ‘disparity’ associated not with the political contestation 
‘between rich countries and poor countries’, but as a broader part of what McNamara viewed 
as the ‘framework of the nations whole program’.143 Gathii argues this move to a ‘basic needs’ 
vocabulary used by the World Bank at this point was an attempt to ‘salvage the promises of 
modernisation or the myth of development’.144 
The Bank’s lending intensified with the view that governments should trust in the eventual 
benefit coming from the market alone. Lending from the Bank between 1968 and 1973 
focused on socio-economic projects of farming, development of rural housing and 
development, all of which failed as specific conditions, particularly land ownership, were not 
taken into account.145 This resulted in most of the loans being given only to richer landowners 
and farmers thereby increasing the gap between poorer and richer populations.146 The 
approach of project-based lending became broader, but also attaching conditionality, that 
required the borrowing country to make structural changes to social domestic policies.147 
The call for a ‘social’ character in the international financial institutions utilized the push 
for rights to embed within its expert knowledge broader areas of the social and economic 
concerns for what makes a state ‘developed’. In the 1980s this became the vocabulary of ‘good 
governance’ underlined by the logic of a specific economic philosophy: neoliberalism. 
Neoliberal economic philosophy reflected a counter movement against the resistance 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s from the third world as well as the human rights activism 
on socio-economic rights. Experts who made neoliberalism the underlying economic thought 
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they were based in Washington DC and included technical experts from the IMF, World Bank, 
US treasury, Federal reserve and think tanks based in the United States.149 The Washington 
Consensus was essentially taking the neoliberal idea of making the market the loci of society 
where consumer rights were the be all and end all of the economic progress.150 Within this 
paradigm, the World Bank projects were based on the deregulation of public sectors, 
prioritisation of the liberalization of the economy and the protection of private investors.151 
Another movement adhering to neoliberalism, as Quin Slobodian observes, was being done 
by experts from Geneva based in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT), later 
named the World Trade Organization (WTO), who followed the tradition of Hayekian 
intellectual thought.152 Focusing primarily on civil and political rights, structural reforms and 
lending conditions of the World Bank and the IMF in this period, the conception of rights 
were defined through the total and absolute priority to economic freedom as opposed to socio-
economic rights.153 
At the outset of the decolonisation process, continued differentiation between the newly 
decolonised state and old powers was not just a term of acceptance for political emancipation. 
Expert networks were constantly at the vanguard of shaping what a modern state looks like. 
Thus, as I observed in the previous sections of this chapter, this was at the level of not just 
shaping governmental structures and units of development but also training and internalizing 
modernity within the state technocrats and political elites. Experts became agents of 
modernity sent to under-developed states to make the state modern. Expert networks as agents 
of modernity both construct the vocabulary of differentiation and expand their geographical 
reach into the places they deem require their expertise and then shape the state through the 
process of internalisation of their knowledge as an authority. 
 
This particular way in which expert rule was and is justified continued to define how the 
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seen through the history of international as Anthony Anghie points out.154 As ‘governance’ 
came to the forefront, the language of difference took a broader social context. Thus 
descriptions of filling the ‘governance’ gap,155 ‘poorer countries’156 became associated with 
the World Bank’s broader agenda towards project lending and policy-based reform for 
countries in the global south. These broader structural reforms that became part of the 1980s 
and 1990s work of the Bank were proved to be devastating on the poorer countries.157 
 
b. Securitisation/development nexus: a cycle of socio-economic violence 
 
 
In the era of the League of Nations, the rhetoric was one of economic progress pushed through 
the mandate governance, the League’s technical organizations and it’s overseeing expert 
committees as a preventative measure against another war. In the post-World War II era, the 
rhetoric on economic progress shifted to policies of the states and the stability of their internal 
security, emphasising that constant regulation of economic principles from the international 
to the national could help in avoiding a situation of internal and external  war.158 This 
literature, as Simon Springer points out, follows the assumption that war results from poverty 
and poverty result from poor economic policies.159 
In the context of the Second World War, in many ways similar to discourses after the First 
World War, the aims and purpose of an international global order revolved around preventing 
the ‘scourge of war’. Thus the United Nations as an organization described its own broader 
role as the prevention of war and hence the designation of the General Assembly and primarily 
the Security Council as referees of any ‘military’ crises between independent nation states 
within conventional domains of war as understood in terms of 
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public international law. These provisions were of course seen as not only the understandings 
of violence within the framework of the war and peace distinction but also  as part of the 
militarization and military security of the world being an undertaking necessary for new world 
order.160 Unlike the shift towards discourses of demilitarization and policing within mandated 
territories, the discourses shifted instead towards having a structure to control military 
aggression after the Second World War.161 
In the wake of decolonisation as well, state sovereignty was also defined in terms of 
military control over a territory. Hersch Lauterpacht in his essay on international legal 
recognition writes that ‘contest of arms’ within the state needs to end in a state of 
‘permanency’ for it to assert its right to recognition.162 One specific aspect of state recognition, 
at the end of the Second World War and in the formation of the new international global order, 
was a ‘sufficient degree of stability as expressed through the functioning of the government 
enjoying the habitual obedience of the bulk of the population’.163 Within this particular 
condition, Lauterpacht elaborates how we can further test the internal stability of territory by 
asking the question, 
 
is it in military possession of the country? And also in a respectable condition of military 
defence against any probable attack?164 
This quote suggests the importance of military control and militarization to determine a nation 
state’s statehood and sovereignty. 
 
The dominant understanding, then, was towards an intensification of military structures as 
a condition to statehood and sovereignty. Therefore, statehood and sovereignty in this context 
meant militarized control as well as the regulation of state military through the United Nations 
Security Council. At the same time, the distinction was drawn between ‘military security’ and 
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with a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well being which are necessary for 
peaceful and friendly relations among nations … all members pledge themselves to take 
joint and separate action in cooperation with the organization for the promoting of higher 
standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic and social progress and 
development.166 
Attributing to this particular distinction between human security and economic stability for 
peace relations, the US secretary of state in his report to the President of the United States 
regarding the San Francisco conference stated: 
 
The Battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where 
victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory 
means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of enduring 
peace.167 
In this formulation of military security, the regulation of militarization was the province 
of principles of public international law and social, economic regulation to maintain human 
security were part of the regime of peace under the United Nations technical bodies and more 
importantly the Bretton Woods institutes. As I explained in the previous section, economics 
as a discipline both defined and led by the Bretton Woods institutes associated itself with 
ensuring ‘human security’ in the new world order to prevent conditions of violence from 
within the state. 
 
Within this neater narrative of what violence meant as lack of human security and how 
international law itself only concerned inter-state violence, the material ways in which 
decolonisation processes of the postcolonial state stepping into modernity was violent were 
ignored at the international plane. The formation of the state at this time was rife with internal 
violence between anti-colonial and imperial governments. Martin Thomas observes this took 
the form of the separation of populations into specific territorial logic representing a 
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This separation took the form of forced displacement of populations justified through 
‘restoring security and as a prelude to economic development’.169 In the context of imperial 
states resisting decolonial struggles, particularly the British and French in their colonies in 
Kenya and Algeria respectively, Mauritz Feichtinger observes that forced settlements were part 
of containment of resistance under the guise of the socio-economic task of ‘development’.170 
Echoing Feichtinger, Jeronimo argues that the late colonial turn during the 1940s and 1950s as 
the decolonisation period was in effect saw colonial territories being turned into ‘technical 
experimental spaces of development and security’ by powerful states.171 Jeronimo cites 
developmental plans carried out at the beginning of the 1950s in Portuguese-controlled 
territories in Africa. Specifically, Mozambique and Angola, as carrying similar objectives of 
controlling populations to counteract anti-colonial insurgency while framing these forced 
‘strategic settlements’ in terms of economic development and modernisation of the villages.172 
These forced settlements during the decade of decolonisation uprooted communities from 
their lands and operated not just to contain and control populations as a measure against anti-
colonial armed resistance, but also, at the same time, as part of massive modernisation projects 
in the form of infrastructural development. The violence that was a routine part of 
counterinsurgency against anti-colonial resistance in the resettlement spaces, including 
detentions, torture, policing and lack of access to basic resources,173 was a direct form of 
imperial violence from powerful states holding on to their territories. The broader techniques 
whereby these forms of violence became justified were part of ideological support at the 
international level by experts such as those of the World Bank. 
 
Dam projects became a massive part of the effects of this kind of violence throughout the 
1950s–1970s. The Cahora Bassa Dam in Mozambique, started in 1969 by the Portuguese 
government still in control of its colonies, forced 25,000 native Africans to leave their homes 
and settlement of one million new white settlers.174 In Angola, the Cunene dam project 
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African natives into resettlement villages as reserve labour.175 Throughout this period, the 
World Bank supported the Portuguese government through aid for the development of large 
infrastructural projects. This became a point of contestation in the United Nations as the 
United Nations decolonisation committee criticized the World Bank’s lending to the 
Portuguese government as adversely affecting the decolonisation process.176 The World 
Bank’s then president responded that the Bank did not take into consideration political 
concerns, referring to its policy for staff in making decisions keeping in mind the division of 
political and economic interests.177 
In later years rural natives were displaced and resettled in development spaces in similar 
and broader ways. In 1980s Egypt, for example, Timothy Mitchell notes how the tourist 
industry became a market for incorporating a similar technique of creating ‘enclaves’ of rural 
communities to cater for the creation of tourist spaces for foreigners.178 The World Bank 
directed this particular investment into building infrastructure for tourist development and was 
led by former IMF staff and tourism minister Fau’d Sultan who slowly privatized hotel chains. 
Mitchell gives the example of the city of Luxor transformed into a tourist project under the 
direction of the World Bank experts.179 The villages surrounding the city, including Gurna, 
suffered a massive displacement, devised and funded by the World Bank, the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Egyptian government, as villagers 
were moved into overcrowded settlements. This also resulted in resistance in the form of riots 
met with police repression in 1998.180 
The effect of World Bank expert policy in the resettlement of native populations through 
the support and reinforcement of private property acquisition by foreign investors intensified 
in the period of the World Bank’s Washington Consensus. David Szoubloski, for example, 
notes how the World Bank funded and supported the Compina Minera Antnima (CMA), a 
mining company, in acquiring lands and drafting the policy of native relocation from their 
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lending body invested in the mining project, giving a policy for the CMA to follow given that 
the project would include the acquisition of land by the company.182 While this policy dictated 
that a resettlement evaluation be carried out confirming how the livelihoods of the population 
being dislocated were affected, the policy was directed more towards the Company who was 
under no obligation to reveal anything related to the policy to the community in question.183 
This resulted in the company providing oral assurance that the people being displaced with 
their livelihoods based on the highlands of San Marco would be given employment and 
involved in other development projects that were later denied to have been part of the 
company’s development projects in the area.184 
The violence of developmental experts of the World Bank that gives aid and provides an 
informal structure of expert policy opinion as a way of support separates itself from the 
violence of these policies in question. Instead of direct, physical violence associated with 
imperial and colonial policing and control, the violence of the expertise is as Arturo Escobar 
describes it ‘long lasting and structural’.185 It is essentially based on ‘displacement producing 
processes’186 that contribute to creating social conditions for everyday violence that is borne 
out of lack of basic needs and resources provided to communities/populations that are 
displaced.187 Escobar correctly observes that this development thinking is embedded within 
modernity itself which has ‘naturalized displacement’,188 a displacement which restructures 
spaces and territories, attributing the result of deteriorating conditions as a fact of the place 
being violent.189 This categorization of these spaces as violent ties into the need for expert 
knowledge on economics, more specifically neoliberal policies, to change these spaces. What 
is unique about the violence of development experts is that they base their need for 
intervention into ‘violent’ spaces without accepting the role that modernity-driven 
development policies have played in the social deterioration of these places.190 In fact,  unlike 
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Bank thinking on violence and development is narrowly framed as needing even more 





As I explained in the previous section, the link between human security and developmental 
thought was already deeply embedded in both the international law thinking and practices of 
imperial control during the decolonisation period by powerful states. The same practices were 
also reinforced through continued support, ideological and material in terms of aid and 
expertise, by the World Bank. Through the historical and contemporary examples of the 
violence of development thinking and the experts that have been norm producers of socio- 
economic governmental policies, my argument shows how the orthodox understanding of 
violence in military security terms renders the violence of expert networks invisible. Through 
this orthodox understanding, we ascribe the economic institutions, state actors and 
international actors the role of preventing human insecurity, thereby ignoring how it is 
precisely these actors and institutions whose governance might be producing the conditions 
for human insecurity. 
 
The era of dialogical interplay in this chapter signifies one of the most contemporaneous 
forms of the dialogical interplay i.e. the nation state’s local expertise formed through the 
‘universalising’ logic of modernity and development. I have shown in particular how the 
crystallization of the modern nation state is predicated on the dialogical interplay between 
local expert networks and international legal jurisprudence on sovereignty. Here we also see 
the emergence and utilization of concepts like ‘human security’ linked to ‘governance’ to 
create graded formulations of a ‘sovereign’ state. More importantly, we see the violence of 
local expert networks re-inscribing familiar forms of violence characteristic of colonial 
governance i.e. population control, displacement, dispossession of land, exacerbating socio- 
economic conditions. In this era, we also see that a security/development nexus is crucial to 
understand the evolution of the dialogical interplay at the turn of the 21st Century, which I 
explore in the penultimate chapter of this thesis and where I also return to the very first case 
study of a network I mentioned in the introduction of this thesis i.e. Network Warfare. 
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Chapter 7. The omnipresence of the dialogical interplay: the War 




In this chapter, I discuss the rise of the Unites States Special Operations Forces network and 
its adoption of the concept of Network Warfare in post 9/11 counter terrorism policies and 
strategies. In particular, I look at how, through understanding the relationship between 
Network Warfare and territorial sovereignty as part of the dialogical interplay of international 
law, we can look at the Network Warfare as a culmination of dialogical interplay. As the most 
recent development of a network and static territory-centred understanding of international 
legal doctrines working in tandem, informed by and informing each other’s expansion, 
Network Warfare goes beyond any form of a network which has come before it in terms of its 
violence where it is deployed. Not limited by either a forum of contestation or multiple 
interests, as in the case of previous networks including expert networks, and yet utilizing 
different networks to its advantage, the USSOF network acts as a hegemonic entity facilitated 
by technological advancements which further enhance its network capabilities to diminish 
spatial and temporal limitations. 
 
Counter to prevailing attempts at accountability or juridical framing of its operations, I 
argue that as a form of the dialogical interplay, it represents how international law’s static 
understandings facilitate, support and enable the expansion and operation of USSOF in the 
world. Network Warfare of the USSOF is both a continuation of and a ‘new’ form of imperial 
network, which can be described as an accruement of previous imperial networks. It creates 
its logic of differentiation based on a construction of the ‘Muslim’ as the other. It is enmeshed 
within secular modalities of political governance. It also operates through modes of indirect 
governance in the territories where it is present. It thus takes elements of each imperial 
network I have explored, embodying it in a military network contingent on technological 
superiority – at a level not present within previous networks – to operate as an omnipresent 
techno-hegemony in the post 9/11 global order. 
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In the next section, I explore the continuities of developmental violence, particularly the 
security/development nexus as it manifested pre and post 9/11. I show how conversations on 
both development and the War on Terror operated alongside each other. In both critical and 
traditional literature, conversations on sovereignty dictated the ‘legality’ of the War on Terror 
and its so called exceptional nature. This also marked a scholarly intervention within the 
discipline of international law particularly after the Iraq Invasion in 2003. At the same time, 
within military and security circles of nation states leading the charge of the War on Terror, 
specifically the United States, conversations remained isolated within a re-emergence of 
‘Westphalian sovereignty’ military liberalism which is embedded within its nation-building 
approach to military purpose. While critical voices within the discipline of international law 
responded to the legal justification of the War on Terror, just war, and particularly broader 
conversation on ius ad bellum and in bello considerations concerning the actions of the United 
States forces, intelligence and private military contractors. The responses were limited to 
either ‘illegality’ or pointing out the inherent imperialism of international law being 
manifested yet again in the post 9/11 international legal order. 
 
In the section three, I explain USOF and its operational wing i.e. Joint Special Operation 
Command (JSOC) as a form of network organization. I look at the intellectual roots of its 
influence through the RAND(Research and Development) organization’s intellectual  genesis 
of a military technique i.e. Network Warfare. Network Warfare is described as an emerging 
mode of conflict that employs network organization in warfare. Adoption of network 
organization in warfare entails the structuring of forces in the web like connections and nodes1 
and dispersing them across the globe. The networked force utilizes advance technological 
communications to facilitate the dispersed nodes to operate in synchronicity across distances. 
This allows the networked force to maintain a presence across different territories and conduct 
operations at any given point in time. The concept itself predates 9/11, and it was proposed as 
a way to understand how transnational criminal organizations and terrorist organizations 
operate and how to counter these organizations using networked forces of nation states. 
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counter terrorism policy, specifically its adoption by the Special Operation Forces that led to 
the formation of the Special Operation Forces Network and its operation wing i.e. JSOC. 
 
Concerning territorial sovereignty, the adoption of Network Warfare has been discussed 
by its proponents, mostly the United States and its policy organizations such as RAND, as a 
way to protect nation state sovereignty against terrorist networks. This narrative of Network 
Warfare roots the relationship between Network Warfare and territorial sovereignty in 
military liberalism along with a reliance on the development/security nexus present before 
9/11 as propagated within and through the World Bank and IMF. 
 
I explain how we can see that Network Warfare is a new iteration of previous imperial 
forms of networks within an international legal order, which works in tandem with 
international law’s static understanding, but is also new in its particular form. In the view of 
the Department of Defence(DOD) of the United States and Special Operations Command, the 
persistent presence of the network is necessary for territories that are termed as ‘ungoverned’ 
and where violent anti-enlightenment mindsets are likely to foster. These territories that are 
viewed as ungoverned, yet still formally sovereign, are termed as places where ‘gaps’ in 
governance exist that need to be filled by the presence of the Unites States Special Operation 
Forces Network.2 This would then bring the territory of such a nation state to the standard of 
‘governance’ that matches its sovereignty in the way envisioned by the United States. Rather 
than justification based on pre-emptive self-defence, Network Warfare relies instead on 
maintaining a persistent presence in territories categorized as ‘ungoverned’. This persistent 
presence in territories allows the use of force at any given time without reference to self-
defence justification as such. I suggest that it is this idea of the persistent presence of the 
network based on the dynamic of difference that reflects a more expansive and persistent state 
of imperial influence through persistent presence. Instead of actual conquest and occupation, 
imperial violence through Network Warfare is based on persistent presence in territories 
whose formal sovereignty is recognized, but who are differentiated as less than a complete 
sovereign due to a ‘gap in governance’. This differentiation becomes the justification for the 




Richard Rubright ‘A Strategic Perspective on the Global SOF Network: Little Money, Unclear Ends, and 
Big Ideas’ in Chuch Ricks (eds), The Role of Global SOF Network in a Resource Constrained Environment 
(JSOU Report 2013). 
221 
 
In the last section, I show how operational actions of these network forces, i.e. covert 
operations such as drone attacks, rendition, targeted killings and overt indirect violence, such 
as intelligence gathering, soft influence and presence, which have primarily been discussed in 
isolation to its network nature, are a direct result of and facilitated through the dialogical 
interplay that the Special Operation Forces Network has with a static understanding of 
international law. In this particular phase of the dialogical interplay, where the United States 
initiated an ‘endless, everywhere’ war against a non-territorial enemy,3 the concept of 
‘ungoverned territories’ and the facilitation of such territories to reach a certain stage of 
governance is another development within international legal thought which facilitates the 
expansion of the Special Operation Forces Network. 
 
The violence manifested through this network can then be understood not in an isolationist 
and regime oriented way, but as an inherent part of how networks and international legal 
thinking operate together, reinforcing one another for specific purposes and for the benefit of 
the network in question. Focusing on primarily direct/indirect operations in Afghanistan post 
9/11, I show how we can understand the Special Operation Forces (SOF) Network as a socio-
political, military governance body whose actions – both direct and indirect – are part of its 
techno-hegemonic governance over the territories it occupies. 
 
II. International law after 9/11 and the discourse of development 
 
a. Security/development and postcolonial state 
 
 
In the 1990s, the security/development nexus became a more formal, recognized issue within 
the World Bank and United Nations bodies. Mark Duffield’s foundational work on drawing 
the link between development and war points out how international public policy networks 
and NGO’s push for the post-conflict reconstruction of nation states to build them into liberal 
democracies and economies to prevent a presumed vacuum which would be filled with 
insecurity and violence thus leading to poverty.4 Liberal economic policies were 
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conflated with, as Duffield argues, ‘peace’, as developmental tools would reduce or prevent 
insecurity which would ‘inherently’ lead to violence.5 As I have mentioned in the last chapter, 
the discourse of development and security was tied to the construction of violence of insecurity 
as an internal state matter determining its sovereignty and its stage of development.6 In 
particular, the concept of security as part of the developmental discourse, as Thomas and 
Jeronimo point out, was part of the late colonial developmental policy to justify further control, 
surveillance and hold over colonial territories’ anti-colonial resistance.7 The Bretton Woods 
institute itself associated the concept of human security to development and progress, making it 
an essential element of its understanding of nation state and nation building.8 The roots of the 
development/security nexus, therefore, are perhaps as long as the late colonial period, 
intertwined with indirect rule, colonial administrators and experts. 
 
During the post-cold war era, the security/development nexus represented within 
organizations like the World Bank assumed a stronger role in signifying the importance of 
stages of development to ‘human security’, which itself was then linked to the ‘sovereignty’ 
of a state.9 The World Bank pushed for developmental institutions to disrupt what they 
considered a ‘conflict trap’,10 which is a ‘vicious cycle’ of under-development leading to 
conflict, conflict leading to missed opportunities of economic progress and development, 
resulting in further under-development.11 Interrupting the conflict trap translates to the 
integration of crime prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, good governance and security 
reforms.12 
In more recent literature and the fact the World Bank’s turn towards the link between 
violence and development, greater emphasis is put on how specific policies for ‘Fragile, 
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conflict ridden, and vulnerable’ states may benefit from policies drafted by experts.13 This 
language perpetuates and continues to link both post-conflict territories and states that are 
‘fragile’ to lack of proper socio-economic, as well as political, direction.14 Immediately after 
9/11 this link between better ‘development policies’ and help to govern ‘fragile’ territories 
assumed a central role in the World Bank policy.15 Soon after 9/11 for example, the president 
of the World Bank in a joint statement of the Fund stressed the need for greater involvement 
in low-income countries given the after effects of the 9/11 attack.16 The attribution of ‘fragile, 
conflict ridden and vulnerable state’ became associated with or more susceptible to ‘violent 
criminal and terrorist networks’.17 This linking of insecurity in ‘fragile’ states to terrorist 
networks and the need for development became the universalised vocabulary of global 
governance through international institutions, NGOs and government aid received from the 
countries in the global north.18 
However, this logic of global governance and influence over controlling the socio- 
economic direction of the states in the global south was not just the purview of international 
institutions like the World Bank anymore or only the state. The security/development nexus 
also translates into forms of militarization as a way to reassert nation-building development 
projects, thereby also reaffirming the position of a nation state as a ‘sovereign’ one as reflected 
within Lauterpacht’s understanding of self-government and control through the military. As 
Guy Lamb observes, in postcolonial Namibia, development projects also came with 
militarization to incorporate them to protect the government from dissidents of the policies.19 
Development projects and policies were actively part of militarization in this case but also 
then assumed an ideological and political undertone, referred to, by some scholars, as military 
liberalism.20 Military liberalism, in United States foreign policy, meant understanding military 
intervention and utilization as part of the liberal world order, where 
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states could be divided into liberal/civilized and illiberal/uncivilized.21 In this particular 
understanding, illiberal states, i.e. those that did not adhere to ideological imperatives of the 
United States, were ‘war prone’ and those that were not had the civilizing mission to bring 
modernity to the illiberal states.22 Post 9/11 development/security nexus constructions of weak 
or fragile states as harbours and havens for terrorism became a trope in orthodox military and 
security literature justifying further interventions and taking up imperialism as a worthy mantle 
for the United States’ military interventions for ‘nation building’.23 Stewart Patrick notes that 
it was the World Bank’s ‘Governance Matters’ dataset that became the gauge to determine 
which countries would be classified as ‘weak’ and/or ‘fragile’.24 The linking of terrorist havens 
to what were considered failed/weak states depended on various elements. All of which were 
categorized as having inadequate ‘state capacity’ and the ‘will’ to ‘govern’ in specific areas 
that corresponded with the list of countries compiled by the World Bank Governance Matters 
indicators.25 These nation states, as per the United States, could have ‘spillovers’ due to the 
‘gaps’ in their state capacity, some considered as ‘ungoverned territories’.26 Since the Reagan 
era and the broader global neoliberal reforms in the 1970s, the United States’ national security 
policy has included in its ‘threat’ to national security ‘extra-military’ concerns, such as 
transnational crime and terrorism, pandemic diseases, energy security and climate threat.27 The 
link between economic liberal development and military and national security, therefore, was 
already present before 9/11 and was broadly concerned with issues and countries beyond just 
the remit of a War on Terror campaign. 
 
As Jacob Mundy observes, these arguments of ‘ungoverned spaces’ as ‘safe havens for 
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The shift could be seen thus in a similar way to a colonial continuity of indirect rule in the 
20th Century finding its way in the cold war era where the ‘third world’ became the 
battleground for imperial power. As the cold war ended, sustaining neoliberal policies through 
interventionist logic based on ‘state failure’ and ‘humanitarianism’ gave rise to another reason 
for indirect rule by imperial powers. The post 9/11 discursive shift on ‘global terrorism’, as 
Mundy notes, could also be seen as a similar continuation of previous attempts at 
consolidating power through discourses of ‘progress and development’.29 
While ‘governance gaps’did not always have to do with countries assumed to be ‘terrorist 
safe havens’,30 due to its discursive basis it also produced a certain intensification of 
otherization based on the construction of religion i.e. islam.31 Nonetheless, the United States’ 
deployment of War on Terror also extended and included its pre 9/11 global political enemies, 
such as North Korea and Iran. The terrorization of development,32 as Mundy terms it, also led 
to a gradual shift in the military liberalist approach to intervene and control the state building 
projects of ‘weak/failing’ states towards a ‘remote’ and ‘discreet’ approach reliant on new 
technologies to fight a global War on Terror and facilitate the ungoverned spaces. 
 
b. Sovereignty, territory and the War on Terror 
 
As this gradual shift is happening, new technologies, the use of ‘humanitarian intervention,33 
and global economic pressure to reconfigure the economic order close to the United States’ 
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In particular, Third World Approaches to International Law, drew on already prevalent 
critiques of development and law, as well as more foundational critical readings of state 
sovereignty within international law to respond to the shift in international legal order justified 
through the post 9/11 Global War on Terror (GWOT).34 As I explain in the introductory chapter 
of this thesis, TWAIL questions the colonial basis of international law and specifically the 
concept of territorial sovereignty.35 In relation to GWOT, Anghie argues how the GWOT is  
another iteration of a dynamic of difference already embedded within the foundational and 
historical understanding of sovereignty.36 His discussion on the dynamic of difference in the 
GWOT rhetoric has also, then, produced different ways in which other international legal 
principles, within specifically international humanitarian law and human rights, draw on the 
categorization of terrorists as the new barbarians,37 and further how this rhetoric is reflected in 
the policy narratives of the US Bush doctrine, specifically in the Iraq War and the doctrine of 
pre-emptive self-defence.38 
In the first instance, GWOT as a discursive justification allowed the United States to 
create, what some scholars refer to as, a state of exception in the global legal order, to both 
create exceptions to the ‘rule’,39 in this case territorial integrity under Article 2(4), and create 
new modalities of war. In relation to the latter, it is particularly the United States’ military, 
intelligence and special forces which have been at the centre of a new and rapidly evolving 
global security regime. Whether this is on a specific paradigm of covert operations, targeted 
killings40 and rendition,41 or through a more critical approach to understanding the inherent  
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politics and power within an international legal regime of aerial bombardment42 and drones,43 
conversations on counter terrorism post 9/11 have produced novel understandings of the 
entanglement between sovereignty and the War on Terror. 
 
Going beyond these scholarships attempting to either produce critiques of international 
legal doctrines through operational regimes or develop a normative understanding of 
international law, scholars using critical global governance and geography, such as Marieke 
de Goede44 and Gavin Sullivan,45 attempt to locate their analysis within global governance 
regimes as central to the functioning of counter terrorism’s underlying politics and power. 
While these scholars emphasise different aspects of global governance, their attention to the 
nature of counter terrorism as being beyond the operational regime-based approach points 
towards a key component missing from conversations on counter terrorism post 9/11; that is 
the nature and processes through which counter terrorism policy permeates as a form of 
global, economic, political and military governance. 
 
While the focus on the organizational and governance nature of counter terrorism broadly 
is being studied, the organizational and governance nature of its operational modes, such as 
drones, targeted killing, and rendition amongst other operations, have not been focused on in 
recent literature on counter terrorism. Even so, within orthodox literature, the central 
theoretical aspect through which counter terrorism operations have been mentioned is through 
organizational and governance i.e. ‘networks’. Specifically, from the policy circles, military 
schools and think tank scholars in the United States have pushed for a network approach to 
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networked threats46 or have advocated for this based on an exception to international legal 
doctrines.47 This orthodox literature, of course, has a specific formulation and understanding 
of sovereignty, which, as I argue, is deeply linked to a particular formulation of sovereignty 
that can be traced to previous forms of networks, notably the World Bank and 
development/security nexus. 
 
My focus on the United States Special Operation Forces, in the next section, therefore 
draws on this particular gap, which also informs my main hypothesis i.e. how networks and 
international law work together, in an interplay, developing each other. Unlike scholarship on 
the actions of Covert Operations, Special Forces, especially within international law, I am 
concerned with how we can view the United States Special Operation Forces as a governing, 
political, military network form in and of itself where its operations, regardless of how they 
manifest, are inherently linked to its network nature. More importantly, what it shows us about 
the nature of international law, as we understand that SOF network, is another reiteration, and 
yet novel form, of an imperial network which has expanded using and advancing through the 
static international legal doctrine of sovereignty as understood through the civilizational 
tropes of security/development nexus in a particular way. 
 
This particular way is a development of state sovereignty understood through the precepts 
of development, security and state building. As I show in the next section, the United States 
Special Operation Forces Network thus is not, as some scholars argue, a shift from Bush’s 
invasion of Iraq or a ‘boots on ground’ approach to counterinsurgency.48 It is an already 
calcifying approach with its intellectual roots beginning before 9/11 and finding its material 
‘experimentation’ in the Iraq War 2003 and Afghanistan occupation. 
 
III. Dialogical interplay and omnipresent techno-hegemony of SOF Network  
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The United States Special Operations are referred to broadly as the organizations under the 
Department of Defence of the United States of America that are engaged in conducting 
‘Special Operations’.49 Since 2003, The Department of Defense defines Special Operations as 
operations that require a unique mode of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and 
training conducted in hostile, denied or politically sensitive environments characterized as 
clandestine, conducted through or with indigenous forces.50 The Special Operations 
Command (SOCOM), the headquarters of all SOF, controls the commando units involved in 
all special operations.51 
While SOCOM heads different specialized units such as the Army Rangers, the Navy 
Seals and the Air Force special operations command, it is the smaller Joint Special Operations 
Command that carries out black/covert operations such as the kill/capture missions52 and 
targeted raids which are also referred to as direct actions.53 The JSOC unit is explained by 
Kibbe as a joint command of three military’s elite shadowy units whose existence the 
Pentagon did not previously officially acknowledge.54 The unit takes the lead in counter 
terrorism operations around the globe that are characterized as clandestine and covert.55 By 
definition, Covert Operation is an activity or activities of the United States government to 
influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role 
of the United States government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.56 
Following 9/11, the importance of Special Forces in taking the lead in the War on Terror 
was emphasised by the office of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.57 It was under 
Rumsfeld that the special operations were given the mandate to plan and execute combat 
missions against terrorists and terrorist organizations around the world.58 This change 
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removed a layer in the chain of command in the bureaucratic structure of the special operations 
command, creating a direct link between the Secretary of Defense and  SOCOM.59 In essence, 
JSOC was placed at the centre of global counter terrorism  operations, giving it the mandate 
to carry out covert operations around the globe. Since the restructuring of the Special 
Operation Forces in 2003, the official growth of SOF has increased from thirty-three thousand 
to sixty-seven thousand operatives. Of these, twelve thousand are ready to be deployed in 
different locations where the network is based.60 Officially, SOF are present and conducting 
operations in over 75 different countries around the world. 
 
In his discussion of the JSOC covert operations through Network Warfare, Steve Niva 
explains JSOC as a network command that would link with, draw from and contribute to 
actions across the military structure by breaking down bureaucratic barriers.61 Niva’s account 
of JSOC explains how the unit grew from being a networked experiment of virtual information 
sharing to a networked force, which spread its units into dispersed locations throughout the 
battlefield. Connected through a virtual information sharing network, the physically dispersed 
units were given greater autonomy to act on the information shared on the common hub.62 
This essentially created a network of physically dispersed units to interact with each other and 
on its own without a hierarchical structure inhibiting  its decision making process.63 From 
Niva’s perspective, this was essentially a problem of accountability and oversight for an 
organization that cuts across foreign sovereign territories. Niva thus describes Special 
Operation Forces as an unaccountable transnational police.64 However, he does not look at the 
concept of networked warfare from a political perspective nor does he discuss the ideological 
underpinning of networked warfare linked to its networked organization. It is these two 
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While, in recent military and security studies literature, counterinsurgency based on the 
SOF has been described in different ways, such as ‘liquid warfare’,65 ‘vicarious warfare’,66 
‘remote warfare’,67 ‘proxy warfare’68 and ‘surrogate warfare’,69 my understanding is  through 
describing it as Network Warfare. This use of ‘Network Warfare’ has to do both with the 
particular intellectual genealogy I trace in this section and with how networking as part of the 
military shift concerning counterinsurgency led by the SOF has been a central component of 
most major work on the SOF.70 
The emergence of Network Warfare can be traced to two military and security studies 
scholars, Ronfeldt and Arquilla, who touch on characteristics of Network Warfare (which they 
term netwar) that engage with the political and ideological underpinning of Network Warfare. 
Further, it is their thesis on Network Warfare that has influenced how the Department of 
Defense has adopted Network Warfare within their Special Operation Forces. Both scholars 
first introduced their concept of Network Warfare through a research report for the military 
think tank RAND in 1997.71 Network Warfare, for Ronfeldt and Arquilla, is based on an 
organizational structure that requires persistent presence and a strong political narrative 
underpinning the network. It is both these aspects of networked warfare that the Special 
Operations network has adopted; that is the policy of persistent presence and the utilization of 
the network for the political goals and interests of the United States. 
 
Network Warfare is defined as an emerging mode of conflict in which protagonists use 
networks’ forms of organization and related doctrines, strategies and technologies attuned to 
the information age.72 Emerging technologies in the information age that allows for 
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communication across distant space and time have thus also allowed for the rise of 
organizational forms of networks.73 Networks within the context of netwar are dispersed small 
groups that are connected through information technology across distant spaces to act in 
conjunction.74 This interconnection allows for the independence of each group that is also 
called a ‘node’ of the network organization.75 Nodes can include individuals, organizations, 
firms or even computers. Hence networks are conceived as a distinct form of social 
organization.76 Within the security and military studies literature, the focus on the creation of 
networks is explained firstly as an information age phenomenon77 Secondly it is also 
associated with emerging non-state forms of political and social ideologies.78 Pitched as non-
state forms of political and social organizations, networks are understood as a new 
phenomenon in contrast to older conceptions of a global order which the authors assume as 
nation state relations.79 Robert Bunker adds to this understanding by stating that sovereignty 
and traditional politics are no longer of the same importance they once were; instead social 
and political forms that guide people are of greater importance.80 
Netwars are thus imagined as ‘taking place between competing forms of social and 
political organization as a means to determine what state form type will guide humanity in the 
postmodern world’.81 Describing their netwar thesis in terms of ideological movements, 
Ronfeldt and Arquilla argue that the netwar spectrum of conflict includes a new generation of 
radicals, revolutionaries and activists whose identities may shift from the nation state to the 
transnational level.82 This line of argument is based on the assumption that inter-nation state 
conflict has declined as ideological /political conflicts become more prominent.83 As the 
conflict in the new age has shifted power and influence to non-state actors, state 
 
technological networking between few large forces rather than what netwar suggests as a nodal expansion of 
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institutions must evolve a new form of conflict or war-like capability that can help with the 
preservation of the nation state.84 
The concept of counternetwar or response networks is proposed by scholars such as 
Ronfeldt, Arquilla, Bunker85 and Borgen86 as a way for the nation state to counter non-state 
network forms particularly violent networks such as terrorists and criminal networks.87 This 
particular perspective of utilizing network forms is described by Ronfeldt and Arquilla as a 
way of incorporating a network structure within state bureaucratic systems.88 As such a 
networked organization will have its association with the state, it would not be completely 
similar to non-state networks.89 However, such an organization imitates a networked 
organization by being dispersed throughout the world and having its different nodes connected 
through advanced technological communication. Another important element of the network 
force is shared goals/interests also explained as the narrative/ideological aspect of Network 
Warfare.90 Sangiovanni describes the network’s main characteristic of flexibility being 
dependant on communication and shared goals and values of the network.91 For Zanini and 
Edwards as well the ties between nodes of a network are enabled by shared norms and 
values.92 The same principle is also explained  by Ronfeldt and Arquilla as the capacity for 
the effective performance of the network depending on the existence of shared principles, 
interests, goals or perhaps even an overarching ideology.93 This allows for the central cohesion 
that allows tactical decentralization and sets boundaries and guidelines for the network.94 A 
network within the context of networked warfare thus is an inclusive structure whose 
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Similar to Ronfeldt and Arquilla’s conceptualization of a networked force, the idea of a Global 
SOF network is rooted in establishing a trust to be included in the network which depends on 
having an understanding of the shared goals and interests of the United States.95 The joint 
report by the Department of Defense and RAND on developing a Global SOF network 
describes one of the network’s purposes as expanding the strategic reach of the United States 
to achieve and support its goals and interests.96 In the Joint Special Operations University97 
publication on the role of the Global SOF network in a resource constrained environment, 
Richard Rubright refers to the Global SOF network as an organizational plan meant to achieve 
and facilitate the political objectives of the United States.98 Referring further to the Global 
SOF vision 2020 plan by the SOCOM, Rubright describes how the SOCOM envisions the 
purpose of the global network as being in harmony with the US national interests.99 Further, 
the Department of Defense view on inclusion in the network is based on the fact that nations 
that are accepted as part of the network must also have objectives aligned to that of the United 
States.100 From this perspective, the leadership of the network and the burden of achieving the 
objectives remains with the United States.101 Recognizing how, within the context of building 
the Global SOF network, the role of the United States is one of a ‘Sheriff of the current world 
order’, Rubright acknowledges the possible difficulties of other nations accepting such an 
arrangement.102 This idea of the United States Special Operation Forces as a ‘global sheriff’ 
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Stephen Warren observes, is how the Special Operation Forces themselves within their own 
culture understand their role in the global order.103 
The Global SOF network and its operations are based, in this way, on goals directed by 
the United States, the state from which the network emanates. The goals of the Global SOF 
network are based on the political and security interests of the United States. Thus the 
parameters of inclusion in the Global SOF network are driving the political and security 
interests of the United States despite the network being deployed in various territories around 
the world. Lyckman and Weissman describe this as new warfare or rather its more proverbial 
description as a global shadow war, as ‘utilization of highly autonomous special operation 
forces or paramilitary operating within a network organization equipped with advanced 
military technology performing tasks on a transnational global scale, hidden from the public 
eye, with little or no political oversight in a conflict with no immediate end in sight’.104 
Referring to Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s thesis that it takes a network to fight a network, the 
Department of Defense prepared an extensive plan for developing a Global SOF network that 
extends throughout the globe to achieve the security interests of the United States.105 
Explaining the role of SOF post 9/11 in countering threats from networked actors, Admiral 
McRaven emphasised that establishing a Global SOF network supports and enables operatives 
to conduct targeted operations.106 This is further reflected in Admiral McRaven’s posture 
statement in 2012, where he stated that such a network ‘enables small persistent presence in 
critical locations’,107 and elsewhere that having a persistent presence is imperative to the 
ability of the Special Operations Forces to conduct direct actions such as covert operations 
either with the help of local partners or ‘unilaterally if required’.108 Networked Warfare in the 
way it is adopted by the SOF thus requires having a persistent presence throughout nation 
states that are described as a Global SOF network. 
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As I mentioned above, the element of persistent presence that is required in Network 
Warfare and its adoption by the Special Operation Forces is also embedded within the political 
framework of the SOF. In talking about the US Special Forces Operations, Ronfeldt and 
Arquilla assess the strength of networked warfare in the Iraq occupation through the 
ideological narrative of the war. In this narrative/ideological level of analysis, Ronfeldt and 
Arquilla make the argument that the narrative of the war being a ‘civilizing mission’ to 
‘promote universal liberal values’ was an effective narrative that the administration should 
maintain to strengthen the ideological dimension of networked warfare.109 This particular 
notion was already embedded within the military liberalism culture of the United States 
military110 but was further consolidated within the revised United States Counterinsurgency 
Field Manual and the Military Field Manual after the Iraq Invasion as Laleh Khalili points 
out.111 However, even as counterinsurgency moved from the heavy presence, boots on ground 
liberal humanitarian discourse112 to what in the Obama era was referred to as ‘light 
footprint’,113 JSOC was already invested in framing their operations within a ‘liberal’ war 
mentality which justified humanitarian interventions underpinning earlier counterinsurgency 
military incursions. What Khalili refers to as a move to counter terrorism was already 
underway even as the Iraq Invasion happened through the idea of ‘persistent presence’. 
 
This can be seen primarily from the JSOC University research articles which described 
the post 9/11 era as the next step in a post-cold war era. In an article by Yoho and Borum, the 
authors frame the ideological narrative of the Global SOF network as the organization that 
can contain socio-political ideologies that are ‘antithetical to the US values’ and are driven by 
an anti-enlightenment mindset.114 Referring to the new war as similar to the cold war which 
required containment through shaping the surrounding environment around the former Soviet 
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containment through prevention.115 The authors argue for persistent presence as part of this 
containment through prevention. 
 
The association of the new war being one of the socio-political ideologies between the 
United States and those with an ‘anti-enlightenment mindset’ is then also translated by the 
Special Operation Command of the United States into how territories are then seen as 
‘ungoverned spaces’.116 In his posture statements through 2012 and 2014, Admiral  McRaven 
for example refers to the need for establishing a presence through a global network in 
‘ungoverned spaces’ where violent ideologies are fostered.117 In the same Joint Special 
Operations University publication on the role of the Global SOF network referred to in the 
previous section, another contributor, Bill Knarr, explains this perspective on the role of the 
SOF network in these ungoverned spaces further through the phrase ‘matching the footprint 
of governance with the footprint of sovereignty’.118 Referring to JQ Roberts, Knarr further 
describes the idea of ungoverned space as territories where the footprint of sovereignty is 
bigger than that of governance. This is further described as a difference in the sovereignty of 
a territory and the lack of ‘governance’ within that territory. According to the United States’ 
2012 Defense Strategic Guidance this lack of governance within a sovereign territory creates 
‘gaps in governance’ that lead to the territory in question being characterized as ‘ungoverned 
territory’.119 Echoing SOCOM’s view that it is within these ungoverned territories that violent 
ideologies are fostered, the author argues that it is within these territories that a persistent 
presence of the SOF network is required before such ideologies grow and become a threat to 
US interests.120 Further, the presence of the network in those territories can also allow the 
network to facilitate democracy in those sovereign nations, allowing the territories to match 
their governance with sovereignty.121 Such a presence can also facilitate US goals and interests 
and make the network stronger due to an expansive presence in the globe.122 Furthermore, 
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territories allows for direct operations to be conducted through partner states as proxy123 and 
facilitates the virtual network that supports such operations.124 
SOCOM’s view of the role of establishing a persistent presence within those territories  is 
not just related to the countering of terrorists’ threats, but having such a presence is also based 
on categorizations based on ideological and political imperatives. These political imperatives 
are embedded within the network itself as parameters of inclusion, which are associated and 
set by the United States based on notions, as we saw above, of ‘liberal values’ and antithetical 
to ‘anti-enlightenment mindsets’. The SOCOMs view on which nations should be a part of its 
network is also based on where its presence is required, which is determined through their 
view on the sovereign nations that have ‘ungoverned territories’. Such territories require the 
presence of the network, which not only conforms to the idea of a stronger network but allows 
the United States to fill in the gaps of governance through its presence in order for the nation 
state to become ‘democratic’ and match its governance to its sovereignty.125 It is also this 
presence in these territories that allows for JSOC to conduct its networked warfare in the form 
of covert operations.126 
Importantly, in the case of the SOF network, the territories where presence is required are 
described as ‘ungoverned’ yet ‘sovereign’. This creates a hierarchal distinction between a 
fully sovereign state and a state where ‘gaps’ in governance are said to exist. The network’s 
presence then is justified to fill such gaps to bring them to a particular level of governance, in 
the way that the United States envisions the nation state to be governed. The move to ‘counter 
terrorism’ or ‘light footprint’, dictated by the presence of smaller clusters of special operation 
teams, use of drones and partnerships with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),127 
makes the SOF network not just a military presence reaffirmed by or underpinned by 
‘liberalism’ but an even more active socio-political and economic network organization. 
 
In this narrative of the network’s presence to facilitate state sovereignty through persistent 
presence, the policy of the SOF is a ‘building’ of or ‘towards’ the nation state which is a 
universal one i.e. the narrative of liberal values, democracy, rule of law in the 
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War on Terror advanced by the United States and its allies.128 By establishing its presence in 
different territories, the response network such as the Global SOF network is aimed at securing 
the political goals of one state, that is the United States. As we can see from this analysis, 
Network Warfare as adopted by the United States Special Operation Forces Network is not 
just about organizational innovation but is based on achieving the political goals of the United 
States under the guise of the ideological narrative of ‘advancing universal liberal values’ that 
is part of the War on Terror rhetoric. In this sense, then, the SOF network can be viewed in a 
similar vein as previous imperial networks discussed in this thesis, whose governance was 
based on an indirect rule, control and influence towards a specific socio-political and 
economic direction for the benefit of the network. 
 
IV. The violence of Network Warfare 
 
 
Given this analysis then, we can approach the violence of Special Operation Forces not just 
through operational acts and modes of violence such as drone attacks, targeted killings and 
renditions, but as a network organization which operates through a governance logic 
embedded in a new form of ‘nation building’ under the cover of counter terrorism and other 
‘national security’ concerns. Primarily, ‘light footprint’ concerns itself with what could be 
described as ‘direct actions’, i.e. its more kinetic acts of violence such as drone attacks, 
targeted killings and renditions, and ‘indirect actions’, i.e. information gathering, making 
strategic alliances with local actors and indirect influence in the name of filling ‘governance’ 
gaps on a local level.129 
Unlike previous forms of imperial network and their violence, my purpose here is not to 
highlight the existence of the violence per se, as in the case of the former there has been 
enough literature that does so from various angles, but showing exactly how the central 
elements that facilitates this violence remains a hidden due to territorially centred 
understandings of international law and ‘war’. This central element is, as I have shown in the 
previous chapters, the network’s interplay with international law itself which results in a 
colonial/imperial governance of a particular form. As I show in the following sections, 
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understanding the centrality of network and international law’s dialogical interplay, in case of 
both ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ actions of the Special Operation Forces, reveals the SOF network 
not as an anomaly to international law, but another iteration or illustration of how international 
law and networks operate in tandem. Further, how fixating on the operational aspects of the 
SOF only frustrates our attempts to understand its violence as it is assumed to be in 
contravention to international law’s static, territory-centered understanding. This only renders 
the effect of this interplay between networks and international law invisible, thereby also 
hiding the nature of violence of international law as colonial/imperial governance through 
networks. 
 




The most significant shift in the way ‘war’ is perceived within the context of GWOT is what 
has been recognized as the ‘light footprint’ approach to counterinsurgency.130 Persistent 
presence, small outposts, small teams of Special Operation Forces being coordinated through 
a technological infrastructure and organized by, most importantly, a network organizational 
structure. In this sense, it is important to note that the ‘technological’ networks enable and 
facilitate what is more important to the mode of operation for special forces, i.e. its social 
human networks.131 
What makes the SOF network different from a conventional military or even beyond the 
direct kinetic operations it is often associated with, i.e. kill/capture operations, drone strikes 
and renditions, is how a smaller presence is based on changing the ‘battlefield’ from the 
inside.132 As Major Lujan, in his report on ‘light footprint’, describes, more visible, kinetic 
operations such as raids and drones are ‘only the tip of the iceberg’.133 The indirect violence 
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nation’s forces, police and working with development actors as well as establishing trust 
with local actors,134 often the population for whom the ‘nation is being built’.135 
The light footprint approach which is utilized by the SOF network allows it to remain a 
network force with persistent presence and is considered a long-term strategy precisely 
because it works with local development, military and state actors from within the territories 
they occupy. This makes its ‘indirect’ approach a form of ‘counterinsurgency 
governmentality’ as a Khalili points out,136 as the focus is on changing the lives of people 
relying on the building of infrastructure and change in ‘rural/village life’.137 
The indirect approach to a presence in territories is informed by particular social 
constructions of the local population, with training based in the United States military bases, 
and universities such as the Joint Special Operation Forces University. Understood as building 
‘cultural intelligence’ for SOF to develop links with local actors, the university also in some 
cases staged fields attempting to replicate local conditions of a village in occupied territory,138 
which became a way of constructing knowledge on the locals. This indirect approach is 
described also as a ‘Human Terrain System’(HTS),139 particularly as it is recognized as a key 
component of counterinsurgency within the Department of Defense counterinsurgency field 
manuals.140 
In a JSOC University publication, Emily Spencer describes the importance of training 
Special Operation Forces in the ‘culture’ of different localities, especially state actors, to 
convince them of interlinking interests through which the interests of the United States can be 
met.141 Spencer, for example, notes the importance of cultural intelligence training as a way 
for SOF operators to use, understand and place values and beliefs of the local 
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population to secure their objectives i.e. of the national security interests of the United 
States.142 Training local state actors is part of this need for cultural intelligence so the SOF 
can provide ‘local solutions to global problems’,143 which also would result in the training of 
military forces and then the local police in accordance to the solutions presented by the SOF 
operators to ‘match the footprint of governance to the footprint of sovereignty’.144 
The indirect approach to counterinsurgency is, then, not unlike a form of indirect rule, 
where the SOF network is operating through and in tandem with the logic of sovereignty 
understood as only conditional on ‘governance’ as defined by a developmental logic. Building 
localities, populations and thus nation states to standards of ‘governance’ and ‘development’ 
become part of SOF Network Warfare’s persistent presence. Here infrastructure changes to 
local conditions, through advice and working with development actors, is part of Network 
Warfare. 
 
The transformation of the ‘village’, or Village Stability Operations (VSO), became a 
central point of SOF operation and violence – both direct and indirect.145 In terms of its 
indirect operations, the use of ‘cultural training’ and establishing trust was one side of VSOs 
which included working to modernise the village through developmental promises.146 Oliver 
Belcher argues that in VSOs in Kandahar and Helmand in 2010, as part of counterinsurgency 
operations against the Taliban, villages were completely or partially razed and then 
reconstructed in a way to facilitate indirect rule by the USSOF.147 These reconstructions of 
the villages are done following the ‘cultural intelligence’ constructions of the locality as 
understood by and for the facilitation of USSOF primarily along with intersecting actors such 
as the state, selected ‘tribal’ leaders and their armed community police – who become allies 
to the USSOF, as well as development actors.148 Using their vocabularies of describing 
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‘paternalistic lineage links’, which is often not the case, the USSOF reconstruction of villages 
leads to gendered, patriarchal enforcement of local men.149 
The social constructions of the village for the use of USSOF is also inherently a form of 
colonial governance in the same vein as counterinsurgency operations due to the 1950s and 
1960s decolonisation era.150 This is particularly why Khalili and Belcher refer to the indirect 
approach as based on ‘hearths and minds’,151 indicating the role that village households, 
through the SOF network’s presence, direction and reconfiguration, play in Network Warfare. 
Patricia Owens notes how the village household ‘becomes a site of indirect rule’ as it is here 
that ‘households are made into units for indirect and direct governance’ as 
counterinsurgencies socially administer the households by ‘withholding aid, repopulation, 
creation and re-creation of villages, tribal and sectarian militia, concentration camps for 
detention and re-education’.152 
 




Explaining the counter terrorism approach of the SOF network, Khalili153 and others  agree154 
how primarily three elements are present, often working with and dependant on each other, 
i.e. ‘technological through remote warfare’, Special Operation Forces and intelligence 
gathering. The relationship between the technological advancements and the organizational 
move to ‘light footprint’ is a synchronistic one. The elements of the ‘light footprint’ approach, 
i.e. human terrain system and cultural intelligence constructions, are how we can understand 
the more direct kinetic violence of the SOF network as part of its governance. Ultimately, it 
is through establishing a small presence through military bases155 and small outposts bringing 
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that the direct or kinetic forms of violence occur.156 Drone attacks are not just isolated, distant 
or remote cause and effect incidents – even if they are based on a drone operator sitting ‘far 
away’ pulling the trigger.157 They are inherently dependent upon the intelligence, data and 
meta-data gathered by a range of actors, including, most importantly, SOF on the ground.158 
Indirect forms of violence, which I have discussed above, or what Khalili describes as 
‘mechanisms of counter insurgency governmentality’, data collection, information gathering 
and the ability of the SOF to conduct drone strikes159 are part of the same loop, i.e. the 
synchronicity between knowledge formation, through social actors, and governance over a 
population.160 What is considered part of the human terrain system of the counterinsurgency 
manual facilitates in creating profiles and personalities based on both meta-data and human 
intelligence, informed mostly through ‘cultural knowledge’ of the population. Concerning 
drone strikes, ‘surgical’ strikes, as Arvidsson argues, are based on militant ‘characteristics’ 
through which their status as ‘military aged men’ is determined.161 These characteristics are 
coded through gendered constructions162 but are also reflective of broader ‘cultural 
knowledge’ of the population constructed as part of racialized othering of the ‘host’ country 
where Network Warfare is conducted. 
 
The ability of the SOF network to conduct raids, sometimes renditions/kidnappings, to 
detention centers, both within the territory and at the same time outside of it, is possible 
through its approach of being a network force. As Niva describes it, rather than a direct 
military force, the SOF unit’s small scale presence allows it to conduct what are described  as 
‘swarm’ tactics, where a convergence towards a possible location and/or target is fast and 
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outposts, termed lily pads, which facilitate the technological infrastructure, become the 
structure through which raids and targeted killing operations (kill/capture ops) are 
conducted.164 Khalili points out how the same constructions of ‘military aged men’, profiling 
of the population based on cultural constructions of troublesome ‘military aged men’, is used 
to detain them and then they are ‘re-educated’.165 ‘Tribal’ chiefs are given the responsibility 
to keep a check on those put in detention and then released conditionally on an assessment of 
the USSOF.166 As part of VSOs, villages also become the site of direct violence as they can 
be bombed or targeted for raids if they are considered to be places where ‘Taliban are based’ 
or where there is a possibility of a weapon cache for the Taliban – especially when houses are 





In this era of the dialogical interplay, I have returned to the initial question and problem posed 
in the thesis: how do we understand the nature and violence of Network Warfare by first 
understanding the relationship between networks and international law. Network Warfare and 
the way it is adopted by the US Special Operation Forces reflects a more expansive and 
persistent state of imperial influence than other focus on operational actions suggest. Whether 
it is a drone, targeted killing, rendition or questions on accountability, I argue that Network 
Warfare needs to be understood as a particular iteration of socio- political, economic network 
through which we see particular imperial governance. 
 
Through a physical networked presence in ideologically categorized ‘ungoverned’ 
territories throughout the globe, a consistent influence within the presence of the sovereign 
territories is maintained to achieve the political goals of the United States. In these territories, 
then, the SOF network decides that the gap of governance exists and the territory is classified 
as ungoverned. The SOF then determines a persistent presence is needed in order for the 
territory to reach a certain level of governance to match its political sovereignty. The way the 
USSOF categorizes territory based on ‘governance gaps’ reiterates 
164 
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logics of military liberalism which are tied to developmental thinking aligned to United 
States national security agendas. 
 
The violence of the SOF network is fundamental to its network nature as I have shown, 
and despite the focus on drones, kill/capture ops and detention, understanding the violence of 
Network Warfare is in how it operates as part of the historical continuity of interplay between 
networks and international law’s static, territory-centred understandings. It is, as I argue, a 
form of imperial governance relying on an indirect rule, like imperial state networks, expert 
networks and local networks of technocrats which I have discussed in the previous chapters. 
It also represents an accumulation of these forms of networks I have covered in this thesis, in 
that the SOF operators claim to build relationships with the ‘other’, whom they profile, create 
social constructions of, and ‘facilitate to modernise’ through the control over their everyday 
social, economic and political life. Discursively, the SOF network and the GWOT create, and 
at the same time are also based on, a religious otherization of ‘Islam’ far more than 
commercial, bureaucratic or expert networks – even though there were social constructions 
being made in all of these cases. The use of technological advancements in communication, 
data and meta-data also creates a commercial/state nexus present within the era of commercial 
networks. 
 
Through this reflection, we can understand the SOF network embodying variations of 
these different networks, while relying on particular understandings of sovereignty and 
territory to justify its expansion and presence in various territories. It is unique and ‘new’ in 
this sense, as through its reliance on technology, the social network of actors representing and 
acting for United States’ national security interests govern through ‘intimate’ close ways, and 
yet also operate at various levels of governance – with various actors (commercial, state, 
international), to further its interests. This level of coherence and fluidity in indirectly 




Chapter 8. Conclusion: networks, violence and resistance 
 
I. Framework as a contribution: the concept of dialogical interplay 
 
Addressing climate change, ensuring reliable and sustainable sources of energy, 
preventing and responding to pandemics, adequate food and clean water for an expanding 
population, enabling economic development, resolving cultural conflicts, addressing the 
threats posed by transnational terrorist networks, fighting corruption, ensuring the stability 
of the financial system and the integrity of the internet, protecting privacy, combating 
money laundering: people understand that such things cannot be solved by one city or one 






Scholars of global governance, science and technology studies and to a certain extent, 
sociology of international law have explored over the past two decades how legal norms 
materialize or are the result of the politics and power relations of social actors and institutions.2 
In this thesis I have approached a similar set of concerns drawing from the longer, colonial 
root of what we may understand as governance through a social web of actors and institutions 
and the international norms that are produced as a result of the governance. Throughout the 
history of international law, we see networks of actors benefiting from, deploying and 
expanding through international legal jurisprudence. Once we approach international law’s 
operation as a dialogical interplay between networks and international law, as I propose in 
this thesis, we see a production of an invisibility which hides the effects of the network’s 
actions. This thesis has shown how the effects of networks, which I have covered in this thesis 
as imperial networks, are inherently violent and remain salient, as a form of governance 
over human social, political, economic, spiritual and intellectual life. 
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This violence takes different forms but is ultimately and inherently imperial and has been part 
of the development, use and evolution of the international legal doctrine of territorial 
sovereignty. 
 
This thesis is a provocation to consider the operation of international law and networks as 
co-constitutive in nature, particularly through the doctrine of territorial sovereignty. More 
importantly, I show that by understanding this co-constitutive nature of international law or 
as I call it the dialogical interplay, we see how the violence of international law as 
colonial/imperial governance of human life gets hidden as part of the continuing adherence to 
a static territory-centered approach to international law. 
 
The forms of networks I have chosen are by no means exhaustive, and my suggestion is 
not to close off different ways in which we might understand how international law and 
networks may operate together. It is to show how they do work together in the first place and 
have throughout different iterations where we see the developments of certain networks in 
continuity as well as changes in history necessitating different juridical and social formations 
to work together. 
 
a. The historical interplay between networks and international legal 
jurisprudence 
 
In this thesis, I have put forward a particular sociology of knowledge production within 
international law which is historically informed and, critically conscious of its inherent 
imperialism, not merely anchored blindly to its descriptive promises. It opens up the 
opportunity to, for example, explore different genealogies of regimes and doctrines in relation 
to networks. I suggest that we must re-examine, then, how we understand various other forms 
of networks working through and with international legal doctrines – not only in the 
development of the doctrine, but also as a way to work for the benefit of the network. 
 
Here the focus on key historical moments was important to highlight a longer trajectory 
of the operation of international law and networks, a dialogical interplay, to understand the 
violence of international law which is rendered invisible. Thus, while key moments and key 
actors I have identified such as missionaries at a certain point in international legal history 
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have a part in the argument of this thesis, the chapter itself is not by any means the only way 
to understand the life of missionary networks and international law throughout history. In a 
similar vein, the Global SOF network is not a newly formed approach to govern nation states 
and the populations of these nation states. It is only another iteration in a series of networks 
which have had a role to play in the development, use and deploying of norms of territorial 
sovereignty. 
 
b. Critical possibilities: treaties, international organizations, 
transnational companies, private global actors 
 
 
Thus, the history of a dialogical interplay I present is only meant to illustrate how particular 
networks at certain temporal and spatial contexts worked in tandem with the international 
legal doctrine of territorial sovereignty. There can be various critical possibilities if we are to 
take international law’s operation as a dialogical interplay framework to understand the 
development, use and deployment of doctrines by and through networks. 
 
One set of critical possibility lies in the afterlives of networks I have identified but have 
not traced all through international legal history. For example, while in chapter 3, and partially 
in chapter 4, I have focused on the commercial/merchant network, the corporation as a 
network organization – particularly in its use of global supply chains of production3 – and 
international law’s interplay with it through its history is a rich space of further discussion 
where we can understand the limitations and facilitative role of corporate ‘liability’ and social 
responsibility. Another is my focus on international organizations as networks in chapter 5 – 
which can also lead to more critical reflections on contemporary or later regional 
organizations and their interaction/deployment of international legal doctrines. 
 
Another possibility of applying the dialogical interplay to understand networks and 
international law is in the overlapping ways in which multiple networks work together, and in 
the underlying politics of knowledge formation of international law which results from their 
interaction. The SOF network’s work with their multiple partners, including NATO, private 
corporations – notably arms and consumer oriented technology companies – and development 
actors, reflects this interlinking of networks that I have not fully explored in 
3 
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this thesis but is a rich ground for further analysis.4 For example, particularly concerning my 
point about intersecting interests of networks, taking the role of NATO as part of the GWOT 
security regime is another rich area of study to explore the violence of the dialogical interplay 
between networks and international law.5 
At the same time, there are possible forms of networks not focused on or highlighted as 
‘networks’ which can also be explored through their interaction/deployment and development 
with international legal doctrines. Some of which has been a focus of attention in some 
literature, such as a network of lawyers,6 but also some of which may be explored more – such 
as treaty making as creating a network of actors with overlapping interests. 
 
II. Decolonising the concept of violence: violence beyond ‘war’ and ‘peace’ 
 
a. Violence as embedded within international law’s operation 
 
 
In the previous chapter, my attention towards the Special Operation Forces Network is meant 
to reframe contemporary debates on how we understand the violence of what appears to be a 
deeply visible and contentious emergence of war. The visibility of drones, detention, raids and 
kill/capture operations all placed at the centre of conversations on SOF also make the broader, 
more salient undercurrent of violence as part of its nature as a network governing body 
invisible. While conversations on modern technology, artificial intelligence and a posthuman 
turn7 are all questioning the nature of international legal regimes utilized to understand 
something ‘new’, I have shown that social actors themselves and how they perceive the world 
in which they interact is the bedrock on which their relationship to ‘technologies’ rests – 
which in the case of international law needs to deal with its colonial/imperial roots of 
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understanding, interacting with and structuring the world. The violence of hi-tech drones, 
surveillance and artificial intelligence is part of the broader violence of colonial governance 
of human life.8 
The running thread of this thesis, apart from the governance through networks of actors, 
has been the violence perpetrated on people governed by the networks. The purpose of 
highlighting this violence as invisibilised, unchecked and unaccounted for was to unearth an 
operation of international law otherwise hidden through its orthodox frames. My focus in 
showing what knowledge is ‘shown’ and ‘legitimised’ within the orthodox development of 
international law i.e. sovereignty and the separation between war and peace was not just to 
demonstrate how these norms get legitimised as part of an imperial project of international 
law. It was also to, simultaneously, show what kind of violence is hidden by adhering to the 
knowledge of orthodox international law. 
 
This allows for a deconstruction of the concept of violence within international law. My 
framework provides a basis for imagining different modalities of violence in the historical and 
contemporary operation of international law as a dialogical interplay between networks and 
its doctrines. Through this framework, critical international lawyers can move beyond static 
territory-centred assumptions of the international legal order. Thus even scholars who focus 
on violence perpetrated by private military contractors,9 corporations10 and transnational 
criminal organizations11 imagine violence in their discussions within a static territory-centric 
view of the international legal order. The violence of international law’s interplay with 
networks, as I have described in this thesis, is a more salient, constantly 
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evolving hegemonic governance over those the network seeks to control and direct. 
Understood as colonial/imperial governance, the violence of networks is both intimate and 
everyday, as well as structurally reconfiguring how social, political and economic life is 
constructed on different local, rural, urban, state and international scales.12 The use of 
international legal doctrines, in this thesis territorial sovereignty, is itself shown as a juridical 
concept which imposes, allows and facilitates violence. This is so even when it evolves into 
‘anti-colonial’ or ‘self-determinist’ forms as its interlinking with nation state makes it an 
inherently extractive form of organizing the world.13 
 
b. Understanding ‘accountability’ through the dialogical interplay 
 
Thus, if understanding the violence of networks shows us how international law’s 
foundational concept is itself violent, we must also push for a critical inquiry into how 
‘regimes’ of international law, such as international humanitarian law, international criminal 
law, human rights and their doctrines, are themselves violent – even as they promise 
liberation, protection, accountability and/or justice.14 While critical international law scholars 
have explored these questions, given the particular intervention of my thesis on the 
 
12 
Here I am referring to ways in which networks of actors operate through, and within, scales of governance, 
such as local, state, international. One of the multiple threads of this thesis at certain points has been the 
reconfiguration of spatial, everyday life of those governed by networks, specifically in chapter 4, 5, 6 and 7 
– indirect rule and governance has focused on the construction of and continuous reconstruction of the village 
as a site for the utopias of international legal imaginations. While this is a point of analysis not within the 
remit of this thesis, understanding the violence of international law in this thesis can open up the possibility 
of exploring the ‘village’ as a site of international law in its history. In addition to this suggestion, a more 
recent excellent approach to the ‘everyday’ of international law particularly the reconstruction of spatial urban 
life is explored by Eslava in, Luis Eslava, Local Space, Global Life: The Everyday Operation of International 
Law and Development (CUP 2015). 
13 
Rose Parfitt, The Process of International Legal Reproduction: Inequality, Historiography, Resistance 
(CUP 2019). 
14 
See critical work within human rights, Makau Mutua, ‘Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of 
Human Rights’, (2001) 42 Harvard International Law Journal 201. Within international humanitarian law, 
Frédéric Mégret, ‘From “Savages” to “Unlawful Combatants”: A Postcolonial Look at International 
Humanitarian Law’s “Other”’ in Anne Orford (ed), International Law and its Others (CUP 2006); Chris af 
Jochnick and Roger Normand, ‘The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War’ (1994) 
Harvard International Law Journal 35. Within international criminal law, for example, Christine Schwöbel-
Patel, ‘The “Ideal” Victim of International Criminal Law’ (2018) 29(3) European Journal of International 
Law 703; Kamari Maxine Clarke, ‘Affective Justice: The Racialized Imaginaries of International Justice’ 
(2019) 42(2) Political and Legal Anthropology Review 244; Sara Kendall, ‘Critical Orientations: A Critique 
of International Criminal Court Practice’ in Christine Schwobel-Patel (eds), Critical Approaches to 
International Criminal Law: An Introduction (Routledge 2014); Tor Krever, ‘Dispensing Global Justice’ 
[2014] 85 New Left Review; Christian de Vos, Sara Kendall and Carstin Stahn (eds), Contested Justice: The 
Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (CUP 2015). 
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role of networks, my specific suggestion is for the possibility of exploring how networks of 
actors embed knowledge into these regimes and doctrines for their benefit. Following from 
this knowledge production and operation of and by networks, then how can we understand 
the interplay of the different regimes within international law and the networks of actors 
producing an invisibility, hiding the violence of their operation. 
 
Such a deconstruction of violence is meant to be decolonial, in the sense that it questions 
the Eurocentric perceptions of violence in international law as only being physical state 
violence and within the confines of international legal frameworks.15 By both theorizing and 
discussing the concept of violence as a material reality of those on whom it was and continues 
to be inflicted, my project decolonises the idea of violence in international law. Ultimately, 
what I am also proposing is for critical international law scholars to re-examine how they 
ought to consider violence as embedded within legal regimes through networks of actors.16 
Further, how this particular violence of networks is made invisible through the underlying 
epistemological assumptions making these international legal regimes ‘technical’ or apolitical 
and objective. 
 
This deconstruction of what is recognized as violence within the history of international 
law, both in past and present times, would give scholars within the field a new understanding 
of how and why regimes of international law themselves can be restrictive in understanding 
how violence is experienced both in the colony and post colony. Questions of accountability, 
then, in this case become less about using ‘regimes’ to hold law breakers accountable, 
especially when this relates to international crimes, humanitarian crimes and human rights 
contraventions, and more about how the violence is ‘experienced’. 
 
Thus, rather than trying to attribute ‘accountability’ through a framework created by an 
imperial production of knowledge through networks, we inform our understanding of 
‘accountability’ through the violence of networks and international law’s interplay. As soon 
as we shift the locus from a normative regime to social actors, the politics of legal knowledge 
production in the international legal order, we must also question ‘where’ and 
 
15 
See for example scholars writing on decoloniality, particularly, Anibal Quijano, ‘Coloniality of Power, 
Eurocentrism, and Latin America (English Translation)’ (2000) 15(2) International Sociology 215;  Achille 
Mbembe, ‘Necropolitics’ (Duke University Press 2019); Walter D Mignolo, ‘Epistemic Disobedience, 
Independent Thought and Decolonial Freedom’ (2009) 26(7-8) Theory, Culture & Society 159; Boaventura 
de Sousa Santos, Epistemologies of the South: Justice against epistimicide (Routledge 2015). 
16 
On how legal regimes themselves legitimise violence, see Mégret (n 14); Jochnick and Normand (n 14). 
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‘how’ we understand ‘legal knowledge’ and the colonial encounter17 between imperial 
networks of actors and their ‘others’. 
 
III. Work beyond critique: resistance networks and knowledge production 
 
a. Decolonial methodology and alternate epistemologies 
 
In exploring this juridical encounter, within the context of my thesis, what we are then 
focusing on is a sociology of knowledge production. Here conversations around what is 
considered international legal knowledge take far greater significance. Thus, scrutinizing the 
place of epistemological roots and effects of international legal knowledge with classically 
Eurocentric characteristics of imperial networks, such as modernity and/or the legal structures 
of the state, in building knowledge on resistance needs to be considered. In thinking beyond 
the critique of networks in international law, we also need to think more substantively about 
the alternate epistemological basis of ‘international legal knowledge’. In this regard, I am in 
broad agreement with de Sousa Santos’ critique of anti-colonial resistance within frameworks 
of modernity as having limited emancipatory potential. For example, thinking through de 
Sousa Santos’18 critique of the current ontological basis of legal thinking is a more useful way 
of looking at a resistance through networks of communities which move beyond the ‘wrecked 
emancipatory promises of modernity’.19 Instead, we need to explore the possibility of 
emancipation in plural epistemological frameworks of ideas other than ‘progress’, and 
‘growth’.20 
At the same time, the turn to epistemological plurality also cannot be the totalizing 
narrative in our attempt to ‘decolonise’ international legal knowledge. If anything, this thesis 
cautions against a polarized or binarized view of global order into the imagination of 
colonial/colonized/anti-colonial through the north/south, European/non-European, 
Western/non-Western divide. As I explore particularly in chapter 4, even before colonial 
 
17 
Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Laws of Encounter: A Jurisdictional Account of International Law’(2013) 1(1) London 
Review of International Law 63. 
18 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and Emancipation, 
(CUP 2002) 
19 
ibid 16.  
20 
Here I refer to the turn in developmental thinking to ‘degrowth’ as a resistance to dominant forms of 
developmental thinking. See for example, Arturo Escobar, ‘Degrowth, Postdevelopment, and Transitions: A 
Preliminary Conversation’(2015) 10(3) Sustainability Science 451.  
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modernity associated with the nation state’s developmental programmes, the imperial British 
administrators worked in cooperation with existing hierarchical structures rooted in the social 
category of caste within the subcontinent. ‘Alternate’ forms of knowledge, from what would 
be considered part of this polarized binary of colonial and anti-colonial as being western/non-
western, do not automatically equate to a ‘decolonial’ form of knowledge which can use its 
separation from the ‘non-western’ as an escape from scrutiny over questions of violence, 
coloniality and universalisation. 
 
This is particularly why the conceptualization of violence of networks in this thesis 
focuses on a fluid understanding of violence as part of, what Quijano has called, a ‘colonial 
matrix of power’.21 My emphasis of understanding violence as experienced by people – who 
are governed by networks – is also a call for methodological intervention into how we explore 
plural epistemologies of international legal knowledge. Here I am referring to not just what 
we can understand as sources of a history of international law,22 but lived, experiential and 
community knowledge in various forms – oral knowledge, stories – or generally what would 
be considered non-juridical forms or even approximations of juridical form.23 
Here it is also important to question the process through which forms of knowledge are 
considered ‘juridical’ within international legal imagination, as I explore in chapter 4 the 
construction of ‘cultural knowledge’ useful to creating an indirect rule was ‘juridified’ as the 
closest approximation to legal, ‘civilized’ form.24 What was important in this instance was the 
interesting interests of a network of actors which facilitated the juridication of certain 
 
21 
Quijano (n 15). 
22 
Rose Parfitt, ‘The Spectre of Sources’ (2014) 25(1) European Journal of International Law 297; Matilda 
Arvidsson and Miriam Bak McKenna, ‘The Turn to History in International Law and the Sources Doctrine: 
Critical Approaches and Methodological Imaginaries’(2020) 33(1) Leiden Journal of International Law 37. 
23 
For scholars who have pushed for this methodological shift in relation to race, see for example, James 
Thuo Gathii, ‘Writing Race and Identity in a Global Context: What CRT and TWAIL Can Learn From Each 
Other’ [2020] 67 University of California Los Angeles Law Review; Jeanne M Woods, ‘Theoretical Insights 
at the Margins of International Law: TWAIL and CRT’ [2012] American Society of International Law 
Proceedings of the Annual Meeting 389-398; Makau Mutua, ‘Critical Race Theory and International Law: 
The View of an Critical Race Theory and International Law: The View of an Insider-Outsider Insider-
Outsider’ (2000) 45 Villanova Law Review 841. For scholars who broadly push for this in research 
methodologies generally see for example, Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies (Zed Books 
1999); Achille Mbembe, ‘Decolonizing Knowledge and the Question of the Archive’ [2015] Wits Institute 
for Social and Economic Research (WISER) 
<https://wiser.wits.ac.za/sites/default/files/private/Achille%20Mbembe%20%20Decolonizing%20Knowled
ge%20and%20the%20Question%20of%20the%20Archive.pdf> accessed June 2020. 
24
Balmurli Natrajan and Radhika Parameswaran, ‘Contesting the Politics of Ethnography: Towards an 
Alternative Knowledge Production’ (1997) 21(2) Journal of Communication Inquiry 27. 
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knowledge as true to the ‘natives’, which was a re-inscription of a socio-political and 
economic hierarchy of caste.25 
What I am suggesting is that this thesis shows that the question of international legal order 
as imperial is not simply a binary of western/non-western as colonizer/colonized, but as a 
more complicated story of how international law’s universalised nature also inscribed racial, 
gendered, and other forms of exclusions. Interactions with the colonized were not simply a 
story of domination but of, often, cooperation, intersecting interests, resistance, assimilation 
and negotiation. 
 
Thus even though we must contend with the ‘secularised theological’26 nature of 
international law,27 the projection/construction of western white man as ‘human’ after the 
colonization of New Indies,28 construction of ‘religion’,29 and even the ecclesial genesis of 
networks and international law’s interplay with networks, a turn to some ‘alternate’ form of 
knowledge needs to be understood in accordance to its location, proximity and interaction 
with power. One particular example to illustrate this point is European encounters with 
‘Islam’, some of which also feature throughout the thesis. 
 
Since the ecclesial genesis of the dialogical interplay, the place and role of Muslim 
communities have been different depending on various locations of power within which the 
encounter between European imperial powers and ‘Islam’ has happened. In every case there 
are constructions of ‘Islam’ encoded which have been dependent on the imperial network and 
the overall social, political, economic goals of the network. The reaction from different 
Muslim communities, empires and states is heterogeneous ranging from resistance to 





Peter Fitzpatrick, ‘“What Are the Gods to Us Now?”: Secular Theology and the Modernity of Law’.(2006) 
8(1) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 161. 
27 
Mark W Janis and Carolyn Evans (eds), Religion and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
1999). 
28 
Sylvia Wynter, ‘Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, after 
Man, Its Overrepresentation - An Argument’ (2003) 3(3) CR: the new centennial review 257. 
29 
Nelson Maldonado-Torres, ‘AAR Centennial Roundtable: Religion, Conquest, and Race in the 
Foundations of the Modern/ Colonial World’ (2014) 82 Journal of the American Academy of Religion 636 
30 
The imagination of ‘Islam’ within a dialogical interplay between networks and international law was seen 
first in the missionary networks of the Holy Roman Church as I have explored in the second chapter, through 
Spanish perceptions of the ‘moors’ and ‘black Muslims’ brought in as slaves in the New Indies. This could 
also be seen throughout the interaction of the European colonial encounter with different Muslim 
communities, in  the Java Islands (chapter 3), in the subcontinent (chapter 4), in northern Nigeria and 
Ottoman Empire (chapter5), and during decolonisation in both colonies fighting for self-determination, 
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A search for plural epistemologies needs to consider, then, the locations of power within 
which international legal knowledge is responded to rather than some homogenous ‘non-
western’ decolonial ‘way of knowing’.31 
 
b. Towards a decolonial study of resistance networks 
 
 
This does not, however, mean that my claim about networks is that they are ontologically 
determined to be only imperial. As I have explored briefly in chapter 6, during the 
decolonisation period alternate forms of resisting a global legal order dominated by the victors 
of World War II were being imagined. Within this alternate global legal order, questions 
around expertise and networks were instrumental – if not explicitly, yet implicit in the form 
they took in their international organizing for resistance.32 
I have explored this particular incident as one of organizing through networks as part of a 
resistance to the/a hegemonic international global order not only as it is important to the 
narrative of expert networks during this period, but also, particularly, to highlight what we 
can learn from the lack of lasting impact of this particular moment in international resistance.33 
I see my critique and formulation of networks as an imperial mode of governance in the 
making of international legal norms as one that informs studies about ‘emancipatory’ or 
‘resistance’ forms of networks. To then write critically and responsibly about resistance 
networks, we need to be aware of what can make a network inherently imperial and violent – 
and how imperial modes of networks operate. This is at its core a deviation from what is 
inherently considered a form of resistance or political potential, such as John Braithwaite, 






such as Algeria, and the global Islamic socialist movements (chapter 6). 
31 
An excellent recent study considering the location of power, encounter and reaction to international legal 
order and local contextual understandings of Islam by ‘Muslim communities’ is Darryl Li, The Universal 
Enemy: Jihad, Empire, and the Challenge of Solidarity (Stanford University Press 2019). 
32  
I am referring here specifically to the NIEO movement and the Bandung Conference. See for example, Luis 
Eslava, Michael Fakhri and Vasuki Nesiah (eds), Bandung, Global History, and International Law: Critical 
Pasts and Pending Futures (CUP 2017) ; Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, 
Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality (CUP 2011); Umut Özsu, ‘“In the Interests  of  Mankind  
as  a  Whole”:  Mohammed  Bedjaoui's  New  International  Economic  Order’ (2015) 6 (1) Humanity: An 
International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development 129. 
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participatory politics.34 My claim has consistently been to show how networks have 
historically been an imperial mode of power; however, this does not mean they cannot also 
be forms of resistance. 
 
While the scope of de/anti-colonial resistance lies outside the scope and beyond the 
purpose of this thesis, what I do suggest in this thesis is that the interplay between networks 
and international law throughout history has not been a simple one – but involves intersection 
with and across various interests, sometimes also direct violence against resistance networks. 
Violence understood as coloniality and governance over human life itself is by its nature 
repression against any plurality in intellectual, social and political life. I have indicated a 
possibility of resistance to various networks throughout this thesis, such as fear of black 
Muslim slave resistance by the Spanish Empire in chapter 2, resistance against Dutch 
commercial empire by Muslim communities in the Java islands, direct and indirect violence 
particularly in chapter 4, Dalit resistance against both British and native elite case networks, 
and the reiteration of violence against different anti-colonial and decolonial movements 
through the 20th Century. 
Nonetheless, the breadth of knowledge we can gain from anti-colonial and decolonial 
networks throughout history is not yet given the attention that it should be to learn about 
resistance more critically. These studies, however, need to move beyond ‘critical’ 
international law’s limitations and methodological conversations – which this thesis has also 
not moved away from despite focusing on the task of decolonising international law. 
However, this thesis does indicate, through the study of international law’s interplay with 
networks resulting in colonial/imperial governance as violence, how our study of ‘resistance 
networks’ must consider colonial/imperial violence. Any study of resistance networks where 
we are not considering if the ‘resistance network’ itself has a ‘universalising’ nature and is 
itself exhibiting colonial/imperial violence, directly or indirectly, would be an incomplete 
attempt empty of critical attention towards the question of violence as coloniality. Here 
‘writing resistance’35 into international law is not about simply adopting a ‘non-elitist’, ‘civil 
society’ approach to resistance uncritically.36 It means to be wary of either a top-down 
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John Braithwaite, Hillary Charlesworth, Aderito Soares,  Networked Governance of Freedom and 
Tyranny: Peace  in Timor-Leste (ANU E Press 2012). 
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Ruth Buchanan, ‘Writing Resistance into International Law’ (2008) 10(4) International Community Law 
Review 445. 
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Balakrishnan Rajagopal, ‘Counter-Hegemonic International Law: Rethinking Human Rights and 
Development as a Third World Strategy’ (2007) 27 Third World Quarterly 767. 
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reformation or a bottom-up resistance based on locations of power where the different actors 
are speaking from, and if they are reiterating forms of violence which are inherently colonial. 
 
IV. Concluding remarks 
 
By presenting a complicated story of international law, especially in relation to how networks 
and international operate in tandem, and how we can see multiple forms of colonialism 
developing – particularly a native elite economic and political class – I am not dooming 
international law of its possibilities beyond imperialism. If anything, by focusing on the 
violence of international law as one of colonial governance, which is totalizing, salient and 
controlling the everyday as well as the structure of human life, I am also opening up the ‘field’ 
in which international legal imagination operates. 
 
This opening of a ‘field’ within which international law operates, both analytical and 
material, also opens us up to other counter-hegemonic encounters, dialogues, forms of 
resistance and sources within which we may derive prefigurative parallel lives of international 
legal order. Knowledge production is, in this instance, situated in more than just ‘technical’ 
legal fields of international regimes. In a sense, research and teaching of international law, by 
researchers and academics, becomes yet another site for imaginations of the ‘field’ in which 
international law exists. Even if these are limited to academic circles,37 the role of critical 
legal education becomes central to pushing the boundaries of international law.38 
Thus, in remembering this particular facet of readjusting our view of the ‘field’ where 
international law happens, we are then also faced with the question of how we bring these 
counter-hegemonic encounters in the ‘field’ to the forefront – ethically, cautiously and 
 
37 
Rajkovic et al note, however, that even academics form part of the sociology of knowledge production 
within the international legal order. Nikolas M Rajkovic, Tanja E Aalberts and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, 
‘Introduction: Legality, Interdisciplinarity and the Study of Practices’ in Nikolas Rajkovic, Tanya Aalberts 
and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen (eds), The Power of Legality: Practices of International Law and their 
Politics (CUP 2016). See also, Gleider Hernández, ‘The Responsibility of the International Legal Academic: 
Situating the Grammarian within the “Invisible College” in Jean d’Aspremont, Tarcisio Gazzini, Andre 
Nollkaemper and Wouter Werner (eds), International Law as a Profession (CUP 2017). 
38 
There is at the same time an important discussion on the politics of international legal education 
specifically on what is considered ‘international law’ and if it is truly ‘international’, see for this, Anthea 
Roberts, Is International Law International? (OUP 2017). 
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carefully. Here, attention to the substantive reflection on ethics of the ‘jurisprudent’s office’39 
is as important as the ‘doing’/acting and connecting with communities on whom  the violence 
is perpetrated – even if they are not the subject of our research. The importance of 
understanding how the violence of international law operates at the most material ground level 
requires us to also reflect on the separation of academia from the material.40 Praxis, here, is 
about ‘getting down and dirty’ with international law,41 but also about sociological positioning 
of the research/teacher within the local, state and international concerning those they write 
and teach about. 
 
While understanding the ‘field’ in which international law happens must be reflected in 
the research/teaching, the position of the researcher/teacher must also be part of the 
conversation. Thus our engagements with the ‘field’ of international law can just as well be 
about ‘standing rock’, to Black Lives Matter, to peasant dalit resistance in Sindh, Pakistan. At 
the same time these fields in which international law operates need to be attentive to the 
location of power from which they are speaking/writing and researching. This reflection is 
more than just about substantive research. It requires us to be, what Allama Iqbal has called, 
the scholar who stays connected to the everyday struggles of people and continuously fights 
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